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Abstract 
In recent years, scientists and science popularisers alike have seen profound consequences for our 
view of ourselves and the organisation of society in new findings about the functioning of the 
human brain. Prominent in the debate surrounding these claims is the question of free will, i.e. 
whether or not humans are able to choose and act freely in a certain fundamental sense thought 
required for our practice of holding ourselves free and responsible for our actions, both morally and 
legally. One common position, as taken by, e.g. Sam Harris (populariser) and Daniel Wegner 
(scientist), holds that free will of this kind is unsupportable in the face of empirical evidence – i.a. 
evidence from neuroscience about the way consciousness lags behind unconscious neural processes – 
and that we therefore need to revise our views and practices in light of these scientific facts.  
In this thesis, I argue that what might be termed the “revisionist” position is predicated not only on 
empirical evidence, but is essentially motivated by a belief in the fundamental incompatibility of free 
will with any reasonable (meta-) physics. In Part 1 I investigate the fundamental philosophical 
debate and find that the question of the possibility of free will is unresolved, thus challenging any 
simple appeal to the impossibility of free will such as that made by Harris in his short book on the 
subject, Free Will (2012). I also provide independent reason for upholding a broadly commonsense 
belief in free will by highlighting the sceptical nature of the challenge from determinism, which can 
be overcome with the help of P.F. Strawson’s “soft naturalism”-appeal to our self-justified reactive 
attitudes. In Part 2 I investigate the empirical evidence adduced as support for the revisionist 
position, focused through the well-developed argument presented by Wegner in his Illusion of 
Conscious Will (2002). Here I argue that the revisionist interpretation of the data loses out to a 
traditional interpretation that is realist about conscious causal eﬃcacy when the former is divested 
of its untenable appeal to incompatibilism. 
I conclude that neuroscience has not settled the question of free will, and, furthermore, that the 
current state of the two debates – the theoretical and the empirical – supports a continued belief in 
free will of a kind that fits with our practice of generally believing ourselves free in our choices, and 
responsible for our actions. 
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1 Introduction 
Reading some of the more popular accounts of research on the evolutionary history, psychological 
mechanisms, and physical substrates of the mind, one can easily get the impression that the results 
are mostly bad news for our traditional conception of our thoughts, our emotions, our actions and 
ourselves. Scientists-authors such as E.O. Wilson, Richard Dawkins, Robert Wright, Sam Harris, 
Jonathan Haidt and Daniel Wegner exemplify what might be considered a scientifically founded 
call to fundamental reform – be it of our mind-set, the judicial system, or society in general. 
Limiting the scope to neuroscience-informed critiques of common sense and traditional ideas, two 
of the more prominent voices in recent years belong to the popular science writer (and polemic) 
Sam Harris and the psychologist Daniel Wegner.  
The puppet master cover for Sam Harris’ book Free Will (2012), opens up to a short but definite 
rejection of all talk about anything like free will, the ability to do otherwise, and any notion of 
responsibility that depends on these, importantly inspired by experiments like those of Benjamin 
Libet and others that appear to show that conscious choice comes too late to be the cause of action. 
This, purportedly, ends the age-old debate about the paradoxical facts that seem to underlie our 
existence as choosing individuals in a determined world, namely the apparent impossibility of any 
kind of “free will” in a world where every event is determined by the unyielding laws of physics and 
events long in the past. 
Not quite satisfied with the simple rejection of free will as obviously impossible (the idea of free will 
has historically proved itself recalcitrant to such attacks), Daniel Wegner sets out for a long haul in 
his book The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002), drawing on myriad anecdotal and empirical evidence 
to show why this feeling of being in control is so hard to shake. With a drawing of a mechanical 
doll on its cover, ICW argues that our experience of willing things or being free is nothing more 
than that, an experience, and does not tell us the truth about what is going on: The experience of 
conscious will is an illusion generated alongside our actions by whatever neural mechanisms are the 
true causal springs of behaviour. 
  C 
 
On the one hand, you could consider this business as usual. Science is appearing in its accustomed 
role as purveyor of objective fact, exposing the faults and fallacies of pre-scientific speculation for 
the good of knowledge and the advancement of humanity – this time around, taking on what we 
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thought we knew about ourselves as acting agents with freedom of choice and responsibility to 
match. On the other hand, few other topics of research engenders such controversy as this, and for 
good reason: neuroscience and its cognates are here butting up against a vast amount of everyday 
experience and common sense, often elucidated in exceedingly intricate philosophical debates going 
back thousands of years. 
Both Harris’ and Wegner’s books are concerned with roughly the same topic, namely the apparently 
poor fit between existing popular ideas about ethics, especially in terms of choice and responsibility, 
and what science seems to show us about the limited role of consciousness and the physical nature 
of our brains. This reminds us that it is not Homo sapiens as such that makes for controversial science 
(I doubt anyone would be oﬀended by the elucidation of the precise mechanisms of cancer 
metastasis), but rather studies of the roots of our meaningful experience, be it consciousness, 
rationality, emotions, morality or value. Perhaps one could say that the friction comes from 
objective science stepping onto the home turf of subjectivity. A doctor explaining that the pain in 
my stomach is due to a bacterial infection is, from my perspective, doing something quite diﬀerent 
from a neuroscientist telling me that the same pain is just activation of the parieto-insular and 
anterior cingulate cortices of my brain; even though from a scientific point of view the one could be 
seen (merely) as an extension of the other. Thus, experiments using advanced imaging techniques, 
ever more precise knowledge about the functional anatomy of the central nervous system, and the 
ability to elicit or modify behaviour by psychological and/or direct physical manipulations that can 
bypass conscious control, have all stirred up significant debate about the veracity of subjective 
experience itself. These books claim that we are importantly wrong about things that up until now 
have seemed perfectly and obviously true, and they do so with the help of, i.a. neuroscience. 
Concomitant with making the human mind a subject of scientific study there is also a drive to 
describe the phenomena studied in terms compatible with existing scientific language, an endeavour 
which in this case often amounts to “naturalising folk psychology”, i.e. redefining the terms in 
which humans usually talk of other humans' thoughts and actions in terms more amenable to the 
kind of precision demanded by science. Failing such redefinition, there has been a tendency to claim 
that the original terms do not track reality as described by science, and, giving preference to science, 
to conclude that folk psychology presents a false image of the world. This is what has engendered 
most controversy in the current case, since the terms proposed to be redefined or thrown out by 
advancing science are ones that people care a great deal about, and sometimes terms on which rests 
much established ethical theory and legal practice. 
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Radical as it may be, proponents of a science-based revision of ethical concepts and practice usually 
hold this to be a change for the better, aiming as it does to increase the precision of ethical discourse 
(and by extension, legal) by making sure that one only utilizes terms that have a grounding in 
natural fact. Just as we should use our most precise mathematical equations and knowledge of 
physics when launching astronauts into space, our moral language should be as precise and well-
grounded as possible to avoid mistakes and bad decisions. If it turns out that concepts like “free 
will” and “conscious control” are poor guides to understanding and judging human action, we 
should stop using them altogether, substituting instead terms that track real phenomena in the 
physical world. As already noted, this aim of science and its interpreters not only puts them at odds 
with commonsense ideas and folk psychological terms – there is also the matter of ethical theory, 
the philosophy of which has historical roots as far back as written history permits us to look. 
While no matter on which new generations will bother to pronounce can be immunized against 
sweeping statements by the mere existence of previous debate, there seems to be a particular 
willingness on the part of some scientists to say controversial things about human experience based 
rather simple laboratory experiments. However, many of the peer-reviewed articles on which the 
above mentioned popularisations are based are far more moderate in the claims they make for the 
import of their results, so much so that the most striking claims of these books seem more like 
hyperbole than necessary conclusions to an argument. Furthermore, being a debate, there are strong 
dissenting voices, even if they are not as widely read or easily spotted. There are both scientists and 
philosophers who disagree with conclusions like those mentioned above, mainly either by attacking 
the argumentation itself as more or less unsupported by the evidence adduced, or by granting the 
truth of the conclusions in principle, but denying that it has the kind of consequences for traditional 
thinking that the polemics claim it has. 
In this thesis, I will approach the matter of whether neuroscience has settled the question of free 
will by a two-step analysis, dealing first with the fundamental philosophical debate concerning free 
will and determinism – a debate both Wegner and Harris appear to regard as settled to the 
disadvantage of free will – before moving on to evaluating the empirical evidence brought forth to 
argue against free will, centred on Wegner’s argument about the illusory nature of our experience of 
conscious will. Following the lines of the analysis, my argument will also be two-fold, establishing 
first a theoretical basis for the possibility of free will, before moving on to argue that the empirical 
evidence, by supporting the causal eﬃcacy of consciousness, likewise can be taken to bear out a 
substantial notion of free will. 
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Part 1 
Neuroscience and the philosophical debate concerning free 
will and determinism 
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2 Neuroscience, Free Will and Determinism 
“All theory is against free will; all experience for it.” Samuel Johnson (1709-1784)1 
“If the scientific community were to declare free will an illusion, it would precipitate a culture war 
far more belligerent than the one that has been waged on the subject of evolution” Sam Harris 
(2012, p. 1)2 
2.1 The Limits of Neuroscience 
As noted in the introduction, the popular science literature is awash with bold claims about how 
new science is exposing the falsehoods and illusions to which, supposedly, our traditional thinking 
about morality and freedom is prey. However, at the heart many of these “challenges to common 
sense” lie philosophical conundrums that have never been, and arguably never can be, subject to the 
kind of empirical testing which is the province of scientific research. Identifying these foundational 
issues and their place in the contemporary, science-informed “revisionist” project is an important 
step in the evaluation of these challenges. 
One of the philosophical conundrums forming the background for an important part of the 
literature on neuroscience and morality is the diﬃculty of fitting human freedom into a coherent 
metaphysical worldview. The discussion surrounding this is complex and known under diﬀerent 
names, but I will be referring to it here as “the debate concerning free will and determinism”. 
What is this debate – why is there a problem with fitting free will into our view of the world? It is 
today widely accepted among both philosophers and scientists that the world and all its inhabitants 
exist within the same, unified “framework”; that we are all part of the same nature, to put it 
prosaically. The trouble with this is that what we know of the mechanisms of physical nature 
appears to leave no room for the kind of freedom so obvious in our everyday experience as acting 
subjects, as “agents”. Nature’s building blocks are governed by laws, and unless something as yet 
inexplicable happens when those blocks build up humans, we too are ultimately governed by the 
same laws. If the world is deterministic, these laws govern change in such a way that two identical 
starting positions will always develop in the same manner. In virtue of this, they seem to undermine 
the freedom we believe to be in possession of when we think that we could have done otherwise in 
1(Boswell [1791] 2012). 
2 Also, a note on footnotes: There will be some of them throughout the thesis, but they are never essential to 
understanding the main argument, and can therefore be ignored. I have tried to keep their numbers to a minimum, but 
in places where I anticipate objections that are only somewhat related to the argument, and in places where I wish to 
point out interesting or important aspects of what I am discussing that is only tangentially relevant, I have allowed 
myself the luxury of writing compact little notes with questionable clarity to point the reader in various directions of 
interest. 
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the past, and that our choices in the present are real; that the future is yet to be decided. For, given 
that the world was a certain way at some time in the distant past, there appears to be but a single 
way for the world to be today, so also for tomorrow and all foreseeable future. It appears that this is 
a world where everything is laid out already. If, on the other hand, the world is indeterministic – i.e. 
not deterministic – it is either governed by laws that are probabilistic, or is also partly or completely 
lawless. But probabilistic laws appear to be no more amenable to our freedom than fully 
deterministic ones, in that they only introduce an element of chance to the proceedings over which 
it is diﬃcult to see that we could have any control. Indeed, some argue that probabilistic laws would 
make us less free, since the only diﬀerence from strict determinism would be the chance that our 
choices would sometimes fail to reflect the deliberation preceding them, or our actions fail to reflect 
our choices. A partly or wholly lawless universe is an intriguing possibility, but advocates of such a 
solution will find similar diﬃculty in explaining the connection between the reasons we have for 
acting as we do and the unprecedented, uncaused, undetermined actions themselves (in this way it 
could be said to present a conceptual threat to rationality). Whatever your attitude to the question: 
theory does indeed seem to contradict experience in this case. 
While Johnson’s exasperated exclamation perfectly captures the paradox that by then had already 
troubled thinkers for millennia, Sam Harris appears to be suggesting that now, some 270 years later; 
science can finally decide the issue. 
2.1.1 Harris’ Trident 
Is science in a position to decide the question of free will? That depends. It depends first and 
foremost on what is meant by “free will”, and this in turn depends on the overall project of the 
person setting out to answer the question. In his short book on the subject, Free Will (2012), Sam 
Harris starts with the following: 
The popular conception of free will seems to rest on two assumptions: (1) that each of us could 
have behaved diﬀerently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are the conscious source of most 
of our thoughts and actions in the present. As we are about to see, however, both of these 
assumptions are false. (2012, p. 6) 
The two assumptions appear to be independent, with (1) seeming like a classic target for 
determinism, and (2), something to which neuroscience might speak. Harris, however, eﬀectively 
treats them as a single unit, and argues from three sources of support to the conclusion that free will 
is nonsense. He takes “free will” to be a) incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, 
b) refuted by neuroscience, and c) not even supported by our own subjective experience (Harris, pp. 
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5-6). Because the three strains of his argument are so tightly interwoven, it is diﬃcult to say when 
he is appealing to what. Indeed, I think it reasonable to say that he regularly appeals to all three, 
with each part-claim simultaneously giving support and being supported by the others. Thus, in the 
opening chapter of his book, the three elements (a), (b), and (c) come together as Harris writes: 
Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own making. Thoughts and intentions 
emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious 
control. (Harris 2012, p. 5, emphasis in original) (b) 
Free will is actually more than an illusion (or less), in that it cannot be made conceptually coherent. 
Either our wills are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are 
the product of chance and we are not responsible for them. (2012, p. 5) (a) 
But the deeper truth is that free will doesn’t even correspond to any subjective fact about us–and 
introspection soon proves as hostile to the idea as the laws of physics are. Seeming acts of volition 
merely arise spontaneously (whether caused, uncaused, or probabilistically inclined, it makes no 
diﬀerence) and cannot be traced to a point of origin in our conscious minds. A moment or two of 
serious self-scrutiny, and you might observe that you no more decide the next thought you think 
than the next thought I write. (2012, p. 6) (c) 
The problem with this way of combining seemingly hedged conclusions is that it obscures the fact 
that Harris’ entire conception of the issue is constrained by his holding all three claims to be 
undeniably true. When Harris in c) claims that introspection alone – what has usually served as the 
strongest ally of the idea of free will – can reveal to us the falseness of that belief, he appears to be 
stating a self-evident fact, but is actually presenting a zero-option scenario defined by his implicit 
and unfounded claim that free will necessarily entails being something like the conscious ultimate 
cause of oneself, and that this is an impossible requirement. It might very well be an impossible 
requirement, but Harris presents no real argument for this, nor for why we should think free will 
would require something like being the conscious cause of oneself. Which is not to say that no such 
argument is possible; Galen Strawson3 is responsible for one of the best-known versions of the 
argument that free will is impossible because it would entail you having to be the cause of yourself 
(“causa sui”), an entailment that arguably leads to a vicious infinite regress of “you” causing “you” 
(the “Basic Argument”, Strawson 2010). Indeed, Harris implicitly acknowledges the source of this 
argument by thanking Strawson for his input, but while Strawson’s argument is influential, it is by 
3 Famous philosopher in his own right, Galen Strawson is also the son of P.F. Strawson, to whom we will turn in 
Chapter 5. 
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no means universally accepted, and so Harris is making a substantial assumption that he neither 
properly acknowledges nor defends in relation to the wider field of the debate concerning free will. 
Harris’ claim about introspection is insuﬃciently substantiated to stand on its own, and can 
therefore arguably only be understood in relation to his position on the two other issues, namely the 
claim that neuroscience has shown consciousness to lag behind the actual causes of thoughts and 
behaviour – causes which he thinks are to be found in non-conscious neural processes –, and the 
theoretical position that free will is incompatible with what we know of the world being 
deterministic or partially indeterministic. His argument seems to be the following: Experience tells 
us that we are not the conscious source of our thoughts and choices (they merely appear to us), 
neuroscience tells us that those thoughts and choices arise from unconscious neural processes, and 
philosophy/physics tells us that these (unconscious) antecedent causes determine our present 
thoughts and choices. In the other direction: philosophy/physics tells us that we are determined by 
antecedent causes, neuroscience tells us that these antecedent causes are unconscious neural 
processes, and experience shows us that thoughts and choices arise out of nothingness into 
consciousness. 
This structure of mutual support completely glosses over the multitude of assumptions that are 
made in the each interpretation of concept, evidence and experience. Just as Harris’ claim about 
subjective experience is otherwise unexplained and unfounded, his interpretation of evidence from 
neuroscience is only one of several possible, and, as I shall argue in Part 2 of this thesis, barring his 
(foregone) conclusions about (meta-) physics and experience, it is not even a plausible one. Finally, 
although he to some extent makes explicit his stance on the question of free will and determinism in 
relation to other possible positions (Harris 2012, pp. 27ﬀ), his stance is still no more than that; a 
stance, and he fails to tackle the substantial problems associated with it – problems to be examined 
here in Part 1. 
The three prongs of Harris’ argument only work (in unison) if his handle on the debate is granted. 
While I will have little to say about his personal experience, I will argue that his trident falls apart 
when the theoretical and empirical claims are investigated on their independent merits. 
2.1.2 Making Distinctions 
Whether neuroscience can decide the question of free will depends, therefore, on what you take free 
will to mean, what aspect of it you are discussing, and what position you hold on those various 
aspects. In order to evaluate claims made on the basis of neuroscientific results, it is especially 
important to distinguish between the theoretical question of whether free will (of some kind) is at 
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all possible, e.g. if it can accord with acceptable (meta-) physical theories; and the empirical 
question of whether humans actually have something like free will, e.g. through the role played by 
consciousness with regards to behaviour. In this part of the thesis, I will therefore initially be 
concerned with separating these two claims before I move on to discuss the theoretical question of 
whether free will can accord with plausible metaphysics and/or accepted theories of physics. 
Among the neuroscientific research to which Harris refers in his quest to settle the question of 
whether humans have anything like free will is a series of seminal results published by a research 
group lead by physiologist Benjamin Libet. Libet’s experiment will serve here as an introduction to 
the debate concerning free will and determinism (section 2.2), and along the way I will show why 
any answer to the fundamental philosophical question in this debate lies outside the limits of what 
neuroscience can provide (Chapter 3, especially section 3.4).  
It will, however, also become clear that the kind of position one adopts on this philosophical 
question (potentially) aﬀects the legitimacy of any subsequent empirical discussion on the subject of 
neuroscience and morality – the most obvious case being the kind of three-part denial performed by 
Harris (Harris). Because of this, I will briefly review the three standard responses to what might be 
termed the deterministic challenge to free will (Chapter 4), reviewing also one radical 
reinterpretation that places the acting agent at the centre of the deterministic universe in a bid to 
make up for the faults of the others (subsection 4.4.1), before finishing with a naturalism-inspired 
take on the issue which aims to diﬀuse the essentially sceptical worry that our beliefs and practices 
concerning free will are in need of external justification (Chapter 5).  
But first, Benjamin Libet’s attempt to time the will. 
2.2 Libet's Timing of the Will 
In the early 1980s, Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a series of articles on the relationship 
between electrical activity in the brain and the voluntary initiation of movement (see e.g. Libet and 
Gleason 1982, Libet et al. 1983). The surprising results of the experiments, which would garner 
massive attention from both scientific and philosophical communities, stemmed from the timing of 
the parts involved: a characteristic electrical signal leading up to a voluntarily initiated movement 
was detectable about 350 ms (0.35 s) before the time at which the subject reported choosing to 
move. Seeming to show that the choice to move comes to the scene only after preparation for 
movement has already been initiated, Libet's articles contributed to the re-ignition of the debate 
concerning free will and determinism, in eﬀect opening this long-standing philosophical problem to 
new empirical evidence from the emerging field of neuroscience. Often claimed either to (finally) 
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have shown free will to be a manifest illusion, or also denied any bearing on the question, these 
articles remain to this day a reference for most any discussion about the empirical issues surrounding 
free will. 
2.2.1 The Experiments 
Libet's results came from a relatively simple experiment based on a well-established 
electrophysiological signal measurable in the motor cortex of subjects about to perform a simple 
action like lifting a finger. Still often referred to as the Bereitschaftspotential (BP) after the name 
given to it by the German pioneers in the field (Deecke 1965), this readiness potential (RP) is 
detected with the help of electroencephalography (EEG), a method of measuring brain activity with 
an array of electrodes placed on the scalp of the subject, picking up on gross changes in the electrical 
activity of firing neurons in the cerebral tissue underneath. Showing a slowly upward-sloping signal 
(increase in negative potential) which drops oﬀ rapidly at the moment of muscle contraction (as 
measured by electromyography of the relevant muscles, EMG), the RP is thought to reflect the 
unique involvement of the supplementary motor cortex (SMA) in the initiation of voluntary 
movements, and is relatively week in (voluntary) actions performed habitually; totally absent in 
those performed compulsively (e.g. by Tourette's suﬀerers, Libet 1998). 
In the original experiment, subjects were seated in front of an “oscilloscope clock” around which the 
light dot of an oscilloscope would move about 24 times faster than a normal clock. Every full 
revolution would take 2.56 s instead of 60 s, with lines at each 1 or 2.5 “seconds” indicating the 
passage of 42,7 or 107 ms of actual time, respectively (Libet et al. 1983, Libet 1998). Subjects were 
told to flex or flick their right hand (fingers or wrists) at will, and to note where on the clock face 
the dot was at that time. Averaging the measurements over 40 trials per subject, Libet now had two 
time points in relation to which the EEG could be analysed: the reported time of initiation of 
movement, what Libet later calls “conscious will” or W (Libet 1998), and the physical initiation of 
the movement as measured by the electrical impulse leading to contraction of the right index finger. 
The finding was that, on average, the reported time of initiation of action was about 200 ms (0.2 s) 
before actual movement. But the onset of RP could be detected already 550 ms before contraction 
of the muscle, meaning that onset of RP on average came about 350 ms (0.35 s) before the time 
reported by the subjects to be the time at which they became aware of the “will” to move. As a 
control experiment, subjects were given an electrical stimulation of the skin without advance 
warning, but with the prior instruction to note the time at which they became aware of such a 
stimulus. On average, subjects would report the time of becoming aware of the stimulus as 50 ms 
before the actual delivery of the stimulus (no RP is detectable in these cases), indicating a consistent 
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error in some part of the report task eﬀectively resulting in a back-dating of stimuli. Supposing that 
this is also valid for reports in the main experiment, the corrected time of awareness of “will” is 150 
ms before actual movement, and there is a diﬀerence of 400 ms between onset of RP and awareness 
of the “will” to move.  
Figure 1: The averaged RPs and skin stimulation 
responses of four of Libet's original experimental 
subjects. Source: (Libet 1998). 
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the "oscilloscope 
clock" used in the Libet et al. experiments. Source: 
(Libet 1998) 
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2.2.2 Reactions 
The papers published by Libet and his colleagues “engendered an avalanche of scientific and 
philosophical commentary” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011, p. 8). In time, the responses have mainly 
fallen into one of three positions regarding the relevance of Libet's findings to the debate 
concerning free will and determinism: The first kind of response takes Libet to have provided 
empirical proof of what many philosophers and scientists until then had argued on a theoretical 
basis, namely that free will is an illusion. In the contemporary debate, Daniel Wegner represents 
one of the most advanced version of this position (Wegner 2002), and Sam Harris refers to both 
Libet and Wegner (Harris 2012). The second kind of response argues that Libet's experiments 
suﬀer from conceptual and/or experimental shortcomings serious enough to deny the results any 
relevance to the free will-debate. Adina Roskies provides a clear and concise summary of some of 
the critiques levelled against Libet et al. in her contribution Conscious to Will and Responsibility 
(Roskies 2011). The third kind occupies a middle position, admitting the experiments some 
relevance to the question of free will, while denying that they provide reason to disbelieve (in) the 
phenomenon altogether. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2011) and Neil Levy (2007) represent two 
diﬀerent versions of this position. 
While the third response – due to its recognition both of the weaknesses of the experiments, and 
the insights available in spite of this – is likely the most enduring, the second kind is important 
because Libet's experiments do indeed have serious shortcomings, both in terms of experimental 
protocol, and in terms of the conceptual foundations on which these rest. But to understand the 
dynamics that shape the debate to which all three positions are contributions, we must look into the 
foundations of the kind of “challenge to common sense” represented by the first response, i.e. the 
claim that these results oﬀer proof against free will. In order to do this, we will have to deal with the 
variegated ideas and arguments around the ominous word determinism. 
2.2.3 Determinism and the Illusion Argument 
On the face of it, the claim that free will in some sense is an illusion is a very strange one. For is it 
not obvious that we are free to decide for ourselves what we do? Am I not now writing what I want 
this line to display to you, the reader, and are you not right now reading of your own free will? 
Granted, I am in some sense obliged to write something (namely in order to graduate), and you are 
probably obliged (e.g. by the need to grade this thesis) to give it at least a cursory glance, but are you 
not also free to choose exactly when to start reading and when to stop? I am quite sure that I could 
have chosen to do something else just now, or that I could simply be sitting somewhere else, typing 
something along these same lines, but slightly diﬀerent; neither of which is necessarily incompatible 
10 
  
with the obligation to finish this thesis. In other words, the sum of all our obligations and 
preferences appear to be compatible with several diﬀerent concrete approaches to fulfilling them. 
Furthermore, while it is trivially true that we only do a minute subset of all the things it seems we 
could do (especially if we consider all the things we could do if only we did not care about 
consequences or long term plans), it appears equally trivially true that there is a real sense in which 
we could actually do many of these other things, if we were so disposed. 
With such evidence amply available from everyday experience, it is diﬃcult to see why anyone 
would find the idea compelling that the arguably commonplace experience of being free is an 
illusion. To understand why this, nonetheless, is a respectable philosophical position, it is necessary 
to introduce what is often considered the fundamental problem for any coherent conception of free 
will: determinism. Briefly, the idea of determinism in its most general form is the claim that “every 
event is necessitated by previous events and conditions together with the laws of nature.”(Hoefer 
2010) Now, let us assume for simplicity's sake that having a free will implies, in principle if not in 
practice, being able to choose freely between alternatives. The problem now is that if determinism is 
true, free will in this sense looks to be impossible: if every event, including your choice, is 
necessitated by previous events and conditions together with natural laws, it seems that you have no 
real choice after all. Whether you think of it as there being no real alternatives, or if you think that 
the choosing itself is “false” or illusory, determinism appears to render impossible any such notion of 
freedom. Still, we feel that we choose “freely” in some sense, that we have the ability to do as we see 
fit, and not simply play out a series of events necessitated by previous events and the laws of nature. 
This is where talk of illusions comes into play through what may be called the “illusion-argument”:  
IA:  Our experience of (free) will is nothing more than that, an experience, and it does not 
tell us the truth about what is going on. Our choices and actions are determined, and 
the experience of free will is therefore illusory. (Wegner 2002) 
The Libet et al experiments have been taken by some proponents of this position to be the first 
empirical evidence in support of the illusion-argument (Banks and Pockett 2007). RP was, more or 
less explicitly also by the original authors, interpreted as the physical precursor of voluntary action, 
the real deal in terms of how behaviour is initiated or caused (Roskies 2011, p. 15), and the report by 
subjects of an awareness of an “urge” or decision to move, while initially associated with the 
“intention” to act (Libet et al. 1983), has later been identified with “conscious will” (Libet 1998). 
Under this interpretation, the evidence appears clear: conscious will (or intention) comes to the 
scene too late to be the origin of movement. Early critics of this interpretation attacked the various 
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methodological and conceptual shortcomings of the experiments, and these do indeed have serious 
consequences for the kinds of conclusions licensed by the results. However, other research groups 
have in the years since performed variations of the Libet et al. experiments addressing these issues 
and testing new hypotheses related to the role or importance of the conscious experience of 
initiating action. Among these are experiments successfully manipulating the reported time of 
“conscious will” using magnetic manipulation of the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA, one 
of the areas of the cortex involved in voluntary behaviour) applied after movement itself was begun 
(Lau, Rogers, and Passingham 2007). Another experiment achieved similar results using an 
auditory beep instead of magnetic stimulation (Banks and Isham 2009), strengthening the claim 
that our experience of wilfully initiating action is not related to movement in the straightforward 
way of an immediately preceding cause or initiator (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011, p. 13 ﬀ.). Finally, 
John-Dylan Haynes et al. have published a remarkable Libet-style experiment in which they predict 
not only that action will be performed, but also which of two alternatives will be chosen, with 
information about which of two options will be chosen available from data recorded up to 10 
seconds before the subject acting is aware of making a choice (Soon et al. 2008b, Haynes 2011a). 
With these experiments giving such intuitively strong support to the illusion-argument, the 
assumption that they also bear on the question of determinism itself is perhaps also tempting: the 
experiments may seem to provide clear evidence for the idea that every event is the result of 
antecedent conditions suﬃcient for bringing it about, with the “event” of a hand movement being 
the result of the preceding RP. While intuitively appealing, the thought is false: Libet’s (and Libet-
style) experiments have no bearing on determinism as such (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011, p. 2). In order 
to understand why this is the case, we first need to understand more fully what determinism is and 
what it is not.  
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3 Free Will and Determinism 
“To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she 
exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and 
she determines which she pursues.” Randolph Clarke (2009, p. 1) 
“The term 'free will' is a philosophical term of art. […] The first thing to realize about the use of 
the words 'free will' by philosophers belonging to the classical tradition is that, now at least, these 
words are a mere label for a certain feature, or alleged feature, of human beings and other rational 
agents, a label whose sense is not determined by the meanings of the individual words 'free' and 
'will'. In particular, the ascription of "free will" to an agent by a current representative of the 
classical tradition does not imply that the agent has a "faculty" called 'the will'. […] When a 
current representative of the classical tradition says of, e.g., Mrs. Thatcher, that she "has free will," 
he means that she is at least sometimes in the following situation: She is contemplating 
incompatible courses of action A and B (lecturing the Queen and holding her tongue, say), and 
she can pursue the course of action A and can also pursue the course of action B.” Peter van 
Inwagen (1989, p. 400) 
3.1 Historic Background, General Classification 
The debate concerning free will and determinism can trace its two main roots back as far as the pre-
Socratic Atomists of 5th century BCE Greece and to the shift from polytheistic to monotheistic 
religions in ancient Mesopotamia and Greece (Eshleman 2009). It is probably also related to the 
even earlier reflections around fatalism, or the thought that (some part) of ones future is 
predetermined (e.g. by the gods) in such a way as to make all one’s own deliberations and actions 
irrelevant to whether that fated future is realised (Eshleman 2009). 
Arguments that have their roots in the early monotheistic religions are grouped today under the 
heading “theological determinism”. One of the better-known arguments for theological 
determinism is the problem of “divine omniscience” or a god’s foreknowledge. The problem, in 
brief, is this:  
Suppose that being omniscient entails being infallible, believing p if and only if p is true 
Suppose that an omniscient god existed in 1900 
Suppose, further, that Jones mowed his lawn on 1/1/2000 
Then the omniscient god believed in 1900 that Jones would mow his lawn on 1/1/2000 
It follows from this that Jones could not do other than mow his lawn on 1/1/2000 
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This follows since any other action would either 1) make it true that the god held a false belief in 
1900, 2) make it true that the god did not hold this belief in 1900, or 3) make it true that the god 
did not exists in 1900 – all of which have been ruled out by the assumptions. Thus, if there is an 
omniscient god, it appears that we are determined to do as we do (Rice 2013, Pike 1965). 
“Scientific determinism” is the modern counterpart to the determinism of the Atomists, and shares 
with theological determinism the fundamental idea that, given a certain starting position, things can 
only turn out one way. Where theological determinism attributes this to the nature of a god, 
scientific determinism sees this as a logical necessity arising out of the combination of prior states of 
the universe and natural laws governing the transformation of these (Eshleman 2009). A classic 
formulation of such nomological determinism is due to Peter van Inwagen: 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequence of laws of nature and events in the 
remote past. But it's not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us 
what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present 
acts) are not up to us. (Van Inwagen 1983, p. 56, quoted in Vihvelin 2011) 
In the following, I will exclusively deal with the scientific species of determinism, and all subsequent 
references to ‘determinism’ are therefore references to this.4 
3.2 Subspecies of Scientific Determinism and Single Cause Theories 
In addition to these fundamental distinctions, some classifications include a number of “special” 
scientific determinisms like biological (Lewontin 1982) and psychological determinism which have 
gained currency with the increased sophistication in theories e.g. about the roots of human 
behaviour in evolutionary adaptation and the psychological mechanisms which often work beneath 
the level of awareness to produce behaviour of some predictability (and in a possibly more sinister 
vein, manipulability). To these one might also add a neuroscientific determinism, in which the issue 
of determination could be seen to arise from the project of explaining mental phenomena with 
purely physical descriptions of deterministic processes in the brain. In another sense, these “special” 
determinisms are unlike the fundamental scientific determinism in that they oﬀer empirical 
arguments against the thesis or idea that humans have (something like) free will in any robust sense 
that they are likely to practice in relevant situations, rather than argue that the concept itself is 
incoherent or impossible in principle or given fundamental facts about the laws of nature. Thus, a 
social psychologist may do a series of experiments on the prima facie irrelevant features of situations 
4 Note also that most if not everything that is true of determinism in this context also extends to plausible forms of 
indeterminism, e.g. the kind espoused by the Copenhagen-interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which 
the world is fundamentally probabilistic. 
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that actually turn out to “determine” choices of moral import, and conclude that situational features 
far outweigh anything like character in deciding how we act.5 These can therefore also be seen as 
“major factor” determinisms, i.e. claims about which factors most influence thought or behaviour. 
Sometimes, such theories slip into the extreme end where other factors are considered irrelevant, 
and a single cause is picked out as that which determines behaviour, etc. The two extremes of the 
“nature/nurture”-debate illustrate this point, where dogmatic positions – we are either fully 
determined by genes, or fully determined by society – obscured the now-recognised importance of 
both biological and environmental/cultural factors in the shaping of our thoughts and behaviour. 
One of the reasons why the nature/nurture debate became so heated (a fact to which Harris' quote 
at the start of this chapter in part refers) was because it appeared that the new science of socio-biology 
– later to evolve into evolutionary psychology – was trying to establish the evolved biological 
determinants of human behaviour. In its least nuanced form, human behaviour was reduced to the 
“self-interest” of our genes: whatever behaviour ensured the spread of corresponding genes to the 
next generations would flourish (Dawkins 1976). Many were unhappy with this assertion, as there 
seemed to be little freedom as a puppet of our genes. At the opposing extreme was the idea that 
human beings were born as “blank slates” onto which any culture or behaviour could be inscribed. 
At least part of the allure of the “standard social science model” (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 
1992),must have been that it seemed to ensure a healthy freedom to decide for ourselves what to do 
and whom to become: A blank slate is waiting to be filled in with what we want it to display. The 
problem with this is of course that the idea was part of social determinism, and as such oﬀered no 
more freedom to the individual than did its biological cousin: instead of being determined by genes, 
our nature, it was society, our nurture, that made us into what we are.6 
Both of these extreme positions are recognised today as examples of the “single cause” fallacy (de 
Melo-Martín 2005), mistakenly singling out a single cause as being responsible for something 
which in fact is the result of the often highly complex interaction of a plethora of factors. But note 
also that this does not aﬀect determinism as such in the slightest, as we are not discussing whether 
behaviour is determined, only what the determinants are. Interestingly, such “single cause fallacies” 
precipitate the fear of determinism in a way plural-cause accounts appear not to. It may be that 
picking out a single cause for our behaviour makes vivid the claim that we are wholly determined, 
5 Thus, certain experiments – showing e.g. that finding a coin in the coin slot of a public telephone was by far the best 
predictor of subsequently helping someone who drops all their documents on the floor – have motivated a position in 
psychology known as “situationism”. Situationists argue that our actions are far more influenced by situational features 
than determined by anything like stable character traits. See e.g. (Harman 1999, Doris 1998). 
6As Stephen Pinker has put it: “a blank slate is a dictator’s dream”, seeing as how it would allow a dictator to inscribe 
whatever system of repression she could wish for onto the “slates” of her subjects.(Pinker 1994, p.427). 
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even if it is 1) a fallacy and 2) no more deterministic than determinism in general.7 Perhaps we 
think that if there are many and murky determinants, one of them (and possibly one of the most 
important) must be our own (free) will. While this might seem like wishful thinking to the 
burgeoning sceptic, there is another sense in which we are absolutely right in thinking that our own 
“will” is a major factor in determining our behaviour, namely as one of the important causes of 
behaviour. 
3.3 Causes of Behaviour 
Somewhat surprisingly then, determinism is quite compatible with the commonplace observation 
that our choices are what might be called causally eﬀective, i.e. that we tend to do the things we 
choose to do. This is “surprising” because a lot of talk about determinism portrays it as a doctrine in 
which human choice and action is to be seen as controlled by forces outside of our control. 
Determinism is usually taken to sideline the faculties by which we normally think we navigate our 
lives, like rational deliberation, evaluation, decision, etc. Instead, thoughts and behaviour are seen as 
caused by e.g. our brain, our genes, the environment, our upbringing, society, or simply the state of 
the universe at some point in time long before our births – in short, causes external to the agent 
acting. 
However, determinism per se provides no reason for limiting determining factors to those that are 
external to the agent acting, nor any grounds for external factors to be emphasised in explaining 
behaviour. To remind ourselves, the fundamental claim of determinism with which we are here 
concerned is simply that “every event is necessitated by previous events and conditions together with 
the laws of nature.”(Hoefer 2010) There is no clause specifying what role diﬀerent factors or causes 
play, simply because determinism as such does not concern itself with the individuation of factors or 
causes. Determinism is actually more counterintuitive than you might think from reading popular 
discussions of the subject. If you picture the world according to determinism as a vast box also 
stretching out in time (which would require four dimensions if it were to be pictured all at once, so 
just let it play out freely in any “direction of time” in your imagination), no single point within that 
box (including any point at any “point” in time, i.e. any four-dimensional coordinate) is any more 
important than the others.8 No cause or factor that would be singled out as important by a human 
7 The fact that ideas of fate and fatalism are related to the rise of monotheistic religion is an interesting historical parallel 
to the “single cause” fallacy. A single God appears to present problems for our thinking that a plethora of gods and 
demi-gods do not, and identifying a single cause of behaviour intuitively threatens freedom in a way a multitude of 
factors appear not to. 
8 While this representation of time and space as a four-dimensional block (known as “block universe”) is controversial, 
so are its alternatives (i.a presentism and growing block universe). For more on this, and especially on the relationship 
between special relativity and space-time, see (Petkov 2005). 
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observer occupies any especially significant position from the point of view of determinism. This has to 
do with the way we understand the world to be according to our best theories in physics. Assuming 
that those are approximately true,9 the world is a vast network of “stuﬀ” which can be considered 
reciprocally interacting in either wholly or partially deterministic ways. It is not the case that there is 
one kind of “thing” (a cause, say) which exclusively determines another (an eﬀect), and therefore is 
the appropriate place to locate the kind of “responsibility” inherent in the claim that your behaviour 
is determined by your genes or the kind of socioeconomic environment in which you grew up. 
Neither of these are the end of the line as far as determinism goes. Your genes did not arise out of 
thin air to serve as the uncaused cause of your behaviour, and the socioeconomic environment of 
your behaviour is just as much an eﬀect of other people’s actions as it is the cause of any of yours.10 
And you in turn shape them both.11 
Determinism can get even more counterintuitive when we consider the time-symmetry of physical 
laws. I will get back to this in section 4.4. For now, the upshot here is the important clarification 
that most talk about determinism and free will brings into it something that is not inherent in 
determinism itself. One of those things is the intuition that external causes become more or even 
exclusively important in explaining behaviour if determinism is true.  
Even if this intuition cannot find direct support in determinism, it is, at least to some extent, 
understandable as a reaction to this, in so far as determinism also does not privilege those faculties 
that traditionally have served as the endpoints of explanations of human freedom, either. To the 
extent that determinism undermines these faculties as they are traditionally understood, the drive to 
look elsewhere for an explanation of both action and the (apparently false) experience of freedom, is 
perhaps reasonable. 
This is also where empirical human sciences such as neuroscience can enter the picture: with 
determinism having undermined traditional explanations of free agency, science can provide 
9 This is the least controversial version of scientific realism, a variant of realism about the existing world according to 
which our best current physical theories about the fundamental nature of that world – and all the macroscopic features 
of the human world with which these are compatible – are at least approximately true, i.e. not completely, hopelessly 
wrong as descriptions of the world as it actually is. For a comprehensive treatment of varieties of scientific realism and 
its alternatives, see (Dudau 2002). 
10 I am shifting between quite diﬀerent levels of description here, going from the kind of micro physics described by 
physical laws to the macro world of human organisms and social interaction, but the point is (I believe) transferrable: 
take away our heuristic interpretations and valuations, and what you are left with is the pure claim of determinism that 
everything is necessitated by law-governed changes between states of aﬀairs. 
11That you shape your socioeconomic environment is trivially true in the sense that this environment is the result of 
complex interactions between individuals, institutions, etc., some of which are interactions directly involving you. In 
case of genes, it is (mostly) the expression of your genes that is aﬀected by interactions with the environment in which 
you as an agent take part, but since genes themselves can claim no primacy (neither explanatory nor physically) to the 
pattern of gene expression (epigenetics), I allow myself the simplistic formulation used above.  
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evidence for the move to relocate the nexus of control outside the now supposedly discredited 
notion of a freely choosing and cohesive “agent self”.  
Very likely, there is a confluence of interest coming from opposite directions on this issue: 
philosophers (and others) convinced by determinism of the falsity of traditional conceptions of free 
will, find confirmation of their views in contemporary science casting doubt on the importance of a 
conscious agent, or even a coherent “self”, in action initiation and control. And scientists 
investigating the “real” mechanisms behind such fuzzy concepts as action control and “conscious 
will” find support for wholly “lower level” deterministic physical interpretations of these phenomena 
in the (separate) theoretical claim that everything necessarily is deterministic in this way. This seems 
to be the case, e.g. for Sam Harris’s approach to the debate, as discussed above. 
However, these matters are in principle independent, and they must be criticised on their separate 
merits. The slide is easily made and often diﬃcult to notice, and it is therefore important to note 
that determinism does not licence or even support conclusions about the locus of action control (or 
something like it). Indeed, determinism is compatible with several diﬀerent accounts of action 
control, some quite surprising in the power and freedom they can aﬀord an acting agent.12  
That being said, the position you adopt on determinism does have consequences for what can be 
said about human freedom and morality, as we shall see presently. I therefore think it necessary to 
give a very brief overview both of the common positions taken on this question, and to present a 
slightly more radical alternative which helps undermine some of the more intractable problems 
which face anyone arguing for a scientifically supported conception of freedom.13 Finally, I will 
explore the option of regarding determinism’s “challenge to common sense” as a sceptical challenge 
similar to the classical, epistemological sceptical challenges, in a bid to diﬀuse the worry that free 
will is somehow ([meta-] physically) impossible. 
3.4 One Debate at a Time, Please. 
Free will is hard to define. So far, I have mainly deferred to the reader’s own understanding of the 
concept, adding here and there bits of specifications which have been given prominence in the 
debate surrounding the relation between free will (or freedom) and determinism (and 
12 I will present one of these accounts in section 4.4.1 where I talk of Hoefer’s “Freedom from the Inside Out” (Hoefer 
2010). What exactly is meant by “freedom” here is of no great consequence, as my argument in this part of the thesis 
does not hinge on any positive account for freedom/free will within current interpretations of determinism, but rather 
on a sort of “discrediting of the sceptical challenge” that determinism can be said to represent. See (McKenna and 
Russell 2008) and discussion here. 
13 Due to place constraints, I will have to ride somewhat roughshod over the very great variety of positions and 
arguments in the classical debate, and will certainly do them injustice in this. I hope this can be excused on the basis 
that this thesis is not concerned with adjudicating between classical responses to determinism. 
18 
  
                                                 
indeterminism), and clarifying some implications of determinism for this. For the purposes of this 
section, van Inwagen’s remark (quoted above) on the “classical tradition” is a suitable definition of 
what is meant by “free will” in the kind of fundamental conceptual debate with which we are here 
concerned. That free will is not considered a particular faculty and is left unspecified in cognitive, 
physiological or other scientific terms is also noteworthy in relation to the distinction made above 
between the classical, philosophical approach to the “Determinist Question” (Kane 2005, pp. 7ﬀ) 
and the way the question of free will is dealt with in scientific studies on human behaviour and 
decision making. In the latter case, one often talks of action control (or initiation, depending on the 
conceptual framework) and whether or how this is exercised when someone chooses or acts. That 
these are separate issues is clear enough: the fundamental, philosophical/theoretical question is 
whether anything like free will is possible, while the scientific or empirical question is whether 
humans actually have or exercise anything like free will. Thus, Libet’s experiments investigated 
whether the conscious intention to move a finger was the actual cause of the finger moving, and 
found, for these cases, the conscious intention to move (W) to be preceded by brain activity (RP). 
Whatever conclusions this might be taken to licence about the relationship between conscious 
intentions (or will) and action, it does not speak to the question of whether every event – including 
the events of conscious intentions and overt actions – is determined by preceding states of aﬀairs 
together with natural laws. Dealing with determinism here, I am therefore engaged in clarifying 
whether something like free will is at all possible, and whether it is possible in principle for 
something like a human agent. All questions of whether any actual humans are candidates for 
having free will and whether any humans have or exercise free will are deferred to Part 2. 
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4 Responding to Determinism  
“There is a disputation that will continue till mankind is raised from the dead, between the 
necessitarians and the partisans of free will.” Jalalu’ddin Rumi, twelfth-century Persian poet and 
mystic (quoted in Kane 2005, p. 1) 
There are at least two general ways of responding to determinism in the context of the kind of 
philosophical discussion of free will that we are undertaking here. By far the most common type of 
response accepts that determinism and/or (plausible) indeterminism poses a challenge for traditional 
conceptions of free will, and argues for the consequences this has or does not have for the way we 
regard each other and ourselves, especially in terms of moral and legal responsibility. The three 
traditional responses to determinism – hard determinism/impossibilism, libertarianism and 
compatibilism – all fall in under the first type of response, in that they all accept that determinism 
and/or plausible indeterminism poses a prima facie challenge that must either be accepted (hard 
determinism/impossibilist), repudiated (libertarianism), or incorporated into a revised notion of free 
will (compatibilism). 
The second, far less common type of response is to deny that determinism poses an appropriate 
challenge to our practice of considering each other free and holding one another responsible for the 
things we do. This is not only a minority position, but represents a completely diﬀerent way of 
relating to the debate concerning free will and determinism, which is why I will refer to it as a 
“fourth option”. Because of this relation to the classical debate, I will return to the second kind of 
response only in Chapter 5 , dealing first with the consequences the acceptance of determinism can 
have, then the diﬀerent positions that have arisen in the discussion of these consequences. 
In order to understand the felt need for these kinds of responses, we should first of all clarify how 
determinism can pose a threat to free will as defined above; secondly why this threat is considered 
important enough to justify such a voluminous debate.  
4.1 The Real Threat from Determinism 
Suppose that determinism is true. Things can only turn out one way. There are practical and 
principal reasons for thinking that we will never be able to tell which way things are going to turn 
out (apart from in the very vague, error-prone and short-sighted guesswork we currently employ).14 
14 It’s important to keep the question of predictability apart from that of determinism, especially as it arguably is the 
contemplation of the possibility of predicting our future actions with 100% certainty that provides much of the intuitive 
drive to our fear that determinism precludes freedom (Holton 2013). While I consider it an open question whether 
determinism entails predictability in principle, it is at least overwhelmingly likely that predictability is impossible for any 
“thing” of which it makes sense to say that it can “know” the future. There are two principal and one practical reason for 
this: The practical reason is that complex systems can develop in highly divergent ways based on tiny diﬀerences in 
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It is plainly obvious that how things turn out depends on your actions, and if anything, the truth of 
determinism supports this observation, as noted above. Therefore, you had better act so as to bring 
about the world you would most like to come into being. Now, what is added by saying that you are 
determined to do this? Does it entail that you are not doing your best to make the world a better 
place? Not at all, for even if one allows that your actions are determined, this does not entail that 
someone else is doing these things for you, nor does it entail that no one is doing anything.15 Does it 
entail that your actions are useless in bringing about this brighter future? No, your actions are 
absolutely essential to bringing this future about: we may very well say that the future would be 
diﬀerent were it not for your actions. So where’s the rub? The rub, it seems, lies in this: determinism 
takes away our ability to do otherwise. That is, one arguably central part of our notion of freedom is 
the thought that we are free to choose what to do now; we have real alternatives, and at the end of 
the day, it is up to us to choose. Determinism seems to undermine this by necessitating that you 
choose and act the way you do. However much you identify with or find abhorrent your behaviour 
in a particular situation, being the physical being you were in that situation, you could not have 
done otherwise. The important thing to keep in mind here is that the position which espouses this 
view (hard determinism) not only intends that you, given a particular situation, due to the kind of 
person you are, your values etc., are overwhelmingly likely to choose a certain kind of course of 
action, e.g. that you are more likely than not to give a moderate sum of money to a homeless person 
in a particular instance. Rather, there is only one unique course of action “open” to you. You cannot 
even choose not to follow that course of action, and hence, you do not have an ability to do 
otherwise. 
starting conditions. The two principal reasons tie in with the practical one: Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle states that 
for any single particle, only one of a pair of properties can be defined with precision at a time (a fundamental feature of 
the wave nature of matter according to quantum physics), meaning that a particle cannot both have a precise position 
and a precise momentum at a given time. The second principal reason to keep predictability separate from determinism 
is that any observation of a system will change the system (what is known in physics as the observer eﬀect), and you 
must therefore include the measurement into the system it measures. This creates a host of diﬃculties for accurate 
prediction, since e.g. for quantum phenomena, the state of a system can depend on whether it is observed or not 
(Schrödinger’s cat is an example of this, see e.g. Gerrits et al. 2010). 
15 This distinction should be kept in mind when reading thought experiments in which some sinister puppet master is 
posited to ease the notion of determination into our intuitive view of responsibility (as is done e.g. by Greene and 
Cohen 2010). When at the end of the thought experiment the puppet master is exchanged for impersonal determinism, 
our intuitive response to the thought that someone else, another agent, is controlling us is supposed to transfer onto the 
idea that our actions are determined (and easily does). This, however, is an illicit bait-and-switch, since in the first 
instance our intuition that we are unfree when controlled (arguably) arises out of the specification that we are being 
controlled by someone else, someone with agency and responsibility, allowing the transfer of responsibility onto this other 
agent. Determinism is unlike this because no one is “being controlled” at all. Determinism also does not entail that we 
are all coerced into doing what we do, nor that we are thus compelled. The only thing determinism entails is that we are 
determined, and even this, as we shall see later on, can be given a diﬀerent perspective. 
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4.1.1 The Relation to Responsibility 
To hold and be held responsible for the actions we perform is a pervasive feature of human 
interaction, most commonly and importantly applicable to the actions we recognise as performed of 
a person's “own free will”. Given this idiomatic gloss, it is easy to see how a “free will”-denying 
determinism might challenge our common practice in this area. Indeed, most discussions of 
determinism and free will present the challenge from determinism not simply as a challenge to free 
will, but immediately also note that this would seem to undermine any notion of moral 
responsibility, and therefore, in turn, the basis for our practices of praise and blame, reward and 
punishment. This is one of the most important reasons why determinism is so widely debated in 
connection with free will. If our practices of moral (and legal) judgement are inconsistent with our 
best knowledge, this seems to present a very strong case for the revision of common practice. If 
people are not really free in the way we think they are, it seems highly problematic to keep on 
treating them as if they were, and not only from the point of view of intellectual consistency. People 
are blamed and punished for their actions every day, and even the most advanced legal systems can 
arguably be said to perpetuate some trace of the notion that the people thus punished deserve their 
punishment. On the other end of the scale, we regularly applaud and otherwise revere those who 
have made something of themselves or done something heroic or great. We certainly tend to think 
that they deserve praise for their actions, and while there are few pure meritocracies, the notion that 
rewards should be earned has broad acceptance across the globe.   
These are, importantly, issues of perceived fairness, social aspiration and a multitude of other 
phenomena that can be analysed purely descriptively in humanistic and natural sciences. But we 
may also consider them normatively, in terms of right and wrong, independently of the motives that 
actually move people in practice. It seems intuitively obvious that the possibility of free will is a 
requirement for the rational appropriateness of holding people responsible, for good and bad. After 
all, if what you did was determined to happen by the state of the universe at some time in the 
distant past together with the impersonal laws of physics, how could you be considered responsible 
for doing it? If someone can be said to have acted knowingly, or knowingly failed to act, we typically 
only excuse their (in-) action if any one or a combination of four things holds true: they were either 
physically restrained (e.g. tied up), coerced (e.g. at gunpoint), lacked the ability (e.g. because 
paralysed), or lacked the opportunity (e.g. because on the other side of a heavily traﬃcked street). If 
it is true that what you do is determined to happen by the state of the universe at some time long 
outside of your reach, then, if you are not literally coerced or compelled, it seems that something very 
like it is taking place. You had no choice; you could not have done otherwise. As we saw above, 
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determinism can be seen to threaten just this intuitively essential feature of responsibility, but it is 
misleading to compare our actions under determinism with those that we can recognise as 
compelled or coerced; these are distinct notions: To say that your actions are determined does not 
entail that someone else is coercing you to perform them, nor that there is some psychophysical 
force beyond your control which compels you. This is how we usually picture “unfree” actions, but 
the threat from determinism is of a diﬀerent, in one sense more fundamental kind (or it appears to 
be, but as we shall see in section 4.4 and chapter 5, just what this means is far from clear). 
In any case, to the extent that determinism eliminates alternate possibilities, there is a powerful 
intuition that this also makes traditional conceptions of moral responsibility untenable. Variations 
of this intuition almost always accompany the debate around free will and determinism, and while 
there are many ways of analysing just what it entails, the common feature of all these is the thought 
that the truth of determinism, in one way or another, is incompatible with free will. As a result, the 
position that holds this to be the case is known as incompatibilism. 
4.2 Incompatibilism 
Incompatibilism, then, is the claim that if determinism is true, there is no free will, and if there is 
no free will, most incompatibilists argue, we also have no grounds for holding people (morally and 
legally) responsible for their actions. We generally only hold people responsible for things they 
themselves chose to do and could have avoided doing if they had chosen otherwise. If we cannot 
hold people responsible for choosing their actions, one important reason to punish also disappears. 
After all, we usually do not punish or punish only mildly those who were not in a position to “do 
otherwise”, e.g. because of coercion by an external force, or through a compelling internal force 
outside of the agent’s control. In all such cases, it is arguably the fact that persons thus aﬀected 
through no fault of their own had no other (or no other real, available) choice than to perform the 
act for which we are then liable to excuse them. If determinism is true, then i) there is no free will, 
therefore ii) people have no “ability to do otherwise”, which in turn means that iii) we have no 
grounds for holding them responsible for their actions in this sense, and lastly, iv) at least one 
justification for punishment – “just desert” or retribution –disappears; or so runs a familiar 
incompatibilist argument.  
Among the incompatibilists, one traditionally finds two contrary positions: hard determinists and 
libertarians. Hard determinists claim that determinism is true, and therefore that free will does not 
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exist. Libertarians claim that free will exists, and that determinism therefore must (at least in part) 
be false.16 
4.2.1 Hard Determinism 
Hard determinism is, as already pointed out, controversial just because it claims that humans do not 
have anything like free will. Since there is no such freedom, we also cannot hold anyone responsible 
with the justification that they could have done otherwise. To the extent that we actually depend on 
such justification in holding persons responsible for their actions, we face a serious inconsistency 
between our practices and what this reflection tells us is true. On the basis of this, many hard 
determinists conclude that we need to amend our practices, typically by completely removing any 
reference to retribution in legal contexts (Greene and Cohen 2010, Harris 2012). However, few 
hard determinists want to release all criminals, and so they are quick to point out that lawmakers 
have another option, namely to punish solely with regard to the eﬀects punishment is likely to have 
on the criminal her-/himself and society in general. Such consequentialist reasons are already 
prominent as justification for punishment in legal systems based on the Roman tradition, and it is 
common to speak of deterrence, denunciation, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and reparation as aims 
for punishment – justification for which can be formulated without any reference to whether or not 
the criminal could have done otherwise. Still, our everyday notions of responsibility, praise and 
blame do seem to depend, and depend to a large extent, on the idea that people really are 
responsible for their actions in the sense that they could have avoided – or could have failed to 
accomplish – those things for which we blame or praise them, and that this depends not on the 
state of the universe at some point in time, but somehow on those persons themselves – their 
baseness, courage, mettle, indecision, kindness, cruelty, wisdom, vileness, egotism, strength; or any 
of a number of other adjectives with which we are apt to describe the people we admire or despise. 
If nothing else, hard determinism seems to render all these (at best) unfounded and illusory. In 
complement to this other-regarding aspect of free will is the thought that we by our actions are able 
to change the course of the world; decide whether something turns out one way or another. While 
hard determinism is compatible with our actions being essential in bringing about a given future, it 
also denies that we have any real ability to bring about a diﬀerent future from the one entailed by the 
16 Thirdly, there is a position known, i.a. as “hard incompatibilism” or, as already mentioned, “impossibilism”, which 
simply adds to the hard determinist position the claim that free will (or ability to do otherwise) is incompatible both 
with the truth of determinism and the truth of indeterminism, i.e. impossible either way. Because both libertarianism 
and compatibilism, if successful in their arguments, can serve as a refutation both of hard determinism and of hard 
incompatibilism, I will not treat the latter separately here, following instead the convention I have already adopted of 
intermittently pointing out that what we are discussing is also valid for (plausible) versions of indeterminism. 
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given past. Same past, same future, as Robert Kane summarises the issue (Kane 2005, p. 16), thus 
rendering also this “power” illusory.  
There is a tension in the hard determinist position between, on the one hand, the radicalness of the 
claim that there is no free will and the consequences this should have for our practices of moral and 
legal judgement; and on the other, the need or desire to accommodate more “everyday” notions of 
choice, responsibility and freedom – things it is very hard to understand how we should live 
without. It is not uncommon for hard determinists to submit that we cannot or should not abandon 
practices of moral and legal blame (and their attendant beliefs) that are unsupported by 
determinism, either 1) because doing so would wreak havoc on society, or 2) because people 
invariably will look at the world in this way, whatever you tell them. While there might be some 
grain of truth to such appeals to consequence (or lack thereof), they are not borne out quite so 
dramatically in practice: firstly, the argument for hard determinism has been known for a 
comparatively long time, and society still seems to be hobbling along as before; and secondly, there 
is scientific evidence that people influenced by the argument for hard determinism behave worse 
than those not under such influence (Vohs and Schooler 2008). In other words, it is neither true 
that people are unaﬀected, nor true that the eﬀect is that of Armageddon.  
One option to try to ease this tension is to see whether we actually need to posit free will and moral 
responsibility to make sense of or justify our practices. I have already mentioned how one can justify 
punishment without recourse to notions of desert, and Derek Pereboom deals with this and related 
issues in his book Living Without Free Will (Pereboom 2001). According to Pereboom, the only 
thing we are really giving up if we accept hard determinism is the thought that we are ultimately, in 
the sense “at the bottom of it all”, responsible for who we are, what we do and what we achieve. Not 
only is this a small loss, he argues, it can even serve as a source of happiness and positive societal 
change: accepting that we do not have (ultimate) power over what will happen to us, we can both 
become less dependent for our happiness on the vagaries of life (a thought with roots in the Stoic 
tradition of ancient Greece), and become more forgiving of the actions of others. Some traditional 
thinking about our own and our fellow’s responsibility and moral “creditworthiness”, as well as our 
hopes for an as-yet fully undecided future, become untenable with the loss of free will, but most of 
what is important to us can either be transferred without problem, or also replaced with analogues 
that do not have unsupportable metaphysical entailments. Pereboom quotes an instructive passage 
from Bruce Waller’s Freedom without Responsibility (1990) on guilt seen without (ultimate) moral 
responsibility: 
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It is reasonable for one who denies moral responsibility to feel profound sorrow and regret for an 
act. If in a fit of anger I strike a fried, I shall be appalled at my behavior, and profoundly distress 
that I have in me the capacity for such behavior. If the act occurs under minimum provocation, 
and with an opportunity for some brief reflection before the assault, then I shall be even more 
disturbed and disappointed by my behavior: I find in myself the capacity for a vicious and 
despicable act, and the act emerges more from my own character than from the immediate stimuli 
(thus it may be more likely to recur in many diﬀerent settings), and my capacity to control such 
vicious behavior is demonstrably inadequate. Certainly, I shall have good reason to regret my 
character – its capacity for vicious acts and its lack of capacity to control anger. (Waller 1990, pp. 
165-6, quoted in Pereboom 2001, p. 205) 
In other words, much of what matters to us can arguably be said to be independent of a true notion 
of ultimate responsibility or free will in the philosophical sense. However, Pereboom also warns that 
we cannot remain completely unfazed by determinism, as it does indeed have consequences for 
some of the things practiced today, most notably, and as already noted, retributivist justification for 
punishment, as well as some aspects of our moral judgements and emotional responses such as 
moral indignation. 
4.2.1.1 Minimal claims and their potential consequences 
There is a critical point to be made here. The Norwegian legal system is, in letter if not always in 
practice, free from reference to “just desert” or retributive justifications for punishment. This, 
however, has nothing to do with the truth of determinism, but is the result of a rejection of the 
thought that punishment has any inherent value (i.e. as revenge), and a shift in focus towards 
punishment as a means to shape behaviour to be in accordance with the laws (NOU 2002: 4 ). It is 
important to keep in mind that much of the debate concerning free will and determinism, especially 
when it comes to moral and legal responsibility, is shaped by a particular, Anglo-Saxon conception 
of desert and law, and that one may reject retribution on other grounds than the truth of 
determinism. This also illustrates a broader point about the need to distinguish between the 
minimal claims made by diﬀerent positions in this debate, and the various consequences than can be 
drawn from them, but which may equally well be denied or associated with a diﬀerent starting 
position. 
4.2.1.2 A side note on an apparent paradox 
There seems to be a practical inconsistency or outright paradox in the notion that the truth of hard 
determinism (or hard incompatibilism) should be treated as important and possibly acted upon. Say, 
for the sake of argument, that determinism (or indeterminism) is true in the way it is conceived of 
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according to the debate concerning free will and determinism. Some people see this truth; others do 
not (as evinced by the debate itself). However, you have no real choice about whether or not you see 
this, nor are you responsible or deserving of credit or blame for your position. Moreover, if it appears 
that you have a choice about whether or not to implement changes on the basis of this truth, in so 
far as your choice and the question of implementation of change is necessitated by antecedent states 
of the universe and governing laws, there exists no real choice in this matter either. Insisting, on the 
backdrop of these connected realisations, that we should all embrace this truth and reject moral 
responsibility – reforming in the process the penal system and our own, interpersonal interactions – 
seems downright absurd: in order for the notion of “should” to apply to the question of 
implementing a disbelief in free will, it must be possible either to do this or not; there must be a real 
choice about it. However, since the idea and entire motivation for modifying anything based on 
hard determinism is that no such choice exists, the claim appears to be self-refuting. 
In other words, hard determinists may very well say that humans do not have free will, but when it 
comes to the question of what we believe, how we live, and how we shape society, the idea cannot 
carry any force in and of itself – in contrast to the force inherent in a belief in free will. This is not to 
say that our lives and society might not be shaped, or even shaped to the better, by assenting to the 
hard determinist position. It is just that there is no force in the position itself to motivate such 
change, and that any change thus justified is actually without justification. If any sense were to be 
made of such a move, it would have to be by appeal to the positive consequences of the acceptance 
of this (absurd) position, and as I have intimated above, any positive change supposed to follow 
from hard determinism can be motivated by other means without attendant absurdity, and so there 
seems to be no reason to shape society on the basis of hard determinism. 
This appears to leave the hard determinist only with the option to say that we do not have free will, 
but that no consequences can or should be drawn from this realisation. I am ignorant of any 
solution to this paradox. 
4.2.2 Libertarianism 
Libertarianism, here libertarianism about free will and not to be confused with its political 
namesake, starts with the opposite assumption from hard determinism. Rather than accepting that 
our understanding of the world implies that freedom is impossible, libertarians takes our perception 
of freedom as given, and concludes that the picture presented by determinism must somehow be 
false (of our world). By denying determinism in part or in general, the libertarian opens up space 
within which we can “will”, i.e. choose and act otherwise. However, by opening up this space or 
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gap, the libertarian is at the same time creating a problem for herself, namely how to account for a 
“willing” that bridges this gap in the otherwise whole cloth oﬀered by the deterministic picture. The 
primary problem for Libertarianism is therefore to provide an alternative explanation of the basic 
nature of the world, or of that part of the world that is made up of our (free, undetermined) actions.  
In other words, positing indeterminism only gets the libertarian halfway to free will, since the 
element of chance thus introduced is one over which we appear to have no control – indeed, such an 
element of randomness is a prima facie detriment to free will, in that whatever control attributable to 
the agent in the wholly deterministic picture would seem to be degraded by randomness; replaced in 
part by mere luck. In order to account for the kind of free will that would entail an ability for agents 
to do otherwise (and not simply a freedom of randomness), the libertarian must therefore give an 
account of how an agent or an agent’s choice or decision is what brings about behaviour without 
being itself determined. 
To account for this, libertarians typically follow so-called extra factor strategies (Kane 2005, pp. 
38ﬀ), where one attempts to provide an explanation of the “extra factor” that would guarantee or 
explain (the possibility of) free will within the opening created by (partial) indeterminism. Among 
the most recognised extra factor strategies are variations on agent causation, in which the extra factor 
typically is the agent as entity, undetermined in itself, but deterministically connected to the actions 
performed (Chisholm 2003, Taylor 1992). This argument hopes to avoid the above identified 
randomness or luck objections to classical libertarianism – i.e. that injecting the decision or action 
process with an element of indeterminism is only apt to reduce our freedom because the element of 
chance induced is outside of our control (“luck decides”) –, without having to rely on a mystery or 
other “panicky metaphysics” (Strawson 1974) to attain its goal of accounting for free will. In 
essence, agent causation accounts of free will posit a kind of causation that is not part of a causal 
chain, but rather always the start of a (new) causal chain, thus distinguishing it from regular “event 
causation” where every cause is also the eﬀect of a still earlier cause. This appeal to a diﬀerent kind of 
causation is supported by the argument that an agent is not an event, but rather an enduring 
substance or entity, and therefore not something that can be caused in the manner that an event can 
be caused (Chisholm 2003). Agent causation ensures free will because choices or actions are neither 
determined by antecedent events, nor arbitrary or random, but simply caused by the (uncaused) 
agent (Kane 2005, pp. 44ﬀ).  
Agent causation is not without its critics, to put it mildly. The most obvious objection is that “agent 
causation” is just another name for “mystery”, and that nothing has been gained by positing it. This 
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can also be connected with Strawson’s Basic Argument (as mentioned above) to form the claim that 
even if one allows agent causation, this still does not get us free will: either an agent-caused choice 
is completely random, or it is made (albeit non-deterministically) on the basis of what might 
broadly be described as character, and unless the agent is also responsible for forming her own 
character, she is not ultimately responsible even for her agent-caused choices. This latter objection 
can, however, be met with appeal to something like Robert Kane’s own suggestion of “self forming 
actions” (SFAs); i.e. those (rare) occasions where a choice between two alternatives is both open 
(requiring alternate possibilities) and significant for the kind of person we become. Given that the 
agent herself makes a diﬀerence in deciding between the possible options in a SFA, she is also 
responsible for forming her character, and thus also for the kinds of action she will be presented 
with later in life. “Ultimate responsibility” (UR) for a given action today can therefore be traced 
back to such SFAs (Kane 2005, pp. 130-1, 172-3). 
Critics have, however, not been placated by the limitation of agent causation to SFAs. Daniel 
Dennett has objected that given the limitation placed on SFAs, it seems that a person might very 
well live their life without ever performing one. If this were the case, that person would be without 
UR, but would, presumably, still feel and appear as free and responsible as anyone (Dennett 2003). 
Furthermore, one can also counter that, unless one can give an explanation of how agent causation 
is not just a matter of randomness or luck, SFAs are also ultimately random, and thus not suitable 
as basis for UR in the sense required by free will. 
C 
 
Given an interest in accounting for free will in face of the challenge presented by determinism, 
libertarianism does not appear to be a viable solution. In light of this, it is time to look at a third 
common response to determinism, namely the thesis that determinism (and/or plausible forms of 
indeterminism) is compatible with free will. This general position is known as compatibilism. 
4.3 Compatibilism 
Compatibilism is a response to the incompatibilist claim that the truth of determinism (and/or 
plausible forms of indeterminism) necessarily entails that the idea that we have free will is false. 
Compatibilists are sometimes referred to as soft determinists because many compatibilists accept (as 
likely) the truth of determinism, but argue that “free will” is possible nonetheless. In support of this 
they provide various arguments to the eﬀect that determinism leaves room for the kind of free will 
“worth having”, as Daniel Dennett puts it (2003). In all generality, compatibilist responses to the 
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challenge from determinism engage the concept of free will itself, and try to provide explanations of 
what really matters to us when we think about freedom and responsibility.  Compatibilists have 
argued, i.a. that what we care about is our ability to act in accordance with second or higher order 
desires, i.e. desires about what should matter to us. Related to this, some compatibilist frame will 
and responsibility in terms of having our actions express those values with which we most identify 
(Frankfurt 1988). According to this picture, we are acting freely when we are able to act in 
accordance with what we reflectively hold to be our values, and comparatively constrained when we 
are somehow restricted from acting thus, e.g. by coercion or compelling force. This is an important 
point, for as shown above, the step from determinism to the thought that our actions are compelled 
or coerced is easily taken by unquestioned intuition. Nonetheless, as also shown above, determinism 
entails none of these standard excusing conditions; since this is the kind of thing that matters to our 
ascriptions of responsibility, determinism is not a threat to our practice of holding people 
responsible for their actions. Whether or not we can speak of our choices or desires as being 
uncaused is not merely of secondary importance, it is the wrong kind of question: we want our 
choices to reflect who we are and what we value, and that necessarily includes our history and 
environment. As already shown, determinism does not entail that our choices and deliberations are 
ineﬀectual or epiphenomenal, quite the contrary. Thus, we should not be dismayed by the claim that 
these also are determined: to all intents and purposes, this only means that they do not arise out of 
thin air by chance. In other words, determinism can be seen to guarantee the continuity over time 
essential for any genuine conception of rationality and agenthood (Levy 2007). 
Compatibilism has much to commend it, and arguably accords well with many of the things we 
would pick out when trying to explain why our freedom matters to us. Still, some might think it 
lacking as an account of freedom in its most fundamental in-the-moment sense. For a long time, 
compatibilism was taken as the received view, something that has come under attack from new 
incompatibilist arguments in later years. This is, at least in part, due to the way compatibilists 
traditionally answer the challenge from determinism, what Harris calls a “bait and switch” (2012): 
In order to save freedom, compatibilists define it in a way that can also be seen to give up the most 
important aspects of the concept, namely the intuition that real freedom must include the ability to do 
otherwise. As sketched out above, the compatibilist position does not really answer the 
incompatibilist allegation that determinism precludes “doing otherwise”, and while there have been 
attempts at reconciling the ability to do otherwise with a deterministic (or plausibly indeterministic) 
picture by way of the so-called “conditional analysis” of “could have done otherwise”, these are 
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generally taken to have failed, roughly because the conditional “could” opens up the gates for any 
statements about what could have been done, regardless of human ability (McKenna 2009). 
There is another way to challenge the alleged incompatibility of determinism and free will. 
Considered as a question of justification – does the truth of determinism bear on the grounds on 
which we justify our beliefs about freedom and responsibility? – the answer, most commonly, has 
been ‘yes’. This is usually thought to be either because those beliefs appear to fall foul of any 
reasonable metaphysical worldview (e.g. as entailing some form of Cartesian dualism, magical 
powers, or mysterious agent causation), or because the concept itself is incoherent (e.g. requiring 
that we both be and not be the causes of our behaviour). Others, most notably P. F. Strawson, have 
countered that it is wrongheaded to search for justification of those/these beliefs and practices 
outside the practices themselves (Strawson 1974). Taken together with the above-mentioned 
(apparent) paradox that results from discussing practical consequences of (hard) determinism, there 
intuitively seems to be something right about this latter approach, as it would appear that the 
(causal) eﬀectiveness of our moral beliefs and practices insulates them from the accusation that they 
are illusory. But Strawson’s argument is controversial, and though influential, can be considered 
somewhat of an outlier in the debate. Moreover, it still does not provide an answer to the allegation 
that determinism excludes an ability to do otherwise – the lack of which will no doubt leave many 
readers unsatisfied with any solution proﬀered. I will therefore first spend some time critically 
investigating the actual entailments of a nomological determinism, as well as presenting a second, 
radical compatibilist alternative due to Carl Hoefer – which purports to get us this “ability to do 
otherwise” within the physicalist framework assumed by determinism – before I return to 
Strawson’s fourth alternative in the last section. 
4.4 Causal Determinism and Time 
So far, I have spoken of determinism both as a matter of deterministic laws and of preceding causes. 
While the two interpretations in some cases can be used interchangeably, there are also important 
diﬀerences in the conceptual baggage each of them brings with it. I have already mentioned the 
nomological definition of determinism, and under the nomological interpretation, determinism can 
be understood as the conjunction (here eﬀectively the logical statement that two things are true: '&') 
of a state of the universe (A) at a given time (t1) and the natural laws (L) which govern the 
transformation of this state into other states at other times, entailing the state of the universe at 
some other time (e.g. B at t2). Moving from t1 to t2, the state of the universe at t2, B, is entailed by 
A&L (Van Inwagen 1975). This is what we say when we say that events are determined by 
antecedent states of aﬀairs and the laws of physics. 
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Under the causal interpretation, determinism is often understood as the claim that every event has 
causes preceding it suﬃcient for its coming about, what is also known as causal completeness (Hoefer 
2010). Taken at this level of generality, the distinction between causal and nomological 
formulations of determinism appears merely terminological. However, the causal interpretation is 
troublesome in a way the nomological formulation of determinism is not. One reason is that the 
concept of causality, while extremely common in everyday language and scientific practice, is very 
hard to precisely define or justify using the kind of physical laws on which determinism is 
predicated (see e.g. Bertrand Russell’s classic put-down in Russell 1912, see also Dowe 2008, 
Schaﬀer 2008), and it is useful to be able to talk about determinism while remaining agnostic about 
the fundamental nature or truth of the separate concept of cause or causality. Another problem with 
the talk of causality in determinism is the notion of “suﬃcient cause”. While this might seem 
innocuous at first blush, merely requiring the specification of a set of antecedent conditions which 
suﬃce for bringing about the eﬀect in question, closer inspection reveals that such a set would need 
to be indeterminately large. This can easily be seen if we consider all the negative statements that 
would have to be included in such a set: my pressing the ‘c’ key causes a ‘c’ character to appear in the 
Word document, unless i) the program has hanged, ii) the button is malfunctioning, iii) the battery 
dies, iv) an asteroid hits the earth, etc. (Hoefer 2002, p. 8). This means that, if we want to posit 
causal determinism, we need to do so at a universal level, i.e. talk of (entire) preceding states of the 
universe as causing (entire) following states (Russell 1912, Hitchcock 2007, Hoefer 2002), and 
given the limitations on the concept of causality as a description of the transformations governed by 
physical laws, this is eﬀectively just a reformulation of nomological determinism. Anything 
perceived to be added by using causal talk will therefore have been imported illicitly into the 
interpretation of that term. The distinction would still be merely terminological but for the fact that 
two important notions often seen in arguments for incompatibilism appear to be imported in this 
manner: direction of time and fixity of the past.  
Ordinary talk of causality always implies a specific direction of time, namely going “forward”, from 
past to present or future.17 In other words, causality is tightly interwoven with our common-sense 
understanding of a time that passes, what J. Ellis McTaggart called the “A-series” concept of time 
(McTaggart 1908). When we say that something lies in the past, other things are present (however 
fleetingly), and yet other things lie in the future, we assume the A-series perspective on time. We 
live inside A-series time, and it is hard to imagine the world in any other light. And yet, the 
17 I venture to use the absolute term here because while there is talk of “backwards causation”, this is obviously equally 
time directed, and only opposed in direction to the regular kind. Note also that backwards causation is a highly 
controversial subject. See (Faye 2010). 
33 
  
                                                 
fundamental physical laws on which determinism is predicated are time symmetric, i.e. make no 
distinction between transformations going “backward” and “forward” in time (Hoefer 2010).18  In 
other words, when the claim of determinism is made that the conjunction of the state of the 
universe A at a time t1, together with the natural laws L, determines the state of the universe B at a 
time t2, there is nothing in the laws (L) of the conjunction (A&L) which supports the additional 
clause that t1 must be in the “past” – as in “yesterday”, or “before his birth” – relative to t2. Indeed, 
the laws (of physics) on which determinism is founded can make do with an entirely tense-less time 
series; the “B-series”, where diﬀerent states are specified only in relation to each other as ‘preceding’ 
or ‘following’ (McTaggart 1908, Hoefer 2002). B-series time is static: while things may change 
from one point to the next, time does not “go by”. Consequently, there is no unique, privileged 
“now”, and nothing corresponds to our ordinary concept of “past” or “future”. One may still specify 
a direction of time to describe phenomena as we perceive them (or think about how they happened 
in the past), but, importantly, determination runs in both (and all) directions19, and neither 
discriminates nor privileges any point in space or time as that which determines the rest. 
To see the importance of an implied direction of time for our understanding of causality in relation 
to determinism and freedom, just think what nonsense it would be to say that your choice today 
causes what happened yesterday – if, for example, I were to say that my baking apple cake today 
caused me to buy apples yesterday. The past is fixed for us in this sense: what has happened is 
irrevocable. The past – in its “nature”, if not retelling – is outside our influence today, in the present.  
If I want to make apple cake tomorrow, I had better buy apples today. A (technical) way of stating 
this is to say that the past in A-series time enjoys a special ontological status (it “has existed”). What 
is special about it is that it excludes causal influences going into it, so to speak, while it may be seen 
as the cause of what is happening now.20 When determinism is thought of in causal terms, 
determination appears only to run in one direction, from past to future: “suﬃcient antecedent 
causes” becomes suﬃcient conditions in the past, often the distant past (“before you were born”) for 
added eﬀect. Neither of these are implied by the conjunction of a state of the universe with the laws 
18While it has long been known that certain forces violate the symmetry implied by relativity (the Charge, Parity, Time-
symmetries), the first evidence of time-asymmetry in particle physics comes from recent experiments showing that the 
oscillations of entangled B mesons between diﬀerent states have slightly diﬀerent probabilities depending on which 
direction the change occurs in. (Francis 2012) While this does indeed show an asymmetry sensitive to the direction of 
time, it's not quite what we expect or would need to argue that our experience of time in macro-physics similarly 
constrains micro-physics: there is only a slight diﬀerence in probabilities, which, if some frivolity is permitted, is like 
admitting the slightly lower probability of my baking an apple cake causing me to have bought apples yesterday, than 
what would be the case if I were to do it the other way around. 
19 This is called the principle of bi-directionality. Note that a weaker form of determinism in which only “past → future” 
determination is allowed actually poses a weaker challenge to free will than full-on bi-directional determinism. For an 
explanation of this, see (Hoefer 2002, pp. 6-7). 
20 At least as long as one puts aside the question of how something no longer in existence can have causal influences, but 
that is another discussion entirely. 
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of nature (A&L), and therefore not implied by determinism. Although this does not change the 
fact that determinism excludes the ability to do otherwise, it does undermine one important source 
of intuitive support for the claim that determinism excludes free will, namely the intuition that we 
today are (exclusively) determined by events long in the past, i.e. by the Big Bang. The significance 
of this will be developed below in subsection 4.4.1. 
Still, saying that my eating apple cake tomorrow causes me to make apple cake today seems 
obviously false. And while it very likely is false (or rather nonsense when considering the meaning of 
the words used), the falsity or nonsense of it has nothing to do with truth or falsity of determinism 
(apart from the fact that our ordinary concept of causation might have to be diﬀerently specified 
depending on the truth or falsity of determinism, Hoefer 2010). Rather, our notion of causality and 
our experience of time – including the experience that the past is fixed and completely outside of 
our (causal) control, while the present and the future is the battleground of any freedom of will or 
otherwise – probably have to do with any of the number of tendencies observable in nature that are 
distinctly unidirectional in time. One popular contender for the bearer of time directionality is 
thermodynamics, the second “law” of which states that systems always tend towards greater entropy or 
elimination of regularity. This is what you observe when you put ice in your drink, and the ice melts, 
cooling it down. In this scenario, the water in the ice-cubes go from a low-entropy state of being 
frozen (in which the water molecules are arranged in a regular pattern) to a higher-entropy state of 
liquid water (in which all the molecules of the now pitifully diluted drink roam around chaotically), 
equalising in the process the temperature (the average velocity of the molecules) of the surrounding 
drink and the melting ice cubes (cooling your drink down). The reverse does not tend to happen: 
your drink rarely heats up while the ice cubes grow bigger. While this tendency is universal21, it does 
not have the status of a natural law simply because it is not a law, but a statistical regularity. The 
micro level physics involved are still time-symmetric. You can visualise this if you imagine a 
speeded-up video recording of ice melting in a drink. Just by looking at this recording, you would 
immediately be able to tell whether it was being played backwards or forwards. Now, if you were 
presented with a similar recording of just one (or a small group) of the molecular interactions of the 
melting ice, you would not be able to say whether the video was being played backwards or 
forwards; it would be like watching the collision of billiard balls isolated from the context of the cue 
ball and the players.  
21 As long as one considers a system with enough possible states to make statistical analysis accurate, that is. 
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Thermodynamic “directedness” arises from the simple fact that there are innumerably more ways for 
the particles of a system to be distributed uniformly than to be distributed non-uniformly, so that 
any unconstrained change will tend towards one of these less ordered, more uniform states. Think of 
billiard balls again: there are innumerable ways the balls can be distributed about the table, and only 
a vanishingly small amount of them would appear to us as ordered. All the balls sitting in the one 
half of the table arranged as a neat triangle is just one possible state among a near-infinite number, 
with the distinguishing feature that it is highly ordered – i.e. that the relative positioning of the 
billiard balls are far from the average. This, approximately, is the equivalent of a low-entropy state. 
Any movement of the table or balls would change their ordering into one of the other possible 
states, progressively moving them away from one we perceive as ordered; it would become 
disordered, i.e. change towards higher entropy. We are ourselves of course unimaginably complex 
systems dependent on thermodynamic regularities, and owe our existence to the rise of less complex 
systems in which the coupling of still les complex systems with opposing tendencies counteracts the 
dissipation that characterises all transformations at this level (Deacon 2012, pp. 106ﬀ.). For this and 
other reasons related to the kind of beings humans are, it is highly unlikely that we have the power 
to alter the past at the level where we perceive events and which is the domain of time-directed 
systems such as thermodynamics.22 In other words, McKenna is very likely right in saying that we 
cannot secure an ability to do otherwise by positing an ability to change the past, at least not at this 
level (2009). As we shall see presently, things are not so clear-cut if we consider the microphysical 
level. 
4.4.1 Freedom from Determinism 
One of the main intuitions behind the incompatibilist argument is the thought that if events in the 
past determine events now, there is no way for us now to act otherwise. As McKenna notes, the 
only two genuine possibilities of acting diﬀerently seems to be if we, through our actions in the 
present, could either a) somehow violate physical laws, or b) change the past; both of which he quite 
naturally considers miraculous (2009). Leaving aside for the moment the possibility of violating 
natural/physical laws and the (arguably failed) conditional compatibilist argument mentioned above, 
I would like to revisit the assumption against “changing the past” in light of the counterintuitive 
features of physical laws with which we have now become acquainted. 
In a paper entitled Freedom from the Inside Out (2002), Carl Hoefer provides an argument to the 
eﬀect that physical laws can support a notion of freedom based on a non-miraculous way of 
22 We can of course enact great change, but only by work, which itself is a thermodynamic phenomenon, and therefore 
also directed in time. 
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“changing” – i.e. determining – the (immediate) past. As already elaborated in the argument above, 
an important part of the perceived threat of determinism comes not from nomological determinism 
itself, but from the assumption that determinism is equivalent with the claim that all present action 
is determined (i.e. caused) by past events. In Hoefer’s own words:  
The notion of past events determining and explaining future events, and the opposite direction 
(or an “inside-out” direction) of explanation being somehow wrong or suspect, arises completely 
from an unholy marriage of A-series time with deterministic physics. (2002, p. 5) 
Taking the four-dimensional “block universe” view of space and time, our present can be considered 
a time-slice somewhere in the middle of that block. Because it is not inherent in the model or the 
laws on which it is based to diﬀerentiate between any possible time-slice, we are free to posit the 
present time-slice as determining the rest. As already noted, the usual worry is that such a statement is 
tantamount to positing backwards causation, something which very likely is impossible (at least for 
humans) independently of whether we assume A- or B-series time (Hoefer 2002, p. 5). To 
reiterate, this worry does not arise from determinism itself, but rather from the additional (and 
arguably highly problematic) causal interpretation of determinism. Forget the troubling thought 
that we should somehow be able to cause the past, and get used to the idea that determinism is 
compatible with regarding the present as determining the past. Hoefer argues that this “determinism 
from the inside-out” can provide a notion of freedom acceptable both physically and for common 
sense (2002, p. 6). 
There are two central points to Hoefer’s argument. The first point is the one outlined above, namely 
that we are free to consider determinism “from the inside out”, i.e. from the time-slice of block 
space we consider “present” outwards into the two halves we usually think of as past and future. 
From this perspective, we are free to say that our actions in the present determine the rest, and 
therefore past and future states. It remains true that everything in the present time-slice is 
determined, as is everything wherever and whenever if we assume the truth of determinism, but as 
Hoefer puts it, our actions are “simply determined”; meaning not unfree or caused or anything else 
which one usually concludes from the “unholy marriage” of determinism and A-series time (2002, 
p. 4). The crux of this is that we can regard our actions as determining rather than being determined 
(by something else). 
It is this radical change in perspective that does most of the work in Hoefer’s argument, but there 
remains a large conceptual hurdle before this perspective can deliver on the requirement of an ability 
to do otherwise: Even taking the inside-out perspective, it seems that the past, being as it is known to 
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us, still necessitates events in the present. To answer this objection, Hoefer again appeals to the 
diﬀerence between the past at the macro-physical level at which we are familiar with it, and the 
micro-physical states which underpin these. Hoefer’s second point is based on the claim that while 
an “inside-out” determining action in the present does aﬀect past and future, it does so only by 
placing constraints on possible past and future states. Keep in mind that neither past nor future are 
ontologically special in this framework, so placing a constraint on preceding states is not beyond the 
pale. Accepting all the (macro level) constraints implied by an assumed context (I am sitting at a 
table before my laptop, etc.), the constraints imposed by my action now also turn out to be so weak 
as to be practically negligible for actions with a limited extension in space-time, such as typing on a 
keyboard.23 The reason for this is two-fold: 1) for any given macroscopic event (like that of typing 
‘t’), there will be innumerable micro-physical states that could correspond to that event (think only 
of all the diﬀerent configurations of molecule placement and velocity that can correspond to the 
average temperature in the vicinity of my typing),24 and 2) any roughly delineated macro level event 
– say with a 10 m radius – will only entail constraints at the level of micro-physical states on a 
“time-cone” in each time-direction with a radius decreasing to 0 after approximately 3.3x10-9 
seconds (the time it takes light to travel 10 m). In other words, my typing ‘t’ now will only 
determine space-time at a micro-physical level in a very limited (and vanishing) area for an 
extremely short time. Practically nothing is entailed about the preceding state of aﬀairs at the macro 
level of events that are recognisable by us. The only requirement is that the preceding events at that 
level must have within their “supervenience  base” a micro-physical state compatible with my typing 
‘t’ in the following moment.25 Now for the freedom: given a known past, i.e. given a known series or 
23 Typing on a keyboard can of course have tremendous eﬀects in the future, e.g. deciding whether someone graduates 
or not, and so can be seen to place (important) constraints on identifiable future states however far into the future you 
would care to follow its trail. But keep in mind that the constraints introduced by pressing a single key at a given time 
now will wash out almost completely when taken together with the incomprehensibly large number of events taking 
place at any given point in time also placing constraints on the future. My typing ‘t’ now is in no way suﬃcient for 
bringing about me graduating on its own, just as Lorentz’ proverbial butterfly is but an infinitesimal part of the 
processes leading to hurricanes in Texas. Thus the real eﬀects of our actions that we can perceive are the results not of 
single free actions in the present time-slice determining the rest, but rather a complex phenomenon on the level of 
macro-physics (and higher levels of organisation/regularity) for which we have no problem of accounting in terms of 
regular cause and eﬀect, regardless of any talk of micro-level determinism, and, importantly, perfectly compatible with 
regarding that choice as free. This is true the “other way around” as well, namely if we think of the constraints imposed 
on our freedom now given the past as this is known to anyone. No one is trying to deny these perfectly obvious 
constraints: I would not be able to type freely on the keyboard of this laptop had I not brought it with me to the library, 
etc. – but that was also a free action within unproblematic macro-level constraints. 
24 Hoefer assumes that identifiable events can be considered event types at the macro level and that these can have many 
instantiations on the micro-physical level: “We assume, in other words, that there is some ill-defined and probably 
infinite set of microphysical state-types that are “good enough” to count as a supervenience base for my typing “t” in the 
assumed context.”(Hoefer 2002, p. 7). 
25 Note that while I still seem to be wedded to A-series time here, this is in fact only a device applied to help make 
visible the kind of constraints involved. I could equally well say that the events following this typing must have within 
their supervenience base a micro-physical state compatible with me typing ‘t’ now. But due to the fact that our 
perspective is from inside A-series time, this future-directed constraint-formation appears to us unproblematic, and it is 
necessary to distinguish between the causal influence our deterministic actions have on the future from the deterministic 
“influence” our actions (according to the inside-out perspective) have on states preceding and following that action. 
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set of events recognisable at the macro-physical level in the period of time preceding the present, I 
am now, in accordance with the rules of grammar, free to type ‘s’ or ‘z’ when I write 
‘recognisable’/’recognizable’ (or ‘s’ and ‘z’, like I just did), and whichever I choose to type determines 
the preceding and following micro-level states in a vanishingly small area around me for an 
incredibly short time.  
There is now nothing standing in the way of regarding that choice as perfectly free in the sense we 
are after here. I really could have typed only ‘z’ or ‘s’, or relied on another example altogether. Of 
course, the example is adapted from Hoefer, and so I was inclined to use just those letters from 
reading his article – still, I was not determined by the Big Bang (or whatever lies at the start of 
everything) to write it in just that way. While it remains true within this picture that my choice of 
what letter to type was deterministic, the physical picture entailed by that adjective is inherently 
perspectiveless and does not support any inference to the status of that choice as free or unfree. In 
order to understand anything from this metaphysical notion, we have to give it a perspective and an 
interpretation. “Freedom from the inside out” can thus be seen as the application of a particular 
perspective, a perspective that arguably accords with the (commonsense) requirement that freedom 
entails an ability to do otherwise and which can supplant the standard perspective in every way 
relevant to the thesis of determinism.26 
Hoefer's argument is perhaps counterintuitive, and it admittedly depends on refutable assumptions, 
but so does the standard argument for incompatibilism outlined above, and to the eyes of anyone 
who would lament the loss of free will, this also suﬀers from other serious defects. 27 
 However, my aim here is actually not to present a coherent picture of freedom within the available 
deterministic framework (even though I think Hoefer’s is an interesting one). Rather, I am trying to 
undermine the traditional incompatibilist picture where the truth of determinism entails the 
falseness of freedom (in one intuitively important sense of the word). To the extent that I have 
succeeded in undermining the “ability to do otherwise”-argument of incompatibilism, what am I 
left with? While I think I have made diﬃcult the “obvious” conclusion that freedom is impossible in 
physical terms, I certainly have not provided a watertight argument for the compatibility of freedom 
and determinism (or indeterminism). In truth, I am left with a negation, but one I hope to show is 
26 Hoefer also shows how it is compatible with (physically plausible accounts of) indeterminism (see Hoefer 2002, pp. 
12-4). 
27 Notably, both rely on assumptions about physicalism/materialism, supervenience and reductionism. Standard 
incompatibilist arguments additionally rely on an interpretation of time not entailed by the physics involved in their 
claim. I also personally count against standard incompatibilism the practical inconsistency pointed out above (in section 
4.1.1) concerning the way we should relate to its claim that we are unfree and therefore essentially not responsible for 
our choices of what to relate to. 
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as good as any compatibilist account in diﬀusing the worry that genuine freedom is somehow 
([meta-] physically) impossible.  
Having thus surveyed the debate of what van Inwagen calls the “mystery of free will” (Inwagen 
2000), I am inclined, but not hard-determined, to take the next step in a diﬀerent direction. 
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5 Leaving Behind the Metaphysical Challenge 
“[A]rgument, reasonings, either for or against the sceptical position, are, in practice, equally 
ineﬃcacious and idle […]. [… W]e have an original non-rational commitment which sets the 
bounds within which, or the stage upon which, reason can eﬀectively operate, and within which 
the question of rationality or irrationality, justification or lack of justification, of this or that 
particular judgement or belief can come up.” P. F. Strawson (2005) 
If nothing else, the preceding sections should have left you with a sense of just how complicated the 
question of the (in-) compatibility of freedom and determinism really is. Far from being resolved to 
any claim’s favour, there are fundamental issues with each of the three major positions that have no 
apparent resolution beyond a reliance on the relative strength of the intuitions which support each 
argument; whether you lean towards hard determinism (or impossibilism), libertarianism or 
compatibilism, your choice ultimately relies on preference.  
I have already spoken of determinism as presenting a “challenge to common sense” in that it appears 
to conflict with notions of freedom and responsibility that are both widespread and widely believed 
true. Provided that this metaphysically based challenge leaves us with no clear answer regarding the 
reality of free will and moral responsibility, it is an arguably reasonable next step to investigate what 
other ways there might be to frame these dual notions that seem to be so important to the way we 
see ourselves and lead our lives. If we can give an alternative, plausible grounding for these ideas – 
and by grounding I mean something beyond a mere appeal to consequences, i.e. beyond an appeal 
to the detrimental eﬀects the acceptance of the truth of incompatibilism would have (or lack 
thereof, cp. Roskies 2006a); I mean a good reason to keep on seeing ourselves as free and 
responsible that holds independently of any practical reason we might have for keeping our beliefs, 
since such a direct appeal to practical consequences tends to leave a bad taste in the mouth of 
anyone suﬃciently worried by the possibility of incompatibilism to seek out an answer to the 
question of whether free will is possible – if, then, we could give an alternative grounding for our 
beliefs, the lack of a resolution to our original question might fade in importance suﬃciently to be 
left behind without much discomfort. 
5.1 Naturalism: A Fourth Option 
The debate concerning free will and determinism as we have surveyed it here is at an impasse, and 
has been for a long time. New arguments are presented on each side with some regularity, but are 
equally regularly found lacking by the opposing side. Is there any possibility for a reconciliation? In 
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a seminal essay entitled Freedom and Resentment (FR, 1974)28, P.F. Strawson attempted such a 
reconciliation. While Strawson’s approach is typically considered a compatibilist argument in the 
classical sense, the unique way he went about making it means that his response can also serve as a 
“fourth option” to the three standard positions already considered, eﬀectively allowing us to lay 
what arguably is a sceptical challenge to rest. In this light, Strawson’s argument falls into the second 
category of responses to the challenge from determinism, what I at the start of Chapter 4 identified 
as rejecting the challenge from determinism, rather than attempting to answer it. In order to see the 
potential of this fourth option, we must first consider Strawson’s view of the classical debate as laid 
out in FR. 
5.1.1 The Optimist and the Pessimist 
Strawson sets up an argument between a pessimist and an optimist, characters representing 
incompatibilism and compatibilism, respectively, whose names point to the fact that the discussion 
is not only theoretical, but has practical and emotional impact on our lives. The pessimist is 
therefore not merely pessimistic about the prospect of giving a coherent account of freedom and 
responsibility compatible with the truth of determinism; he palpably depressed or dispirited at the 
thought that belief in free will appears unfounded (McKenna and Russell 2008, p. 4). The optimist, 
as we might expect, tries to convince the pessimist that we can find suﬃcient justification for our 
moral practices by other means, i.e. by appeal to consequentialist reasons – such as prevention in the 
case of punishment –, and that nothing of importance is lost to the truth of determinism. The 
pessimist remains unconvinced, feeling that the optimist is leaving our something crucial, some 
deeper sense of what it means to be free and responsible. Strawson accepts the pessimist’s criticism 
of the optimist, but rejects the standard (non-)solution, proﬀered by libertarians, of denying 
determinism and attempting to account for some “extra factor” that guarantees freedom; what 
Strawson, as mentioned above, calls “panicky metaphysics”. 
5.1.2 Our Reactive Attitudes and when We Suspend Them 
In order to attempt a reconciliation, Strawson asks us first to take a step aside from the words and 
concepts we usually apply in this discussion, things like “agent causation”, “conditional arguments” 
etc., and train our gazes on something closer to home, namely on 
[…] the very great importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other 
human beings, and the great extent to which our personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or 
28 Read in (McKenna and Russell 2008, pp. 19ﬀ). I follow here the practice of McKenna’s reprint of Strawson’s text 
which refers with bracketed numbers [60] to the page number in the version of Strawson’s text published in (Watson 
1982, pp. 59-80). 
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involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions. (FR [62], McKenna and Russell 2008, p. 
22) 
McKenna describes this as “Strawson’s ‘naturalistic turn’”, turning away from the usual conceptual 
analysis and looking at what goes on when (e.g.) we hold someone responsible (2008, p. 5). This, 
warns Strawson, necessarily involves a loss of precision, since the field of everyday activity in which 
we are now moving is so complex. But the loss of precision is arguably made up for by the gain in 
validity that comes from discussing the phenomena as they present themselves (in all their 
complexity), rather than easily definable concepts suitable (or made to suit) for a conceptual 
analysis.29 
Strawson wants us to focus on an important subset of our personal feelings and reactions, namely 
those that depend on our beliefs about the feelings and attitudes of others towards ourselves. He 
calls these our “reactive attitudes”. If someone steps on your hand, what you believe about the 
attitudes and intentions expressed by that someone towards yourself in the act of stepping on your 
hand has tremendous importance to how you react. If you think that he knew your hand was there, 
but stepped on it anyway, you would be (rightfully) indignant from his lack of regard. If, 
additionally, you (reasonably) believed that he stepped on your hand with the express intention to 
cause you harm, righteous anger would (arguably) be in order. And so on for a vast range of reactive 
attitudes concerning the ill-or-good-willed actions of others towards yourself, as well as your 
reactive attitudes towards your own actions, e.g. the guilt you might (correctly) feel at having 
wrongfully disregarded the interests of a fellow.  
Having identified this commonplace feature of human interaction as our present field of study, 
Strawson asks us to consider which situational features cause us to suspend these otherwise 
pervasive reactive attitudes. He identifies two categories of reasons that he thinks are suﬃcient for 
his purposes: 1) specific situations in which we temporarily suspend our reactive attitudes for one 
reason or another, e.g. for those reasons that make it appropriate to say “he didn’t mean to”, “he 
hadn’t realised”, “he couldn’t help it”, “he had no alternative”, etc. What is common for all the 
various instances where one of these might apply is that we do not suspend our reactive attitude 
towards the person acting, but rather towards this single act, the specific injury inflicted. In other 
words: “They do not invite us to see the agent as other than a fully responsible agent. They invite us 
29 This kind of “pragmatic” approach to philosophy that trades formal accuracy for descriptive power has many 
detractors, but keep in mind that we are exploring Strawson’s argument as an alternative to the formally more stringent, 
but woefully deadlocked traditional approaches.  
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to see the injury as one for which he was not fully, or at all, responsible.”(FR [65], McKenna and 
Russell 2008, p. 23).  
The second category has two subcategories, the first of which contains the instances in which it is 
appropriate to temporarily suspend our reactive attitudes towards an agent, e.g. the times at which it 
can be appropriate to say things like “he isn’t himself”, or “he is under great duress at the moment”. 
While these pleas have their place, they are far less important (for present purposes) than the second 
subcategory. To this belongs the cases in which we permanently suspend our reactive attitudes 
towards an agent (and therefore towards his actions). The circumstances are in this case normal – the 
agent “was himself”, so to speak – but he is “warped or deranged, neurotic or just a child.”(FR [66], 
McKenna and Russell 2008, p. 24).  
5.1.3 The Participant and Objective Attitudes 
From this, Strawson draws up a “crude dichotomy” between two ways of relating to other humans, a 
“participant attitude” and an “objective attitude”. When we suspend (all) our reactive attitudes 
towards an agent for reasons such as those which belong to the second subcategory above, we are 
taking an objective attitude towards that person, seeing him “[…] as a subject for what, in a wide 
range of sense, might be called treatment[…]” (FR [66], McKenna and Russell 2008, p. 25). 
Taking an objective attitude does not mean suspending all emotional responses: one may be 
repulsed, say, or pity the person towards which one adopts an objective attitude, but the range of 
emotions (or cognitive-emotional complexes) expressed in terms of reactive attitudes are excluded 
from the objective relation. By way of example, in my work as a nursing assistant for seniors with 
dementia I may sometimes appropriately react with anger when one of the patients that I care for is 
violent, but I may not feel resentment towards them, at least to the extent that I have 
(appropriately) adopted the objective attitude of a nurse caring for a patient no longer the master of 
themselves.  
Strawson submits that we can take this objective attitude also in “normal” cases where none of the 
above categories applies, i.e. regard all our fellows and interpersonal reaction with an analytical eye 
from an impersonal standpoint. Still, being human, we are not able to keep this up for long: to 
suspend (all) our reactive attitudes is akin to withdrawing from life itself, at least to the extent that 
this entails meaningful and valuable interpersonal relations (FR [67], McKenna and Russell 2008, 
p. 26). This is similar to the problem that faces anyone trying to maintain a radical, sceptical doubt 
with regard to knowledge: however hard you try to maintain a pervasive doubt, you will soon 
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succumb, by the nature of practical life above all, to the need to assume that some things are some 
ways and others diﬀerent. 
Furthermore, that the standard modus of humans and human interaction is one of participant 
attitude is not a claim that needs to be justified or defended by anything but reference to the 
phenomena to which this term is defined to refer: “This is simply a ‘given’ of our human nature and 
without it we would hardly recognize an individual or community as being fully human.”(McKenna 
and Russell 2008, p. 6, emphasis in original) 
Given these distinctions and the conditions in which it is appropriate to suspend our (otherwise 
pervasive) reactive attitudes towards actions or agents, we can now ask what influence the truth of 
the thesis of determinism could have on these attitudes, and whether there is any way in which this 
truth should lead us to suspend them. 
5.1.4 Why Determinism does not License the Objective Attitude 
Strawson answers this question on three levels, beginning with the question of whether the truth of 
determinism would bring into action any of the two categories in which it is appropriate to suspend 
our reactive attitudes towards actions or agents. This is answered in the negative: the truth of 
determinism neither makes it so that no action is done with good or ill will, nor makes it so that 
everyone is under duress to do what they do, nor activate any of the other reasons we have for 
suspending our reactive attitudes towards the actions of others. Nor does the truth of determinism 
make it true that people, in general, are psychologically abnormal or children (a self-refuting 
hypothesis), so that we should adopt the objective attitude towards other people (and ourselves) in 
general.30  
Beyond this, even if there were some way for the truth of determinism to make it appropriate 
pervasively to adopt the objective attitude, humans would be incapable of doing this. However hard 
we may try, convinced by some traditional hard-determinist argument, we would be forced by our 
very nature into treating most people (and ourselves) as agents with whom it is appropriate to have 
participant interaction, (if for no other reason than to distinguish them from those that clearly merit 
the kind of treatment entailed by adopting an objective attitude, i.e. those that are warped, 
deranged, neurotic or just children). 
30 This also predicts Stephen Morse’s distinction between causation and abnormal causation in the actually non-
analogous cases of a person behaving abnormally due to e.g. a brain cancer, and a person’s behaviour being the result of 
normal brain processes – and analogy often, and falsely, adduced in arguments from neuroscience and determinism to 
hard determinism. See (Morse 2010). 
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Finally, even if we were given the “god-like” choice of whether or not to suspend all reactive 
attitudes, this would mean choosing between an emotionally impoverished, dehumanized life and 
its opposite; a choice on which the truth of determinism could not rationally be claimed to have any 
say. 
As for the typical “moral judgements” of right and wrong, Strawson says of them that they are 
generalised, “vicarious analogues” of reactive attitudes. This means, roughly (and amongst other 
things), that when you see someone treating me in a certain way, you may judge, based on features 
of the situation, that I am justified in being indignant: the treatment can be considered 
mistreatment, or as displaying ill will, and therefore can be judged morally wrong. Therefore, the 
same applies to moral reactive attitudes and judgements as to personal ones: the truth of the thesis 
of determinism does not make it appropriate to suspend them; neither in specific cases, nor in 
general. 
5.1.5 Attempting a Reconciliation 
From this way of conceiving of the issue, Strawson revisits the argument between the optimist and 
the pessimist, and points out using the tools now acquired just what he thinks each of them has 
gotten wrong. The optimist typically argues that the truth of determinism does not aﬀect the 
eﬃcacy of rewards and punishments in regulating behaviour, e.g. punishing to prevent further 
crime. But this picture is “wholly dominated by objectivity of attitude”, with “[t]he only operative 
notions involved [being] such as those of policy, treatment, control.” By excluding the moral 
reactive attitudes, the optimist’s picture is leaving out “essential elements in the concepts of moral 
condemnation and moral responsibility.”(FR [76], McKenna and Russell 2008, p. 7, emphasis in 
original). The pessimist is right to dismiss this attempted solution, but he is wrong in thinking that 
the reactive attitudes are insuﬃcient to “fill the gap in the optimist’s account”, and that he must 
therefore provide some metaphysical explanation that can be “repeatedly verified” in all cases where 
we want to claim that someone is acting freely and is morally responsible (FR [79], McKenna and 
Russell 2008, p. 7). Only if the optimist concedes to the pessimist that something vital is missing 
from his picture, and only if the pessimist in turn lets go of his metaphysics, can the two be 
reconciled and the dilemma of determinism hope to find a solution. At present, the debate is at a 
standstill because both parties are guilty of “over-intellectualizing the facts”; disregarding the 
emotionally rich framework in which these practices actually exists, seeking some purely intellectual, 
outside justification: 
Inside the general structure or web of human attitudes and feelings of which I have been speaking, 
there is endless room for modification, redirection, criticism, and justification. But questions of 
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justification are internal to the structure or relate to modifications internal to it. The existence of 
the general framework of attitudes itself is something we are given with the fact of human society. 
As a whole, it neither calls for, nor permits, an external ‘rational’ justification. Pessimist and 
optimist alike show themselves, in diﬀerent ways, unable to accept this. (FR [78-9], McKenna 
and Russell 2008, pp. 7-8) 
McKenna points out two important aspects of Strawson’s naturalistic turn that have interesting 
historic precedents. The first is his emphasis on emotion in moral judgements, what at the time of 
writing FR was a return to the “moral sense theory” associated with David Hume and Adam Smith. 
This emphasis on emotions has gained prominence in wider circles interested in morality in recent 
years, especially as the human sciences have picked up the topic, giving rise to subfields such as 
aﬀective neuroscience. That emotions are not “rationally suspect” – a historically common prejudice 
in much philosophy –, but rather an essential part of rationality itself, is a realisation with increasing 
influence in both philosophy and science (see e.g. Nussbaum 2001). The other, for purposes of this 
section more important aspect of Strawson’s rather unique contribution is what McKenna calls 
Strawson’s way of “discrediting the skeptical challenge” that the standard dilemma of determinism 
can be taken to represent, something he does by reference to “the inescapable, psychological 
mechanisms that guide human thought and action.”(McKenna and Russell 2008, p. 8). As 
McKenna points out, Strawson develops his ideas from FR in the later book Skepticism and 
Naturalism (SN, [1985]/2005), in which the connection between his approach to the debate 
concerning free will and determinism in FR is connected to a kind of “soft naturalism” taken up, i.a. 
by Hume, in reply to the classical forms of epistemological scepticism, such as scepticism about 
secure knowledge of an independently existing world.  
This is, in my eyes, the crux of Strawson’s approach, and why I have presented his argument as a 
“fourth alternative” instead of reporting it under the more commonly applied heading of 
compatibilism. For, while one might be tempted to think that Strawson’s appeal to the fact that we 
neither can nor could want to rid ourselves of our reactive attitudes constitutes a concession to the 
hard determinist/incompatibilist, in that the solution proﬀered is merely pragmatic, leaving the 
fundamental challenge unanswered and therefore (tacitly) admitted (as in the traditional 
compatibilist accounts), subsuming Strawson’s argument under classical compatibilism in this 
manner misses the main, if not the entire, force of his argument. To see how Strawson’s suggestion 
might actually reconcile the pessimist and the optimist, we should therefore investigate more closely 
what Strawson calls “the way of Naturalism”; “a diﬀerent kind of response to skepticism – a 
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response which does not so much attempt to meet the challenge as to pass it by.” (Strawson 2005, p. 
11 & p. 3). 
5.1.5.1 Soft Naturalism in Reply to Sceptical Determinism 
Strawson covers a much wider ground in SN than in FR, and so the general outline of his reply to 
determinism first appears in his comparison of the way Hume and Wittgenstein relate to the 
justification of judgements: 
[Hume and Wittgenstein] have in common the view that our “beliefs” in the existence of body 
and, to speak roughly, in the general reliability of induction are not grounded beliefs and at the 
same time are not open to serious doubt. They are, one might say, outside our critical and rational 
competence in the sense that they define, or help to define, the area in which that competence is 
exercised. To attempt to confront the professional skeptical doubt with arguments in support of 
these beliefs, with rational justifications, is simply to show a total misunderstanding of the role 
they actually play in our belief-systems. The correct way with the professional skeptical doubt is 
not to attempt to rebut it with argument, but to point out that it is idle, unreal, a pretense; and 
then the rebutting arguments will appear as equally idle; the reasons produced in those arguments 
to justify induction or belief in the existence of body are not, and do not become, our reasons for 
these beliefs; there is no such thing as the reasons for which we hold these beliefs. We simply 
cannot help accepting them as defining the areas within which the questions come up of what 
beliefs we should rationally hold on such-and-such a matter. (Strawson 2005, p. 21, emphasis in 
original) 
There are two elements at play here. 1) Strawson is saying that “professional skeptical doubt” about 
the grounds for our belief in the existence of “body” (the things that populate the perceptible world) 
and in the reliability of induction, is idle, pointless: those “beliefs” are not the kind of beliefs that 
need to be justified. Rather, they serve as part of the framework within which it is possible to justify 
beliefs proper. Thus, when we in a particular case investigate whether or not we are right about 
some judgement of what something in the world is, we do so only on the backdrop of the belief that 
things in the world are a certain way, and that we can make reliable judgements about them. That is 
not to say that our practices are what validate these beliefs, or that scepticism about these beliefs is 
self-refuting because talk of doubting them presupposes certain foundational concepts (Strawson 
2005, pp. 3ﬀ). No, these beliefs are simply outside of justification, not something we can rationally 
doubt or reason away. We may try, as the sceptic indeed does, to doubt them and demand 
justification for why we should believe in them, but try as we might, we cannot escape relying on 
them in anything and everything connected with human life. Hume saw them as simply given by 
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Nature; that we cannot any more choose to judge than we can choose to breathe, and Wittgenstein, 
roughly, saw them as part of the framework or scaﬀolding of our thoughts. 
2) Because of this, trying to argue with the sceptic is equally idle and pointless: these beliefs are also 
not in need of any justification. The framework given by nature is not something we have assented 
to; is what allows us to distinguish between true and false in the first place (as Strawson quotes 
Wittgenstein saying, Strawson 2005, p. 16). Thus, if we disregard this and go looking for reasons to 
continue to hold a belief, e.g. reasons or justification for believing in the reality of the external 
world, whatever reasons we might find would still not be (or become) our reasons for believing in the 
external world– we have no such reasons, we simply have these (framework) beliefs. 
That is not to say that science or reasoning is pointless, of course, but that science and reasoning are 
properly occupied with questions within the framework of some given beliefs.  
Strawson argues that this is directly transferrable to the debate concerning free will and 
determinism, since, as he has analysed our belief in free will, the reactive attitudes (and their 
vicarious analogues the moral judgements) are just as much a part of our given nature or “humanity” 
as our belief in physical objects: 
What we have, in our inescapable commitment to these attitudes and feelings, is a natural fact, 
something as deeply rooted in our natures as our existence as social beings. (Strawson 2005, p. 34) 
Our reactive attitudes are, in the end, “inescapable” says Strawson. 
Although that “inescapable” must be qualified, seeing as how we do have the ability, in certain 
instances and for certain people, to suspend our reactive attitudes and take what he called the 
“objective attitude” towards such people. And as the “moral sceptic” (the incompatibilist) based his 
argument against our unreasoned views on just this our ability to view each other from a detached, 
objective point of view, the question can then be raised: from which point of view, the participant or 
the objective, do we see things as they really are? For, even if we might not be able to escape our 
reactive attitudes completely in practice, it seems that we can still say of the objective point of view 
that it is the right one, the one most in accordance with how the world really is (Strawson 2005, pp. 
36ﬀ). It seems that we are still stuck with the same problem as before. This, however, is only 
appearance: we have established the inescapability and unjustifiability of our reactive attitudes, and 
the existence of a second point of view with a second set of attitudes can now be granted without 
discomfort. Indeed, the whole problem, continues Strawson, arises, not from the existence of two 
possible points of views that are, if not mutually exclusive, at least tending to exclusivity “at their 
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limits”; the problem arises from the forced choice between them. But there is no reason to think 
that only one is correct or true, or that one is “more true” than the other; they are fundamentally 
diﬀerent ways of looking at human action. The real illusion is the idea that there is a “metaphysically 
superior standpoint”: 
Once that illusion is abandoned, the appearance of contradiction is dispelled. We can recognize, 
in our conception of the real, a reasonable relativity to standpoints that we do know and can 
occupy. Relative to the standpoint which we normally occupy as social beings, prone to moral and 
personal reactive attitudes, human actions, or some of them, are morally toned and propertied in 
the diverse ways signified in our rich vocabulary of moral appraisal. Relative to the detached 
naturalistic standpoint which we can sometimes occupy, they […] have no properties but those 
which can be described in the vocabularies of naturalistic analysis and explanation. (Strawson 
2005, p. 39-40) 
Note Strawson’s usage of “naturalistic” here to signify the “sceptical” or objective position. This is 
where Strawson introduces his distinction between a non-reductive or “soft” naturalism and a 
reductive, “naturalistic” view of humans. Whereas the latter form of “hard” naturalism seeks 
reductive explanations of human phenomena in the terms of purely objective natural sciences, 
Strawson argues that a soft naturalism can incorporate both the scientific objective regard with its 
absence of interpersonal reactive attitudes, and the personal perspective; and thus, does not try to 
deny or seek (unneeded and unwanted) objective justification for how we as humans relate to the 
world, each other, and ourselves.  
To substantiate this “relativizing move” (2005, p. 38), Strawson compares the participant and 
objective attitudes (as complementary, moving on mutually exclusive, points of view) with the case 
of perception and its objects. For, argues Strawson, we can talk of the objects of perception either as 
being, in the vulgar meaning of these terms, “coloured or plain, hard or soft, noisy or silent” (2005, 
p. 52); or we can talk of them in the terms of physical theories as having certain physical properties 
that impinge on our sensory apparatus, modulating neuronal patterns of excitation, etc. Which of 
the two descriptions or explanations we are interested in depends on what point of view we inhabit. 
Are we asking what something looks like, or are we wondering how the visual system works? Of 
course, neither point of view, whether it is subjective or objective, on human relations or objects of 
perception, is above error or criticism: speaking of the subjective point of view, we can certainly be 
mistaken in our perception of something or in our reaction to some perceived harm, and it may be 
argued that large parts both of perception and our reactive attitudes are shaped by our particular 
history and current situation, and that the subjective view therefore has “internal relativities”. While 
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this on the one hand can make it even easier to accept that there are no single metaphysically 
superior point of view of the world as it “really is” (since there is also no singe subjective point of 
view under which every subject would have to be subsumed), this point can also be exploited by the 
“scientistic hard-liners” to argue that their framework – which, while struggling with internal 
relativities of its own, has been build up over time using a variety of tools to ensure a cumulative 
advance in knowledge (“notably, the test of verification, the hard test of success or failure in 
prediction and control”) – is clearly superior to the multifarious and uncertain subjective point of 
view (2005, p. 51). Moreover, the hard-liners or hard naturalists might further claim that their 
objective view of the world can account, not only for the world as it really is, but also for every 
phenomenon described by the rival subjective views, namely as subjective experiences and reactions 
for which the hard naturalist can give a “causal analysis” (Strawson 2005, p. 52). 
This, however, misses the point and force of Strawson’s “relativizing move”, and here a lengthy 
quote must be excused: 
To this the patient reply must be: not that it is mistaken to think of the physical world in the 
abstract terms of physical science which allow no place in it for phenomenal qualities; nor that it 
is mistaken to think of the world of human behaviour in the purely naturalistic terms which 
exclude moral praise or blame; only that it is mistaken to think of these views of the world as 
genuinely incompatible with the view of physical things as being, in the most unsophisticated 
sense of these words, colored or plain, hard or soft, noisy or silent; and with the view of human 
actions as, sometimes, noble or mean, admirable or despicable, good or evil, right or wrong. 
Though we can, by an intellectual eﬀort, occupy at times, and for a time, the former pair of 
standpoints, we cannot give up the latter pair of standpoints. This last is the point on which the 
non-reductive naturalist, as I have called him, insists. What the relativizing move does is to 
remove the appearance of incompatibility between members of the two pairs of views. Without 
the relativizing move, the scientific hardliner, or reductive naturalist, could stick to his line; 
admitting that we are naturally committed to the human perceptual and morally reactive 
viewpoints, he could simply conclude that we live most of our lives in a state of unavoidable 
illusion. The relativizing move averts this (to most) unpalatable conclusion. It would surely be an 
extreme of self-mortifying intellectual Puritanism which would see in this very fact a reason for 
rejecting that move. (Strawson 2005, p. 52) 
C 
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By treating the deterministic dilemma as a sceptical challenge and connecting his reply to 
established philosophical tradition, Strawson goes a long way in diﬀusing the entire worry that our 
beliefs and practices concerning and surrounding free will and moral responsibility are somehow 
untenable or in need of metaphysical justification.  
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Interlude 
6 Questioning the Framework or Framing our Questions? 
“One reason why most people don’t perceive [incompatible beliefs in free will and in determinism] 
as a conflict might be that our belief in freedom is so deeply embedded in our everyday thoughts 
and behavior that the rather abstract belief in physical determinism is simply not strong enough 
to compete. The picture changes, however, with direct scientific demonstrations that our choices 
are determined by the brain. People are immensely fascinated by scientific experiments that 
directly expose how our seemingly free decisions are systematically related to prior brain activity.” 
John-Dylan Haynes (2011b) 
6.1 Free Will as Framework: Taking Stock 
Taking a cue from Strawson, most of the discussion in Part I can be seen as a discussion of the 
framework of free will, i.e. the framework constituted by our ideas about freedom and responsibility, 
within which we can distinguish between actions that are free in the relevant sense and those that 
are not, and between persons that are responsible in the relevant sense and those that are not. When 
discussing determinism and indeterminism, incompatibilism and compatibilism, we were never 
concerned with whether some person A, in some situation X, had acted freely, or if it was 
appropriate to hold person A responsible for doing X, or to what degree we should hold A 
responsible for X; no, we were considering whether it is ever accurate, or even permissible, to talk of 
a person doing something freely, acting out of their own, free will, or if it is ever legitimate to say 
that someone is responsible for doing something, in the sense of ‘responsible’ that goes beyond mere 
physical causation or strict liability. 
Conversely, outside of this philosophical scientific discourse, the reality of free will and 
responsibility is presupposed, taken for granted, forming the framework within which we resolve 
the questions that matter to us in the present, namely questions about responsibility for specific 
people in specific cases: Who was responsible for this? Could they have avoided it? What was their 
intent? Should they have realised the consequences? When we judge our fellows or give them fair 
trail, we typically do not ask: Is there free will? Is the notion of moral (and legal) responsibility 
supported by a coherent metaphysics? No, we want to know who did this, and whether or not it is 
right to hold that person responsible for that action and its outcome (Greene and Cohen 2010).31  
31 Stephen J. Morse, speaking on the relationship between neuroscientific results and legal practice, calls the first kind of 
discussion “external critique”, as it is external to the framework of our ascriptions of legal responsibility, while the 
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In surveying what admittedly are only parts of this vast “framework debate”, we saw that the 
question of whether free will is compatible with determinism, or indeterminism, or any coherent 
metaphysics for that matter, is complex and far from resolved. I went to some lengths to undermine 
the felt acuity of the incompatibilist dilemma (that free will seems to be impossible whether the 
world is deterministic or indeterministic) with the help of Hoefer’s radical, if counterintuitive, shift 
in perspective from outside-in “determined” to inside-out “determining”. 
Finally, considering determinism’s “challenge to common sense” a sceptical challenge to the notion 
of free will and moral responsibility, I argued with P. F. Strawson that it was misguided to search 
for external justification for our “reactive attitudes” and their vicarious analogues the moral 
judgements: What Strawson called our “personal and moral reactive attitudes” are given features of 
human life, not suppositions requiring or capable of being given justification. According to 
Strawson, all three main positions in the standard debate concerning free will and determinism are 
guilty of over-intellectualising the issue, accepting that the framework formed by reactive attitudes 
and moral judgements is in need of rational outside justification. This error is, at least in part, the 
result of a form of scepticism with strong similarities in structure to the kind of epistemological 
scepticism that both Hume, Kant and Reid dealt with, a scepticism that, according to what 
Strawson called “soft” or “non-reductive naturalism”, is idle and pointless; perhaps, at best, showing 
the limits of human reason, but by no means providing reason to actually doubt all claims to 
knowledge, or in the present context, undermining the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes in 
toto. 
6.2 Empirical Critique of “Free Will as Framework”: The Discussion Ahead 
The initial aim of Part I was to separate this philosophical debate about the possibility of free will 
from the kind of critique that neuroscience (along with the other, empirical sciences relevant to 
human reasoning and behaviour) could leverage against our traditional conception of free will and 
responsibility. The human sciences do not touch upon the question of whether the world, 
fundamentally speaking, is deterministic or not, nor whether it is possible to give an account of free 
will that is compatible with any reasonable metaphysic. Therefore, neuroscience does not have a say 
in this fundamental debate, and cannot provide or partake in any “wholesale” denial of the 
framework of our traditional conception of free will and responsibility that would arise from it. Nor 
can neuroscientists eager to explain (free) will in mechanistic terms rely on the fundamental 
incompatibility of freedom and determinism (or indeterminism) when claiming they have shown 
second kind is dubbed “internal critique”, since in this case, neuroscientific evidence is applied to settle questions within 
the framework of the assumption of “minimal rationality” that is operant in (US) courts of law (Morse 2010). 
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free will to be an illusion, since no such simple incompatibility exists; despite what Haynes appears 
to believe, his Libet-style experiments are not empirical confirmation of an already-accepted truth 
about the incompatibility of free will and determinism. 
Neuroscience, then, has no truck with the fundamental philosophical debate concerning free will 
and determinism.32 That being said, one might still make a scientific critique of the framework of 
free will. Instead of arguing, theoretically, that (something like) free will is impossible; such a 
critique could make the empirically founded argument that humans actually do not have anything like 
free will. This kind of empirical critique would have, as far as I can tell, the same potential 
consequences as the theoretical critique of the framework of free will is thought to entail. The 
natural next question is therefore: Does such an empirically founded critique of the framework of 
free will exist? 
If you look to the popular science literature again, you might very well get the impression that 
neuroscience (and other sciences studying the human body and mind) really are deciding, once and 
for all, this time with evidence, the age-old question of whether we have free will or not. And you 
would think that the answer was “no, we do not”. Books like that of Harris base their argument on 
evidence from several fields of study, among them neuroscience. Most commonly, the 
neuroscientific critiques of free will have focused on the role consciousness can or cannot be said to 
play in action initiation and control, a tendency best exemplified by Libet and his scientific 
successors such as Haynes, and in the attempt at a broadly based critique of “conscious will” as seen 
in Daniel Wegner’s Illusion of Conscious Will (2002). This tendency to focus on what might be 
termed the causal eﬃcacy of consciousness (with regards to behaviour) can be understood in relation to 
the importance ascribed to consciousness for agency; both implicitly in commonsense thought, and 
explicitly in the elucidations of our commitments in legal texts and practices. Accepting that 
consciousness matters to our ideas of freedom and ascriptions of responsibility, investigating 
whether consciousness can play this role is a natural question for empirical science, not least 
neuroscience. 
Both in Libet’s early experiments (1983) and in the later work by Haynes et al. (Soon et al. 2008b, 
2011a), showing temporal priority of subconscious over conscious processes is taken as evidence for 
the claim that conscious decisions come too late to be the “real” causal power driving behaviour, 
which therefore is ascribed to the non-conscious neural processes that are seen to predate conscious 
32 There is a theoretical possibility that neuroscience could one day evolve into a science that might have something to 
say about this fundamental debate, e.g. because it could somehow give (conclusive) evidence for agent causation, 
although I do not profess to know what such evidence would look like. 
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choice. The mainstay of empirically motivated critiques of “free will as framework” is therefore to 
deny the causal eﬃcacy of consciousness with regard to behaviour. 
However, as we shall see in Part 2 of the thesis, there are issues both with the evidence denying 
conscious causal eﬃcacy, and with the way consciousness is framed in the experiments which have 
generated the evidence. Taking Wegner’s broadly based, “revisionist” argument about the illusory 
nature of our experience of conscious will as a prime contender for a successful empirically founded 
critique of free will, I argue that the evidence he presents only supports a limited claim about part of 
our experience, and not a wholesale denial of causal eﬃcacy of consciousness as this is seen to be 
required by our traditional understanding of free will and (moral) responsibility.  
To the extent that Wegner’s can be identified as the “best bet” for an empirically founded wholesale 
critique of free will, showing the limitations of this critique also amounts to a serious objection to 
this kind of approach in general. Keeping in mind the types of claims made e.g. by Harris and 
Haynes, this is a significant result in itself; free will is neither theoretically nor empirically refuted.  
That we shouldn’t expect a wholesale denial of free will and moral responsibility to arise from 
scientific quarters is however no reason to disregard the findings, i.a. in neuroscience, about the way 
humans in certain situations go about doing things in ways which appear to conflict with at least the 
stronger interpretations of what it means to have free will, especially as this relates to our thoughts 
about moral and legal responsibility. Leaving aside the question of whether free will is possible and 
whether any humans ever have something like it, scientific studies of the processes that lead to 
action and of the actions themselves can illuminate aspects of human nature that might otherwise 
be disregarded for reasons of theory or ideology. In other words, neuroscience and the other 
sciences studying humans might give critiques of the appropriateness of ascribing free will and 
(moral) responsibility to specific people or groups of people, in specific situations or more generally, 
within the assumed or accepted framework of a notion of free will and associated ideas of moral and 
legal responsibility. The limited claim I identify in Wegner’s argument is significant in this respect, 
but for this limited claim to be incorporated into a “traditional” interpretation of the available 
evidence – an interpretation that is realist both about free will and about conscious causal eﬃcacy – 
it is also necessary to consult the empirical evidence to see if there is support for such an 
interpretation; to see if consciousness really is causally eﬀective in bringing about behaviour in any 
way comparable to what can be said to be required by our traditional notions of freedom and 
responsibility. 
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Part 2 
Free will and the causal efficacy of consciousness 
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7 Neuroscience on Consciousness in the Critique of Free Will 
As humans, we like to think that our decisions are under our conscious control — that we have 
free will. Philosophers have debated that concept for centuries, and now Haynes and other 
experimental neuroscientists are raising a new challenge. They argue that consciousness of a 
decision may be a mere biochemical afterthought, with no influence whatsoever on a person's 
actions. According to this logic, they say, free will is an illusion. (Smith 2011) 
7.1 Dissolving the Dilemma of Free Will 
As we saw in Part I, the debate concerning free will and determinism arises out what appear to be 
irreconcilable facts, a “fact of experience” (FE) and a “fact of theory” (FT):  
FE  We experience having free will of a certain kind33 
FT  Free will of this kind appears to be impossible in (meta-) physical terms 
Assuming a naïve position, there are strong intuitions to support each apparent fact: we are not 
usually systematically wrong about what we experience, but here we have run up against theoretical 
arguments that flatly contradict the particular experience we have of being free. Any thinker seeking 
an answer to the question “do we have free will?” is therefore faced with a dilemma: which of the 
intuitions should be trusted? Let us call this “the Dilemma of Free Will”, or just “the Dilemma” for 
short. Now, I take the discussion in Part 1 to have shown FT to be less than certain; indeed that 
there is no simple reply to the question of whether free will is at all possible in (meta-) physical 
terms. I was motivated to embark on that analysis by the observation that some of those who oﬀer 
scientifically supported arguments against free will assume that FT is undeniably true and therefore 
set their sights on undermining FE. Writers like Daniel Wegner thus amass evidence, i.a. from 
experiments like those of Libet et al., to support the claim that our experience of free will is false, 
illusory. While Wegner pursues several lines of evidence, one aspect that we have not yet discussed 
is common to his entire argument: Wegner (and his fellow revisionist) argue that consciousness does 
not play the role we think it plays with regard to action, i.e. does not play the role that supposedly it 
would have to play if our experience of having free will of a certain kind were veridical.  
This appeal to consciousness might appear entirely natural or somewhat strange, depending on your 
familiarity with this kind of debate. I will not enter into a long discussion of history of the idea of 
consciousness or the place of consciousness in commonsense and legal discourse today, but simply 
33 “A certain kind” can here be taken to refer to any of the ways in which free will has been construed in the traditional 
or classical debate concerning free will and determinism, what in Part I was centred around “the ability to do 
otherwise”. 
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note that consciousness is strongly associated with every aspect of what it means to be an active, 
acting human, especially in relation to questions of whether some action was chosen or intended, 
and therefore with the question of when and how we are responsible, morally and legally, for the 
things we do.34 
With this in mind, if we approach free will as an empirical matter, FE can perhaps be taken to 
stand for something like the following:  
FE* We have the experience of consciously initiating and controlling action. 
If we assume for the moment that the experience we have is veridical, i.e. that we experience 
consciously initiating and controlling action because it is true that we consciously initiate and 
control action, FE* could be taken to amount to a claim about what might be called the “causal 
eﬃcacy of consciousness” (CEC) with regard to action: 
 CEC Consciousness is causally eﬃcacious in initiating and controlling action.  
Given the this reading of the dilemma, the road is open for revisionist arguments based in empirical 
research on the actual role of consciousness in action initiation, guidance and control to criticise FE 
through CEC. Thus, when Wegner attempts to dissolve the Dilemma by claiming that our 
experience of conscious will (FE*) is an illusion, he does so based on an empirically founded 
argument against CEC.  
Now, while Wegner and other revisionists set their sights on FE because they hold FT to be 
undeniably true, the discussion in Part 1 has excluded such simplistic appeal to FT. Any empirical 
argument against FE by way of FE*/CEC must therefore be made without relying on FT. To the 
extent that, e.g. Wegner’s interpretation of evidence against CEC currently relies on FT, its 
potential support to an argument against FE will be weakened accordingly. 
Another thing is now also clear: even though I have undermined the arguments to FT and thus any 
easy recourse to this in the interpretation of evidence against CEC/FE*/FE, suﬃciently strong 
evidence against CEC could still undermine our belief in free will, regardless of whether or not free 
will is possible in principle: If we accept that conscious control over our decisions or actions is 
essential for free will, evidence against conscious control would undermine free will in practice, i.e. 
34 I will also not attempt to give an account of what consciousness is: there are several interesting theories about the 
nature of consciousness, but none of the arguments I will review (or make) here depend on a specific theory of 
consciousness. 
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be evidence against humans actually having anything like the “ability to do otherwise” discussed in 
Part 1.  
Finally, and correspondingly, even if the evidence against CEC is insuﬃcient, this still does not give 
us more than a prima facie reason for continuing to believe in free will. Therefore, just as I provided 
independent reason for a continued belief in free will at the end of Part 1, I will argue here that the 
evidence supports a continued belief in CEC, which together with the argument in Part 1 can be 
taken as support for the veracity of FE. 
Given this backdrop of the importance of consciousness for the empirical study of free will, we can 
return to the experiments by Libet and others to see what, if anything, these allow us to conclude 
about CEC/FE*. 
7.2 Conscious Causal Eﬃcacy in Libet-Style Experiments 
In the Libet et al. experiments discussed in Part I, subjects, based on introspection, evaluated the 
time at which they first became aware – consciously aware – of the urge, wish or spontaneous 
decision to move their finger or wrist (W). This was then compared to two objective measures, 
namely the onset of the characteristic “readiness potential” (RP, specifically RP II) and the onset of 
movement (M). When the experiments repeatedly showed the onset of RP to precede W, it was 
concluded that the conscious awareness of the urge or decision to move – although purportedly 
experienced as something like a conscious will or choice, and although reported to appear before the 
actual movement – could not be the cause of the subsequent movement. That honour was given the 
RP itself based on a conjunction of the measured temporal sequence and the commonly accepted 
idea that a cause must precede its eﬀect. Since RP appeared consistently before both W and M, the 
conclusion was drawn that RP must be the real cause of M (RP → M), with W either a product of 
RP or something produced in parallel with the causally eﬀective processes which lead from RP to M 
(RP → [W→] M).35  Thus, Libet’s results were taken by many to be unequivocal proof of the claim 
that consciousness does not initiate action, thereby denying CEC.  
Libet and his colleagues first suggested and later argued that there was a gap of around 100 ms in 
which one could consciously veto the movement about to be made (Libet 1998, Libet et al. 1983). 
According to this picture, conscious will would not be the initiating cause of action, but would be 
able to serve as a final “controller” of action execution, which in normal situations would arguably 
35 By way of illustration, the various interpretive possibilities identified by (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011) are shown here in 
a simplified annotation with brackets surrounding W, indicating the uncertain relation between W and M, but with RP 
given temporal and causal priority in every case. 
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translate to the kind of ultimate “executive” control needed for ascriptions of responsibility. 
However, most critics dismissed this suggestion as a non-starter, and reasoned that parity with the 
(RP → [W→] M) argument would imply that the conscious “veto” itself was also caused by 
preceding brain activity, relegating any veto power back to those unconscious mental mechanisms. 
The experiments by Haynes et al. (Soon et al. 2008b, Haynes 2011a) have been presented as 
evidence to strengthen the claim that the real causal processes leading to decisions and behaviour 
are physical and non-conscious (Smith 2011). In Haynes’ Libet-style experiments, subsequent 
choice between pressing a button connected to the left finger or one connected to the right was 
predictable with up to 60% accuracy from data recorded a full 6-7 seconds before the subject 
actually pressed one of the buttons. Taking into account the time lag inherent in the method used 
to measure activity (BOLD fMRI)36, this has been taken to mean predictive patterns of activity in 
areas of the cortex up to 10 s before conscious awareness of choice. Appearing to show non-
conscious neural processes “deciding”, not only the ‘when’, but also the ‘what’ of action at a 
subjectively appreciable interval before the person choosing has any experience of actually making 
the decision, these results oﬀer intuitively compelling evidence against what might be called 
“conscious free will”. Libet-style experiments have thus reanimated the above quoted belief that 
consciousness or conscious will is a mere “biological afterthought”, an epiphenomenon37 hitching a 
ride on the inexorable motion of the physical nervous system. 
As for consequences for the debate concerning free will, if FE*/CEC is accepted as the correct 
interpretation of the entailments of FE, or alternately, simply that consciousness in the role in 
which it is portrayed by FE*, i.e. CEC, is important to free will and moral and legal responsibility; 
and if we agree that Libet’s experiments and subsequent studies modelled on these show that 
consciousness comes too late to be the cause of action, then it would seem that the dilemma is 
dissolved, and furthermore, that we have a successful wholesale scientific denial of free will.  
 
36 Blood Oxygen Level Dependent functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging is a brain-imaging technique that relies on 
the diﬀerence in magnetic field properties of haemoglobin carrying oxygen compared to haemoglobin without oxygen to 
indicate the changes in neuronal activity in areas of the brain (reasoning that neurons that are more active require a 
larger local blood flow to supply nutrients, but have little or no increase in oxygen consumption, thus giving a net 
increase in blood oxygen level in the area of activation). This technique has high spatial resolution (2-3 mm), but poor 
temporal resolution (around two measurements per second, and lagging several seconds behind neural activity) 
compared to, e.g. EEG (on the order of centimetres and milliseconds), and is heavily reliant on statistical analysis in 
order to get useful results. This also makes results from fMRI controversial, since it is possible to get widely varying 
interpretations based, i.a. on how one generates the “baseline” activity against which task-relevant activity is measured 
(Stark and Squire 2001, Gusnard and Raichle 2001). For more reasons to be generally sceptical of neuroscientific 
results, see (Button et al. 2013) 
37 A phenomenon with no causal eﬀects; caused but not causing. The idea or worry that consciousness is an 
epiphenomenon has important historical roots, as we shall see in section 9.2 
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However, there are issues with both premises:  
1. Construing conscious control in accord with FE*/CEC, as exemplified by Libet-style 
experiments including those by Haynes et al., is not the only way of accounting for the role 
of consciousness in the generation of behaviour, nor is it, on closer inspection, necessarily 
even a good one. While it might seem intuitively right to identify any conscious causal 
power with the direct initiation and control of action, this actually accords rather poorly 
with the role consciousness is commonly taken to play in complex behaviour of the kind 
where questions of freedom and responsibility are commonly raised, where goal-directed 
behaviour comprising a wider temporal and thematic range of thoughts and intentions are 
essential to understanding action (Gallagher 2006).  
2. Even if one were to accept this construal of the role of consciousness, there remains two 
serious issues with the inference from the kind of experiment performed here to a general 
truth about choice and action:  
a. There are good reasons to be sceptical both of the claim that W is anything like a 
conscious decision or act of will, and of the assumption that RP is the neural cause of 
action, as showed by experiments where change in instructions or merely in analysis 
produces results which are inconsistent with the claims of Libet et al. (Pockett and 
Purdy 2011). 
b. Even if we were to accept that W really corresponds to what we think “will” is and 
that RP is the real cause of movement in Libet’s studies, this is still only valid for the 
kind of highly constrained and highly artificial experimental setting used in Libet-
style experiments (Bayne 2011). 
Whereas (1.) is mainly a conceptual worry related to the framing of the empirically informed debate 
concerning free will and conscious causal eﬃcacy, (2.) concerns the evidence itself as it is presented 
within the given conceptual framework. In order to criticise fairly the extant empirical evidence, I 
will allow the assumed framework for now, and return to the possibility of a diﬀerent framing of 
consciousness in chapter 9. 
Issue (2.a) is a serious objection to the claims made by Libet et al. as well as any subsequent 
experiment that similarly relies either on measurements of RP, a subjectively evaluated time of 
(spontaneous) “decision” (W) based on the instruction to wait for an “urge” to act, or both. While it 
is possible (and common) to object to the reliance on the ability of experimental subjects to 
accurately evaluate the time of W (Pockett and Purdy 2011, pp. 29-30), there is a more 
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fundamental objection to be made about the claim that W is anything like a conscious decision to 
move. In most Libet-style experiments, including those by Haynes et al., subjects are instructed to 
wait for an “urge” to move. Ostensibly worded thus to avoid pre-planning of action and transference 
of eﬀects from one trial to the next, guaranteeing that each measured “choice” really is 
“spontaneous” (Libet et al. 1983, Soon et al. 2008b), these instructions also mean that subjects are 
not focused on making a decision of when to move or what button to push, but rather direct their 
attention towards detecting the arrival (from somewhere) of an urge to move (Batthyány 2009). The 
problem with this is two-fold. Firstly (2.a.a), subjects are arguably not engaged in making decisions 
or choices at all, and thus the relevance of the experiments for free will, understood as freedom in 
decision/choice, is undermined. Secondly (2.a.b), even if the wording is supposed to pre-empt pre-
planning of action, there is an argument to be made that subjects in Libet-style experiments rely on 
(implicit) plans for how they should act during the experiment, e.g. how often they should press the 
button so as to be good experimental subjects (Talmi and Frith 2011), and that this makes diﬃcult 
the conclusion that measured brain activity really precedes the conscious choice to act. 
Considering (2.a.a), one of the most significant critiques of Libet’s original experiments has been 
provided by Susan Pockett and Suzanne Purdy (Pockett and Purdy 2011). Using a combination of 
reanalysis of extant experimental data and evidence from new experiments, Pockett and Purdy were 
able to show i) both that Libet’s type II RPs are neither necessary nor suﬃcient for spontaneous 
voluntary movement, and that RPs are probably a subclass of a signal related to “general readiness” 
or expectancy rather than the preparation of movement. This is further supported ii) by the fact that 
new experiments replicate Libet’s only when subjects are instructed to wait for an urge to move; for 
trials where subjects are instructed instead to make an explicit decision to move, either no RP or 
only a much shorter RP that coincides with or arises after the time of decision is detectable. This 
clearly undermines the argument that classic Libet-style experiments show conscious choice coming 
too late to be the real cause or initiator of movement. 
Haynes et al. are mindful of the possibility that increased activity in certain brain areas leading up to 
a decision or choice may only be “unspecific preparatory activation” (Soon et al. 2008b, p. 543), 
reflecting, e.g. “attention to intention” (as Hakwan Lau et al. put it, Lau et al. 2004), rather than a 
pre-conscious decision to move; but argue that the measurement of activity predictive of one of two 
possible choices – as in their experiments – circumvents this objection. Thus, showing that patterns 
of activation of an area of the brain predicts with 60% certainty which of two buttons will 
subsequently be pressed, up to 10 seconds before the time at which the subject is aware of making a 
choice between the buttons (Haynes 2011b, Haynes 2011a), could perhaps be taken as evidence of 
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the claim that consciousness “comes too late” to be that which decides what we do. The choice is 
already encoded in certain brain areas long before we become aware of it. 
There are, however, significant hurdles to such a conclusion. On the one hand, the evidence 
obtained does not support it. While it is certainly an impressive feat to decode patterns of activation 
that can predict subsequent choice with 60% certainty, this is still a far cry from the claim that your 
brain decides all your choices 10 seconds in advance of you yourself becoming aware of them – a 
point Haynes himself duly notes: 
Importantly, a diﬀerent interpretation could be that the inaccuracy simply reflects the fact that 
the early neural processes might in principle simply not be fully, but only partially predictive of the 
outcome of the decision. In this view, even the full knowledge of the state of activity of populations 
of neurons in frontopolar cortex and in the precuneus would not permit to fully predict the 
decision. In that case the signals have the form of a biasing signal that influences the decision to 
a degree, but additional influences at later time point might still play a role in shaping the decision. 
Until a perfect predictive accuracy has been reached in an experiment, both interpretations – 
incomplete prediction and incomplete determination – remain possible. (Haynes 2011b, p. 93) 
As is often the case, Hayne’s is not as bombastic in his peer-reviewed articles as his popularisers are 
when making claims from the experimental evidence (Harris). Nevertheless, it is probably not 
uncharitable to say that Haynes himself is leaning towards the “revisionist” interpretation that our 
conscious choices are, if not fully, then at least importantly determined (in advance) by non-
conscious brain processes. Whether made by Haynes himself or by his popularisers, the revisionist 
interpretation must be tempered when considering the limitations inherent in the Libet-style 
experimental design that is still employed, albeit in modified form, by Haynes et al. Thus, while they 
rely on a series of letters on a screen rather than an “oscilloscope clock” to allow subjects more 
accurately to time their conscious choice, Haynes et al. still ask subjects to wait for an urge to move 
to spontaneously arise, which – although they argue that prediction of choice between options 
circumvents the objection that the measured activity is merely generally preparatory or activation-
in-expectation (of something) – still leaves open the objection that subjects are skewed towards 
waiting and “introspecting” for a something to appear, rather than making any real choice or 
decision. Thus, whatever the predictive power achieved by Haynes, his subjects are arguably not 
deciding when these predictive patterns emerge, but are simply waiting for an urge to push a 
specific button to arise on its own. This objection can be expanded and strengthened if it is 
connected to the second part-objection identified above (2.a.b), namely that subjects in Libet-style 
experiments – although given instructions which are meant to pre-empt preplanning, etc. – might 
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nevertheless be shaped in their behaviour by more or less explicit ideas about the expectations of 
others (most notably those of the experimenter), or of their own expectations about being subjects 
in an experiment, e.g. the thought that being a good experimental subject entails following 
instructions; and that this, for Libet-style experiments, actually requires you to feel an urge, or at 
the very least, to push the button at least once, and probably a number of times, as well as making 
sure that the button-presses are spaced out appropriately (Talmi and Frith point out this often 
ignored aspect of the experimental situation, although they focus on the issues associated with the 
implicit suggestion that experimental subjects should feel an urge to move, Talmi and Frith 2011).38 
Any subject who fails to comply with these more or less explicit requirements is likely to be 
corrected by the experimenters (otherwise, the data will be useless), and so it seems not entirely 
speculative to say that subjects are probably shaped in their behaviour by more or less explicit 
attention to these requirements, even if they never have to be (explicitly) corrected. This arguably 
also touches the instruction, given to subjects in Haynes’ experiments, to choose randomly which 
button to push – although Haynes takes pains to provide observations indicative of the true 
randomness and autonomy of his subjects’ choices, with a statistical analysis of button sequence 
showing a nicely random distribution (Soon et al. 2008a) despite not instructing his subjects to 
distribute their responses (Haynes 2011b, pp. 91-2). However, as he points out in another article: 
Importantly, in order to facilitate spontaneous behavior, we did not ask subjects to balance the 
left and right button selections in successive trials. This would require keeping track of the 
distribution of button selections in memory and would also encourage preplanning of choices. 
Instead, we selected subjects that spontaneously chose a balanced number of left and right button presses 
without prior instruction based on a behavioral selection test before scanning. (Haynes 2011a, p. 12, 
emphasis mine) 
Thus, there is a live possibility that Haynes’ subjects, specifically selected for the trials that provide 
his evidence because they “spontaneously chose a balanced number of left and right button presses”, 
are simply (implicitly) aware of the niceness of having an even distribution of responses, and act 
accordingly. This could undermine the validity of the evidence, since the combination of waiting for 
an urge to act and the (implicit) ideas that can or do shape both these urges and the actions that are 
to result from them, means that any patterns of brain activation might simply reflect the various 
38 Libet et al. were aware of this possibility: “Asking subjects about 'surprise' acts should have indicated to them that it 
was acceptable even to have and to report the absence of a conscious urge or intention to act prior to a self-initiated act. 
The fact that instances of 'surprises' were reported increases confidence that the reports of timing prior to the act 
represented endogenous experiences not defined or induced by the instructions.” (Libet et al. 1983, p. 627) However, 
this is only a guess on their part, and, in any case, does not address the worry arising from the implicit requirement to 
perform (a number of) self-initiated button presses. 
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biases that shape subjects’ choices over time, e.g. the bias towards an even distribution of left and 
right button presses shaping future choice in light of past button presses. If nothing else, this is 
potentially a significant source of error. 
Finally, as noted in (2.b), even if the assumptions made by Libet and others about the role of 
measured preceding brain activity and the casting of ‘W’ as a conscious choice to move are granted, 
the undeniable simplicity of the experimental task represents another hurdle for those who wish to 
make a general claim about the causal eﬃcacy of consciousness from these experiments. Lying still 
and pressing a button is not a good paradigm even for simple tasks in real life; even less so if the 
tasks with which we are concerned are actions with potential immediate moral implications  
(Roskies 2006b, Roskies 2012, Roskies 2011). 
C 
 
In sum, there is a long way to go from the kind of evidence presented by Libet and his successors to 
the claim that consciousness is causally ineﬃcacious in bringing about behaviour, and thus 
FE*/CEC still stand as plausible. 
That the validity of evidence from Libet-style experiments have been so extensively questioned is 
probably one of the reasons why psychologist Daniel Wegner’s comprehensive treatment of the 
question of free will in his 2002 book The Illusion of Conscious Will (hereafter ICW, Wegner 2002) 
has gained such influence with the “revisionist” side of the debate. Wegner is now often mentioned 
alongside Libet as one of the most influential thinkers to oﬀer scientific support for the argument 
that consciousness cannot and does not play the role we normally attribute to it in action initiation 
and control, i.e. that FE* and CEC are false (Even Pockett and Purdy conclude their article by 
expressing belief in Wegner line of argument (Pockett and Purdy 2011). Building partially on Libet 
and others, but adducing a much wider range of experiments alongside varied evidence from both 
pathological and non-pathologic examples of dissociations between what he terms phenomenal and 
empirical will, Wegner argues that what we usually take at face value – our experience of consciously 
causing, initiating or controlling our actions (“phenomenal will”) – is an illusion, i.e. does not reflect 
the actual mechanisms that bring about action (“empirical will”). In other words, he attacks FE* and 
attempts to dissolve the dilemma by denying that our experience of consciously initiating and 
controlling action is veridical – hence illusory. Wegner’s version of the illusion argument is widely 
based and well developed, and is probably one of the best bets for a wholesale critique of the 
framework of free will to date. But is it successful? 
67 
  
  
68 
  
8 Is Conscious Will an Illusion (with a Purpose)? 
“Conscious will is the mind’s compass. […] The experience of will is therefore an indicator, one 
of those gauges on the control panel to which we refer as we steer. Like a compass reading, the 
feeling of doing tells us something about the operation of the ship. But also like a compass reading, 
this information must be understood as a conscious experience, a candidate for the dreaded 
“epiphenomenon” label. Just as compass readings do not steer the boat, conscious experiences of 
will do not cause human actions.” Daniel Wegner (2002) 
8.1 Wegner’s Argument 
Libet and others using Libet-style laboratory experiments have not been able to provide convincing 
evidence to refute CEC/FE*. The data is too weak, the assumptions made in acquiring it are 
unsupported, and the experiments themselves have serious methodological problems. They might be 
on to something, but they are not there yet in terms of evidence or explanatory power. In addition 
to this, there is the question of why we are equipped with an experience of free will if there is 
nothing to it. While classical epiphenomenalists do not seem overly bothered by the sheer 
uselessness of the phenomena to which they assign this label, it is quite reasonable for normal 
people to wonder why evolution, notoriously fixed on function, would equip humans with the 
illusory experience of being in (conscious) control if it did not serve any purpose. 
Wegner’s book The Illusion of Conscious Will (Wegner 2002) can be seen as an attempt both at 
remedying the weakness of the evidence from Libet-style experiments, and at giving a reply to the 
nagging question of what an illusion of free will would be good for. The premise of Wegner’s book 
is that there is evidence to the eﬀect that we can be mistaken about our conscious control over 
something, both attributing control to ourselves when in fact the action in question was performed 
by someone or something else, and failing to recognise that we are responsible for something we 
have in fact done or contributed to. There is, that is, evidence both of “illusions of control” and of 
“automatisms”. From this apparent dissociation of phenomena, Wegner argues for what he terms 
the “illusion of conscious will”, i.e. a substantial dissociation between the conscious experience of 
will and the actual mental mechanisms that bring about action. As for why humans are subject to 
such an illusion, Wegner argues that what might more properly be called the “feeling of authorship” 
is an important element of social coordination and character formation. Thus, while the illusion of 
conscious (free) will is an epiphenomenon in terms action initiation and control, therewith denying 
CEC; FE or FE* are not completely epiphenomenal, and therefore not as hard to explain (away) as 
in traditional epiphenomenalism.  
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8.1.1 Automatisms: Unexpected Absence of Conscious Will 
As Wegner uses the term, an “automatism” is any “apparently voluntary behaviour that one does not 
sense as voluntary.”(Wegner 2002, p. 9, footnote 3).39 Evidence for automatisms comes from varied 
sources. There are the strange cases of “alien hand syndrome”, in which a person will attest to the 
fact that one of her or his arms is acting “on its own”; apparently purposefully (“quite willful” as 
Wegner puts it, 2002, p. 5), but without any sense of voluntariness or agency, and often at cross 
purposes to the person who’s hand it is, sabotaging the actions s/he is trying to perform with the 
other hand. Considering hypnosis, Wegner argues that the most salient quality of behaviour 
resulting from (post-)hypnotic suggestion is the lack of wilfulness that accompanies it; behaviour 
that by all other measures is attributable to the person who has been hypnotised, but which the 
person acting rather feels is happening to her (Wegner 2002, pp. 6, 271ﬀ). Wegner also brings to 
the fore historic examples of automatisms, including the table-turning fad that arose in spiritualist 
milieu in England and America in the mid-nineteenth century: In a session of table turning, a 
group of people would sit around a round table with their hands on the table top, ostensibly doing 
nothing, when the table would suddenly start to move, often in a “sinister” fashion, typically 
indicating the presence of hidden dark powers (Wegner 2002, pp. 7-9, 100ﬀ). Of course, and as 
proved at the time by the famous physicist Faraday, the actual cause of the table’s movement was 
the people sitting around it. Another historic example with spiritualist credentials is automatic 
writing: a person, more or less practiced in the feat, sits down at a writing table, hand resting on a 
small plate, which in turn rests on the table supported by two wheels and a pencil tip; and scribbles 
away. After a while, strange words, meaningful sentences or even whole paragraphs can appear, 
without the person physically writing reporting any sense of being the author of those phrases 
(Wegner 2002, pp. 103ﬀ).  
In a less frivolous vein we find the controversy surrounding so-called “facilitated communication” 
(Wegner 2002, pp. 195ﬀ): based on the irreproachably good intention to facilitate the 
communication of persons with poor or no powers of communication (initially children with 
cerebral palsy, later also severely autistic children), trained facilitators (typically) support (or rest on 
top of) the arm or hand of the person they are facilitating, helping them to type on a keyboard. 
Initially, the technique was deemed a great success when children who formerly had been non-
communicative could suddenly express themselves in writing quite comprehensibly and intelligently, 
in one famous case moving on later to successfully argue in a courtroom for her release from 
hospital (Crossley and McDonald 1984). The technique was however controversial, and became all 
39 Note that this is markedly diﬀerent from how ‘automatism’ is used in legal contexts, as discussed above. 
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the more so when several peer-reviewed experiments repeatedly showed alleged “communication” 
rather to be the direct product of the facilitator (Jacobson, Mulick, and Schwartz 1995, Mostert 
2001). That’s not to say that the facilitators knowingly took over or led those they were trying to 
help, quite the contrary: facilitators had no experience of their facilitation slipping into control, even 
if this was what was really happening in most of the cases. While anecdotal evidence supports the 
claim that at least some forms or instances of facilitated communication constitute genuine 
communication from the person facilitated, the demonstrably false cases provide, at the very least, 
yet another dissociation between being the physical cause or author – here of something as complex 
as written communication –, and the feeling or experience-based conviction that one really is 
responsible, which we would normally expect to accompany such action.  
8.1.2 Illusions of Control: Unfounded Experience of Conscious Will 
As for “illusions of control”, examples are neither as numerous nor striking, but there has been some 
work on the phenomena in social psychology (see e.g. Thompson, Armstrong, and Thomas 1998), 
and Wegner argues that we quite commonly experience varying degrees of this illusion e.g. when we 
operate the buttons of an elevator or a vending machine and we are unsure whether our action has 
caused anything to happen. He also argues that we experience an illusion of control in cases where 
we (superstitiously) think that our actions aﬀect our surroundings in physically impossible ways, e.g. 
“jinxing” a sporting event on TV by something trivial like leaving the room (Wegner 2002, p. 10). 
Humans are indeed susceptible to superstitious belief in mysterious paths of influence, as are other 
animals who can learn by conditioning. B.F. Skinner, the famous “behaviourist” psychologist who 
suggested we do away with mental explanations altogether, showed this with pigeons (Morse and 
Skinner 1957, Skinner 1948): after having tested regular conditioning, in which the pigeon would 
perform a certain act and reliably get a treat, Skinner changed the feeding schedule to random 
intervals independent of the pigeons’ actions. As a result, the pigeons would repeat whatever 
random behaviour they had been performing at some point when they had been fed, e.g. moving 
around in a circle.  
Although the results are contested (and behaviourism mostly abandoned), they do bear a certain 
resemblance (that has also been investigated empirically, see Rudski 2001) to the human propensity 
to stick with what has “worked” in the past, even if “sticking with what works” entails doing things 
where no plausible physical account can be given for their eﬀect. This is especially prominent in 
high stakes settings such as professional sports (or in war), situations where “ […] chance can 
sometimes defy even the most rigorous training and discipline”, as author Elizabeth D. Samet says 
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of baseball, after becoming a “lucky charm” for her West Point academy team (Samet 2010). Thus, 
sportswomen and -men might have “lucky” underwear, a convoluted pregame ritual or other things 
they have to do in order to maximise their (perceived) chances of success. Of course, for humans, 
once such a ritual or talisman has been adopted, it does in fact become directly influential in the 
sense that its disruption might disrupt the psychological part of the performance that follows. Still, 
the actual path of influence here is arguably diﬀerent from whatever “lucky” power originally 
attributed to the thing in question, and so one might still say that this constitutes an illusion of 
control.40 
8.1.3 Significance for Free Will Debate 
If we allow that these examples provide tentative evidence for a double dissociation between the 
experience of “consciously willing” and actually doing something, two responses seem immediately 
available: either we could focus on the fact that these situations all appear to be exceptions to what 
we commonly (and supposedly correctly) experience as a robust connection between our choices and 
our actions. Or, says Wegner, we can focus on just how easily we are misled about something so 
basic as our own agency: If it really were the case that our experience of conscious will was directly 
connected to (or identical with) the processes that generate action, we would arguably not expect 
such blatant errors as evinced in these examples. Asking us to allow for the possibility that our 
ordinary perceptions may be mistaken, Wegner presents the hypothesis that our experience of 
conscious will is not a reflection or direct perception of actual agency at all, but rather something 
generated alongside the actual causal non-conscious mental processes that issue in behaviour. If this 
is the correct understanding our experience of consciously “willing” things, this experience would 
arguably be illusory since it is not a veridical reflection of the real causal path developed 
subconsciously.  
The significance of this for the free will debate is clear in Wegner’s project. He introduces his book 
with a version of the Dilemma, in which the opposing explanatory modes of a mechanistic science 
and a personal belief in conscious will are seen to have “an oil and water relationship” (Wegner 
2002, p. 2). His proposal is that we can resolve this apparent conflict if we can explain how and why 
we have the experience of conscious (apparently free) will despite the fact that free will in the 
traditional sense is incompatible with a scientific understanding of human action: 
40 Or perhaps more appropriately a delusion of control – although it is far from clear that people might not be aware of 
both sides of this while still continuing with the practice, so that there really isn’t an delusion at all, but rather a 
voluntary endorsed belief in something one knows does not quite fit in with other commitments. 
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One way to put [the two] together—the way this book explores—is to say that the mechanistic 
approach is the explanation preferred for scientific purposes but that the person’s experience of 
conscious will is utterly convincing and important to the person and so must be understood 
scientifically as well. (Wegner 2002, p. 2, emphasis mine ) 
Showing that the experience of will is sometimes dissociated from actual causal processes that issue 
in action is the first step towards substantiating the claim that it is always so, and this in turn is the 
basis for Wegner’s scientifically based resolution of the Dilemma, by way of denial of CEC/FE*. 
8.1.4 Apparent Mental Causation 
Central to Wegner’s argument in ICW is the idea that our experience of consciously willing or 
controlling something is constructed by subconscious mental mechanisms based on the fulfilment of 
a set of criteria. Comparable to the way “we” automatically and subconsciously infer causality 
between external objects when their relative movements fulfil certain criteria, we automatically and 
subconsciously infer or interpret that our thoughts are the causes of certain happenings (typically 
actions) when the two coincide in a particular fashion (Wegner 2002, pp. 64ﬀ). For there to be an 
experience of conscious will, i) our thoughts about an event must occur prior to the event, ii) the 
same kind of though must consistently occur with the same kind of event, and iii) there must be a 
relative absence of other factors to explain the event. These are the priority, consistency and 
exclusivity criteria that Wegner argues must be met for any experience of will to arise. When 
thoughts appear thus reliably as “previews” of upcoming action, we have the experience of 
consciously willing those actions. 
In an analogy with stage magic, Wegner says that our experience of conscious will – “phenomenal 
will” – arises out of the perceived causal sequence of thoughts leading to action. As with stage magic, 
the real causal sequence is hidden from view, far more complex (and not at all magical); and will not 
usually or necessarily correspond to the one that is perceived. In the cases where “we” – our 
thoughts or mental states, that is – actually are the causes of action through “a massively 
complicated set of mechanisms”, this is a manifestation of “empirical will” (Wegner 2002, pp. 26-
7). The illusion of conscious will is then essentially the result of mistaking phenomenal will for 
empirical will (Levy 2007, p. 229).  
Wegner calls this the “theory of apparent mental causation”:   
People experience conscious will when they interpret their own thoughts as the cause of their actions. [… ] 
This means that people experience conscious will quite independently of any actual causal 
connection between their thoughts and their actions. Reductions in the impression that there is a 
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link between thought and action may explain […] automatisms […]. And inflated perceptions of 
the link […] may, in turn, explain why people experience an illusion of conscious will at all. 
(Wegner 2002, p. 64, emphasis in original) 
In other words: with every experience of conscious will being the product exclusively of 
interpretation, abnormal cases of too much or too little “will” can be explained as easily as the 
standard, appropriate-interpretation case(s), namely by case by case analysis of the basis for the 
interpretation. 
8.1.5 The Emotion of Authorship 
 Wegner makes a convincing argument that the feeling we may or may not have of having caused 
something to happen is neither the same thing as whatever mechanisms actually bring about action, 
nor an infallible readout of the workings of these mechanisms. But while our experience of 
consciously causing or being in control over our actions is illusory, the experience itself is not really 
an epiphenomenon. Rather, argues Wegner, our experience of conscious will serves a diﬀerent 
function in our lives as acting subjects, namely as a sort of “authorship emotion” (2002, pp. 325ﬀ) 
that may vary in strength to support anything from perfect certainty that something was done by 
ourselves to perfect certainty of the contrary. While this authorship emotion most often arises in 
connection with acts of which we really are the author, it can also fail to appear in appropriate 
circumstances, or also arise in inappropriate ones. Since the “emotion of authorship” often is 
correctly attached to actions performed by ourselves, it serves as a “body-based signature” of the 
actions that are likely to be our own, allowing us “to develop a sense of who we are and are not”, “to 
set aside our achievements from the things that we cannot do”, and “[allow] us to maintain the 
sense of responsibility for our actions that serves as a basis for morality.” (2002, pp. 325, 327, 328). 
The nagging question about the point of an illusion of free will is therefore answered on an 
altogether positive note: 
The fact is, it seems to each of us that we have conscious will. It seems we have selves. It seems 
we have minds. It seems we are agents. It seems we cause what we do. Although it is sobering 
and ultimately accurate to call all this an illusion, it is a mistake to conclude that the illusory is 
trivial. On the contrary, the illusions piled atop apparent mental causation are the building blocks 
of human psychology and social life. It is only with the feeling of conscious will that we can begin 
to solve the problems of knowing who we are as individuals, of discerning what we can and cannot 
do, and of judging ourselves morally right or wrong for what we have done. (2002, pp. 341-2) 
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8.2 Critiquing the Argument: Interpreting the Experimental Evidence 
In addition to what has already been mentioned about automatisms and illusions of control, 
Wegner brings to the fore a wealth of empirical and anecdotal evidence to support the idea that 
“conscious will” is illusory, or rather, to substantiate the theory of apparent mental causation. The 
argument runs an integrated course throughout the book, drawing upon many strands of research 
and more or less closely associated ideas, such as the Chevereul Pendulum and dowsing; ideomotor 
action and ironic eﬀects (phenomena where conscious or subconscious influences related to action 
unintentionally causes associated movements); the “ideal agent” hypothesis (that we have an idea of 
an ideal agent who always acts for appropriate reasons, and that we are therefore liable to invent 
reasons or intentions after the fact if we find ourselves having); the theory of the “left hemisphere 
interpreter” (who’s task it is to make sense of things, i.a. what the right hemisphere is doing, and 
who’s interpretations can become pure confabulation when dissociated from the processes that cause 
action); the existence of action projection (where agency is projected to outside forces, e.g. other 
people or invented, often supernatural agents to explain phenomena); invasive thoughts in 
schizophrenia (where i.a. speech that is probably self-generated is mistaken for taunts, threats and 
commands from one or several external agents); and so on. 
Wegner discusses far too many interesting phenomena and too much experimental evidence to be 
presented or commented upon here. Taken as a whole, the evidence presents a strong case for the 
claim that our experience of being acting agents, our attribution of agency to ourselves and others, 
and our understanding of the causes of our actions can be misleading relative to what would be 
determined from an objective point of view. There is, however, good reason to temper the 
conclusion Wegner reaches from this. 
Apart from what might be said about the abnormal presence or absence of an experience of will, all 
of the studied situations are abnormal in one way or other, either involving pathologies (as with 
schizophrenia and alien hand syndrome), some degree of self-deception or complicity (as in 
spiritualism and hypnosis) or experimental trickery specifically intended to deceive or bring about 
error. Furthermore, in the controlled experimental conditions, which one would think would 
provide the best or most “clean” evidence for the dissociation, the experience of conscious will is 
only ever modulated (as in the oft-cited “I Spy” study, see below), and trickery is discovered by the 
subjects if the discrepancies introduced are too large (in line-drawing experiments with false 
feedback, subjects detect deviations between input and feedback above 14°, Pacherie 2006).  
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Take, as an example, the “I Spy” study that Wegner uses as evidence for the theory of apparent 
mental causation  (Wegner 2002, pp. 74ﬀ). The experimental setup consists of two people with 
headphones jointly moving a computer mouse in circles by resting their fingers on opposite sides of 
a plate attached to the mouse (similar to the operation of an Ouija board). The mouse pointer 
moves correspondingly on-screen where an image containing a myriad of small items is displayed. 
For each trial, after some time of moving the mouse around in this manner, music will be played 
over the headphones, with the participants previously having been instructed to stop the mouse 
sometime during this music. Unbeknownst to the real experimental subject, her fellow participant is 
actually an experimental confederate, whom for certain trials is instructed over the headphones 
where she should force the pointer to stop. In addition, for some trials, the real subject will hear a 
word denoting one of the figures on screen at variable intervals before, during or after the music is 
played. 
  
Figure 3: “Participant and confederate move the mouse pointer together in 
the I Spy experiment by Wegner and Wheatly (1999)” Source: (image and 
caption from Wegner 2002, original in Wegner and Wheatley 1999) 
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The parameters are varied across trials, so that on some trials, the subject will hear a word denoting 
a certain object on screen (e.g. “Swan”), and the confederate will (shortly after) be instructed to stop 
the pointer near the swan. Compared to trials where the parameters are diﬀerent (“Swan” is not 
said, or is said long before or after stopping the mouse; the confederate is not instructed to stop), 
this particular configuration tests the hypothesis, based on the theory of apparent mental causation, 
that eliciting thoughts which are consistent with a later event just prior to that event will augment 
the experience of conscious will in the subject. The experimental results support the hypothesis, with 
subjects reporting a level of intentionality up to about 60% on forced-stop trials where e.g. “swan” 
was said 1 second before a stop, compared to a mean of 52% for forced-stop trials on average and a 
mean of 56% for the rest of the trials, in which the confederate was instructed to let the participant 
decide.41  
However, while this does support the hypothesis that thoughts consistent with the result elicited 
(externally) just prior to the result increases the experience of the result being intended, it does not 
support the hypothesis that the “experience of conscious will” is purely the result of inference, nor 
that it is (somehow) illusory. Subjects in the “I Spy” study reported the result being intended (albeit 
to a lesser degree) also on other trials, and while the confederate forced the pointer to stop, the 
subject is not mistaken about acting (she is indeed moving the pointer around, and has presumably 
chosen to do so); nor can it be said that the subject does not contribute anything to the stop, since 
the confederate would (likely) be hard-pressed to force a stop if the subject was unwilling.42, 43  
In his review of ICW (2002), Eddy Nahmias points out that the anecdotal and experimental 
evidence Wegner presents can all be seen as exceptions to the general rule of correspondence 
between “conscious will” and action. This is arguably also the most common interpretation, with the 
cases Wegner presents being notable just because they are such exceptions. The fact that there are 
exceptions does not show that conscious will is causally irrelevant in the standard case of 
correspondence; it “only” shows that the “experience of conscious will” is neither necessary nor 
suﬃcient for (voluntary) action. This in itself is a significant result, but Wegner wants to go further. 
41 1% corresponded with the statement “I allowed the stop to happen” and 100% with “I intended to make the stop”. 
Note that “allowing to happen” is also not without its significance as far as behaviour (in the non-specialist sense) is 
concerned. 
42 Due to the experimental setup, the last of the three criteria – the criterion of exclusivity – cannot be varied, but will 
(according to the theory of apparent mental causation) be a constant source of attenuation of conscious experience of 
will, thereby (presumably) explaining the average figures across the board (the participant is unsure or confused). It 
would be interesting to see the results of a single-subject variation on this experiment, where a forced pointer stop was 
accomplished in some way that minimized the perception of external agency in the subject (perhaps accomplishable 
with careful, gradual application of electromagnetic force to the mouse). 
43 This cooperative aspect of the experiment arguably complicates analysis of individual action, with so-called 
“contributive acts” to cooperative action being the subject of a whole field of study in social ontology (see e.g.Schmid 
2005). 
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Aware of the standard interpretation, Wegner words his arguments tentatively, but the claim is still 
that what we think are exceptions are actually the rule – that automatisms reveal the real, causally 
eﬀective processes that underlie action as they are sans the illusion of conscious will: 
Automatisms could flow from the same sources as voluntary action and yet have achieved renown 
as oddities because each one has some special quirk that makes it diﬃcult to imbue with the usual 
illusion of conscious will. Automatism and ideomotor action may be windows on true mental 
causation as it occurs without apparent mental causation. (Wegner 2002, p. 130) 
But, as Nahmias points out: 
[A]nother interpretation is that automatisms are not produced by the same kinds of processes that 
create intentional action precisely because the causal role of conscious intention has been 
bypassed. (Nahmias 2002, p. 533) 
There are, in other words and as already mentioned, at least two possible interpretations of the 
evidence presented by Wegner. The standard or traditional interpretation is that all these 
automatisms and illusions of control are exceptions to the rule of conscious causal eﬃcacy – i.e. that 
automatisms are diﬀerent kinds of action compared to regular, voluntary action; that ordinary 
conscious processes are “out of the loop” only in these special cases, and that this is what makes 
them special. Wegner’s alternative, revisionist interpretation is that automatisms show action 
generation as it really is, stripped of the illusory experience of conscious causal eﬃcacy, and 
correspondingly, that illusions of control show this experience devoid of its supposed correlate, the 
actual causal connection between agents and acts. Consciousness is therefore always “out of the 
loop”, and we think otherwise only because we have been misled by appearances. 
Given the set of evidence presented by Wegner, the traditional and the revisionist interpretation can 
be seen as instances of “inference to the best explanation” – competing hypotheses that can account 
for the same experimental data. If we accept this framing of the issue, adjudicating between the two 
interpretations becomes a matter of evaluating the way they explain the observed phenomena, i.e. 
their relative “explanatory virtue”.44 Wegner takes the revisionist interpretation to provide the best 
explanation, but the traditional interpretation is far from obviously inferior. Indeed, the revisionist 
explanation must arguably cover a wider explanatory stretch since it is arguing for a reversal in our 
44 Inference to the best explanation, also known as abduction, is at once a very common and controversial type of 
inference. While we humans are usually adept at evaluating which of two competing explanations is the best (e.g. in the 
case of whether the room is still messy because you didn’t clean it as you said you would, or because a poltergeist messed 
it up again after you had cleaned it), giving a precise account of just what considerations should matter when we say that 
one explanation is “better” than the other – especially as one starts to consider diﬃcult cases in science – is far from 
trivial. For more on this, see e.g. (Douven 2011). 
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view of normal and exceptional cases, eﬀectively making the most common case – the experience of 
consciously initiating and controlling actions that are actually initiated and control by ourselves – 
the one in need of explanation. Evaluated side by side, the revisionist interpretation thus appears 
somewhat unmotivated given the extant option to explain the prima facie exceptions of automatisms 
and illusions of control as exceptions to the standard case of causal eﬃcacy of consciousness. The 
traditional explanation seems unquestionably to be the “better” of the two, given the set of data 
presented by Wegner,45 and in comparison, the revisionist interpretation appears more like a purely 
sceptical challenge, put forth only because it is possible. 
This, however, misses one important point. Wegner’s revisionist interpretation is not only motivated 
by the empirical evidence presented in the book: it is, as shown, an attempt at dissolving the 
Dilemma – a dilemma that from the point of view of Wegner is perpetuated by the traditional, 
“realist” interpretation of conscious causal eﬃcacy, and which would be dissolved given the 
acceptance of the revisionist interpretation he presents. However, given what was shown in Part I 
about the diﬃculty of substantiating the “fact of theory” FT that free will appears to be impossible, 
such motivation cannot be said to be objectively present. Consequently, Wegner’s revisionist 
interpretation must be considered a challenge to FE* based wholly on its merits as an explanation of 
empirical data.  
The traditional interpretation thus retains its prima facie advantage as the better explanation of the 
considered evidence. That being said, we should not be content with leaving the question open like 
this, since a simple appeal to common sense and extant divisions into rules and exceptions is 
unsatisfactory in face of the wealth of empirical evidence presented by Wegner about how 
surprisingly often we appear to rely on inference or interpretation to arrive at our judgements of 
agency and responsibility, and how we may misjudge the level of our own contribution to some 
observed eﬀect. If our “experience of conscious will” were straightforwardly connected to whatever 
other systems that underpin agency, such rates of error would not be expected. If automatisms and 
illusions of control really are the exceptions, why do they arise at all? The traditional interpretation 
has an important lacuna in this respect, and so we should take the challenge presented by Wegner’s 
argument seriously, even if it fails as a wholesale denial of free will. 
45 This, as we shall see below, is an important point: inference to the best explanation violates what in logic is known as 
“monotonicity”. This means that while two explanations might equally well explain a limited set of data, the 
introduction of additional data might render one of the hypotheses untenable because unable to account for the new 
evidence. Continuing with the example from the footnote above, if a poltergeist was to appear all of a sudden, the 
poltergeist-explanation would now be uniquely able to explain all the observed phenomena. 
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I will meet this challenge with two quite diﬀerent argumentative points, considering FE* and CEC 
apart. First of all, I will show that there is a limited but significant revisionist claim to be made from 
Wegner’s argument about part of our experience of conscious agency, and secondly, I will support 
the traditional, realist interpretation of the causal eﬃcacy of consciousness by arguing that this 
remains the best explanation of the available data concerning the way consciousness is related to 
action initiation and control. 
8.2.1 Where is the (Empirical) Will? Identifying a Successful, Limited Claim in Wegner’s 
Argument 
Wegner himself uses the observation that our experience usually corresponds to the facts of the 
situation as part of his argument about the role the purportedly illusory experience of conscious will 
can be seen to play in keeping track of which perceived acts belong to ourselves, and which are the 
acts of others. 
One might then wonder at the use of the term “illusion”, which indeed does seem altogether too 
strong a word for the discrepancy in question, something Wegner himself admits:  
Calling this an illusion may be a bit strong, and it might be more appropriate to think of this as a 
construction or fabrication. (2002, p. 2, footnote)  
Before ICW was written, I had alternate titles for it: The Construction of Conscious Will, The 
Experience of Conscious Will, The Fabrication of Conscious Agency, and so on. (2004, 
commentary p. 34, R2) 
So why did he end up using 'illusion' anyway? In the same footnote, Wegner goes on to defend its 
usage thus:  
[T]he term illusion does convey the possibility that we place an erroneously large emphasis on 
how will appears to us and assume that this appearance is a deep insight. (2002, p. 2, footnote) 
This points to an element of Wegner’s argument that I think has sometimes been overlooked by 
critics responding to it – although, to the readers’ defence, it seems Wegner is confused about this 
himself. Early on in the book, Wegner distinguishes between two commonsense notions of will: 
The first is will as an experience associated with certain acts, a “feeling of voluntariness”. The second 
notion is of “conscious will as a force of mind, a name for the causal link between our minds and our 
actions.” (2002, p. 3) After first examining will as an experience, however, the second notion of 
conscious will as force of mind – “will power” (2002, p. 14) – is also examined and explained wholly 
through various interpretative mechanisms, ultimately captured in the theory of apparent mental 
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causation. It is another mere appearance. The thing studied is thus always the “phenomenal will”, 
never the “empirical will”, whatever that might be. However, given that “empirical will” is defined as 
the actual causal relation between thoughts/persons and actions, it is arguably the “empirical will” 
and whatever role consciousness plays in this that is the interesting question when discussing the 
Dilemma and the possible threat to free will from epiphenomenalism of consciousness.  
While Wegner to some extent vacillates between concluding that consciousness is an 
epiphenomenon with regards to action, and admitting it an important (although unconventional) 
role in this, it is, I believe, and taking the argument as a whole, reasonable to conclude that he 
intends to deny the common understanding of CEC, i.e. deny that consciousness or conscious will 
plays any direct role in bringing about action. Thus, the fact that he only discusses the role of 
consciousness in phenomenal will reflects the fact that this is the only role he takes consciousness to 
play. For Wegner, consciousness does not partake in the empirical will at all – at least not in any 
direct way commensurable with what he takes to be our commonsense or traditional ideas about 
freedom and responsibility. 
I have already shown why this expansive claim about the role of consciousness in all aspects of 
action generation/initiation and control lacks conclusive support in the evidence presented by 
Wegner, but given the distinction between the possible roles of consciousness in phenomenal and 
empirical will, we can now identify a second, more limited claim from Wegner’s argument, namely 
a claim about how an important aspect of our experience of agency is constructed based on 
interpretation or inference.  
Given such a separation, one can both admit that the evidence Wegner brings together makes a 
strong case for the more limited hypothesis, and hold that no part of the evidence excludes the 
possibility that consciousness plays an active, direct role in empirical will – i.e. in addition to the 
experience Wegner identifies as interpretational. In terms of the Dilemma and FE, FE*/CEC, the 
limited claim invites an addendum to FE*, but does not licence any conclusion about CEC or the 
veracity of FE* in general, nor does it undermine FE. The addendum, which following Wegner may 
be called the “authorship emotion” AE, can be included into FE* to make a revised version FE†: 
FE† We have the experience of consciously initiating and controlling action.  
AE  Part of this experience is the result of interpretation, and may therefore be 
misleading in comparison with objective, third person accounts. 
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Accepting the limited claim has the benefit of explaining the exceptions of automatisms and 
illusions of control, i.e. why we can be mistaken in ascribing agency, even when the agent in 
question is us: we can be so mistaken because an important element of our judgements (whether 
implicit or explicit) is the result of inferential processes which may err either from imperfect data or 
simply by “procedural” error. The limited claim gets us this without committing to 
epiphenomenalism about consciousness in action, i.e. without also denying CEC. Because of this, it 
may also be incorporated into the traditional interpretation, and the traditional interpretation, 
bolstered by the limited claim, will now let us account both for the standard case of correspondence 
between first and third-person accounts of agency, and for the exceptions of automatisms and 
illusions of control – without (in contrast to the revisionist interpretation) having to subsume either 
under the other. The lacuna is filled in. 
Of course, if Wegner’s argument were to count as a successful denial of free will according to the 
framework of the debate that has been set up here, he would need to show that CEC is false, i.e. 
that consciousness in not causally eﬀective in initiating and controlling action. As I have argued, the 
evidence presented by Wegner is not suﬃcient to deny CEC, and so his argument does not 
constitute a successful empirical denial of free will. Even so, it might still be the case that CEC is 
false, and that this explains the evidence presented by Wegner – in which case his argument would 
regain status as a contender for an inference to the best explanation, even tipping the scales in 
favour of the revisionist interpretation; since if CEC is false, what we now take to be the ordinary 
case must involve some kind of illusion or mistake, e.g. the one associated with Wegner’s expansive 
claim. Settling the question of whether CEC or something like it is true of actual humans is 
therefore a prime concern in adjudicating the debate between the traditional and the revisionist 
interpretation. Additionally, if CEC is one of the true dependencies of our traditional or 
commonsense ideas about free and responsible action, investigating whether it or something like it 
holds for humans is also directly relevant to the question of free will. Onwards to the causal eﬃcacy 
of consciousness, then. 
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9 Countering Epiphenomenalism  
“It's not as though the task of neuroscientists who work on free will has to be to show there isn't 
any." Alfred Mele (Smith 2011) 
9.1 Substantiating the Causal Eﬃcacy of Consciousness 
Having identified the (arguably successful) limited claim in Wegner’s argument, and having 
incorporated AE into FE†, we can move on to investigate whether there is evidence to support CEC 
beyond intuitive plausibility. This will provide support for the interpretation that what remains of 
FE* in FE† (which is most of it) is a veridical experience, what in turn, and together with the 
refutation of arguments for FT in Part 1, can be taken as support for the claim that FE is a veridical 
experience, and hence endorse a continued belief in free will.  
The first thing to be noted here is that the main source of support for CEC just is its intuitive 
plausibility based on everyday experience. I have already argued that we experience consciously 
initiating and controlling our actions (FE*), and I take this to be a fairly unproblematic statement in 
itself; all the more so with the inclusion of the “scientifically vetted” addendum AE (in FE†). The 
revisionists also appear to be interested only in undermining the basis for FE*, and have not 
questioned the assumption – that FE* is true of humans – itself. In the following discussion, I will 
therefore continue the dialectic between a traditional interpretation that is realist about CEC, and 
the competing revisionist interpretation that continues to maintain that consciousness is causally 
ineﬃcacious with regard to action. In order to support CEC, I will present both theoretical 
considerations and empirical situations for and in which the traditional interpretation exceeds the 
revisionist in its ability to explain the matters at hand. While this cannot conclusively establish 
CEC, it will render the revisionist interpretation so contorted that it can be disregarded in practice. 
The first step towards this goal is to ask what exactly CEC should be taken to entail, i.e. what role or 
roles consciousness can be taken to play with regard to action. 
9.2 What is Conscious Will (for)? 
While Wegner is not arguing that the experience of conscious will is strictly epiphenomenal, he 
does argue that it is not one of the causes of action in any direct way corresponding to traditional 
ideas about how conscious decisions issue in action. There is, in other words, a kind of limited or 
local epiphenomenalism in Wegner’s (expansive) claim, an epiphenomenalism about direct 
conscious involvement in behaviour generation – approximately what Nahmias calls “modular 
epiphenomenalism” (Nahmias 2002, p. 530): Wegner seems to regard consciousness or conscious 
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will as a separable module which receives input from causally eﬀective brain processes, but which 
has no output back into those processes. 
This way of framing consciousness or conscious will brings me back to the first issue identified in 
the assumptions of Libet’s original argument, namely the open question of whether this particular 
conception of how and when consciousness can be said to impact on behaviour is the best or most 
appropriate. Seen in terms of CEC, we should consider at what level the hypothesised “[conscious] 
initiation and control of action” is supposed to be taking place. 
9.2.1 Recasting Consciousness 
The idea that consciousness does not matter to action is an old one in psychology and philosophy. 
Shaun Gallagher, taking a cue from William James (1842-1910), credits the comparatively 
unknown British philosopher Shadworth Holloway Hodgson (1832-1912) – or, rather funnily, 
“Hodgson’s brain” – with explicating the idea that “[n]eural events form an autonomous causal 
chain that is independent of any accompanying conscious mental states.” (Gallagher 2006, p. 109) 
According to the tradition Hodgson represents, “[c]onsciousness is epiphenomenal, incapable of 
having any eﬀect on the nervous system.” (Gallagher 2006, p. 109) 
Gallagher also quotes James in saying that Hodgson’s claim is the natural completion of Descartes’ 
argument about animals being mere automata. Descartes famously stopped short of claiming the 
same of humans, attempting instead to argue that we have an uncaused immaterial soul that causally 
interacts with the brain through the pineal gland.46 The problem with Descartes’ attempt to save a 
role for the soul in his otherwise completely mechanistic picture was to account for how an 
immaterial entity could interact with a material body. In his Treatise of Man (1662/1664), he simply 
specifies that one of the ways movement of the muscles can be brought about is by “the force of the 
soul” acting on the gland (Lokhorst 2011). Hodgson’s solution to this proto-form of agent 
causation was simply to extend the evident explanatory power of an autonomous nervous system to 
cover human action as well. Presumably, he could not deny the self-evident fact that there was 
something like Descartes soul, i.e. a consciousness, but this move obviated the need to account for 
the interaction of mysterious soul and physical body, since there on this account simply was no such 
interaction.47 
46 The only brain structure known at that time of which there was only one, in contrast with the other features which are 
mirrored in the opposing hemispheres; a fact which for Descartes explained the unity of perception/consciousness 
(Lokhorst 2011) 
47 This kind of epiphenomenalism has its own lacuna however, since it is hard to understand how the immaterial soul is 
kept “in tune” with the material brain if there is no interaction in either direction. 
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According to Gallagher, the uneasy Cartesian middle position continues to shape the debate 
concerning what role (if any) consciousness can be said to play in relation to action initiation and 
control: Consciousness is seen as a kind of mind space (the “module” in modular 
epiphenomenalism) in which action can be simulated and from which consciousness can or cannot 
(as the revisionist claim) direct purely physical/non-conscious bodily movement. When this is taken 
as a premise in the debate concerning free will, the proof of free will ends up hinging upon whether 
or not one can show consciousness in action, directly initiating and controlling the execution of 
motor acts (Gallagher 2006, pp. 110ﬀ). 
Experiments like those by Libet follow this train of thought, looking for proof of CEC in the 
immediate vicinity of action – both in terms of temporal order and in the kind of relation between 
consciousness and motor acts that is taken as paradigmatic. Thus, W – which is supposed to be a 
“spontaneous intention” to move immediately preceding the execution of the simple motor act of 
flexing a wrist or a finger – is taken to be an appropriate measure of the role consciousness plays in 
action initiation. The temporal aspect in particular is weighted, with CEC – and by explicit 
extension, conscious will – either being killed oﬀ by concluding that consciousness comes too late 
(part of the argument for Wegner’s illusion), or also (purportedly) salvaged by appeal to some last-
millisecond intervention into the execution of unconsciously initiated motor plans (Libet’s veto). 
I have already shown why (extant) Libet-style experiments do not allow one to conclude anything 
about CEC, and this point can be expanded by the recognition that the framing of consciousness in 
these experiments only captures a small subset of the theoretically possible ways in which 
consciousness could be causally eﬀective with respects to behaviour. I do not wish to conclude that 
consciousness does not have a role to play in the direct and immediate initiation of (simple) motor 
acts (indeed, I believe it has, and evidence for this will be reviewed below), but it is clear that such a 
framing misses important aspects of what it means for us consciously to do something. To see this, it 
suﬃces to recognise that things like conscious deliberation and choice are usually not explicitly 
related to the execution of motor acts, nor temporally related to these on the scale of milliseconds. 
One response to the results from Libet-style experiments has therefore been to focus instead, e.g. 
on the conscious, explicit choices that participants make about partaking in the experiments, and 
the intent they have formed of following the experimenter’s instructions. For these choices, which 
undeniably are followed by the behaviour thus chosen, no neuroscientific evidence is provided to 
cast doubt on their causal eﬃcacy.  
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In line with this, Gallagher argues that the common framing of the question “does consciousness 
cause behaviour?” in terms of movement initiation and control is misguided, at least when it comes 
to deciding whether something like conscious will is operative in a way that is relevant to freedom 
and responsibility. According to him, the paradigmatic conscious control necessary for the exercise 
of (free) will is not to be found in the moments before or during motor action, but in the 
consciously made decision to do something, i.e. in relation to actions that are intended  (Gallagher 
2006, pp. 117ﬀ). As an example of this alternate way of framing “free will” in terms of consciously 
chosen intentional action, Gallagher compares the lightning fast reaction he might have to a 
something moving in the grass next to his feet (at time T), where he jumps back before having had 
time to realise what he has encountered – behaviour which can be explained wholly through non-
conscious processes –, to the subsequent behaviour he might consciously bring about based on his 
wish to capture what turns out to be a harmless lizard for his collection:  
My next move is not of the same sort [as the initial reflex]. At T+ 5,000 ms, after observing the 
kind of lizard it is, I decide to catch it for my lizard collection. […] At T + 5,150 ms I take a step 
back and reach for [it]. One could focus on this movement and say that at T + 4,650 ms, without 
my awareness, processes in my brain were already underway to prepare for my reaching action, 
before I had even decided to catch the lizard –  therefore, what seemed to be my free decision was 
actually predetermined by my brain. But this ignores the context defined by the larger time frame, 
which involves previous movement and a conscious recognition of the lizard. (Gallagher 2006, p. 
118). 
Gallagher argues that his reaching for the lizard cannot be explained without referring to the 
intention he has of catching it, which in turn refers to his conscious decision to do so and the matrix 
of judgements and goals that surround this decision.  
Considered in the terms of competing explanations that we have used so far, we could certainly 
imagine a revisionist interpretation of the above scenario. However, this would either involve a 
duplication of the proposed causally eﬃcacious conscious entities (e.g. his decision and intention) 
into unconscious ones of comparable function – at which point one would be hard pressed to find a 
reason to choose these hypothesised non-conscious copy-entities over their extant conscious 
originals –, or one would have to provide an explanatorily superior account of Gallagher’s behaviour 
without making any reference to conscious entities or words like ‘reason’, ‘goal’, ‘decision’, etc. 
While this might be possible, the onus is on the revisionist for providing such an explanation. 
Provided that no such explanation is (immediately) forthcoming, we are permitted to conclude that 
the traditional interpretation is the best explanation available. 
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Note also that this does not entail any form of substance dualism: Gallagher’s conscious decision to 
catch the lizard is not some extra entity over and above the workings of his brain. The claim is 
simply this: given the facts of the matter, the observable diﬀerence between his initial withdrawal 
from the lizard and his subsequent reaching for it is best explained by the fact that he in the second 
case has formed the intention to catch the lizard. If there is to be talk of any causal relations in this 
explanation, it must therefore also be between the relevant conscious phenomena and the 
subsequent behaviour. 
In order to bolster the claim that certain actions can only be explained by reference to conscious 
decisions, and to clarify how this supports CEC, we will now turn to Alfred Mele’s work on the role 
of consciously formed intentions to act in understanding conscious behaviour. 
9.2.2 Eﬀective Intentions 
The subtitle is taken from a book by Alfred Mele (2009), who approaches the theme of 
consciousness and free will with the notions of “intention” and “conscious decision”. Mele argues 
that the meaning of these two words are rarely if ever made explicit in research on consciousness 
and behaviour, and that a proper understanding of them in relation to what he terms “practical 
deciding”, i.e. deciding what to do, can throw light on the role played by consciousness with regards 
to action. While Mele’s work as a whole provides a useful framework within which to discuss free 
will from a scientific perspective, the current focus is on his argument for how conscious decisions 
are causally eﬃcacious (Mele 2010). 
As Mele conceives of it, (consciously) deciding to do a thing A is to perform a momentary (mental) 
act of forming the intention to A.48 Importantly, the decision must not be confused with any process 
that might lead up to it, e.g. deliberation about what to do. A decision is thus an “intention-
forming action” (Mele 2010, p. 3), circumscribed as the act itself. There are proximal decisions 
concerned with the immediate performance of some act, and distal decisions that pertain to an act to 
be performed at some future time (and, correspondingly, proximal and distal intentions formed 
through such acts of deciding). 
Proximal decisions are what Libet-style experiments are concerned with (even if the original Libet 
et al. experiments didn’t test decisions, as discussed above), and Mele confesses to taking part in a 
Libet-style experiment where he failed to feel any “urge” to move at all. As a way around this (it 
would arguably be embarrassing if he sat motionless throughout), he devised a way of immediately 
48 More precisely, “an executive assent to a first-person plan of action.”, where “executive assent” is what you do when 
you consciously assent to some suggestion or proposition (Mele 2010, p. 44). 
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deciding to move by silently saying “now!” to himself as the triggering of finger movement by 
conscious choice. Mele argues that there is no way in which consciousness can lag behind such a 
decision: in contrast to conscious awareness of external events – which may only arise some time 
after the external event is already underway49 – the act of silently saying “now!” is not a thing of 
which Mele can become aware after it has already begun; the act of (mentally) saying “now!” just is 
the conscious silent “now!”-saying. Mele vehemently denies any suggestion that he is a substance 
dualist because of this stance, since the conscious speech act of silently saying “now!” undoubtedly is 
the mediate result of a causal process, and not some Cartesian “force of the soul”. But the process 
leading up to the speech act is not the speech act itself, and so whether or not one is aware of this 
process is not at issue: what matters is that the conscious speech act is conscious right from the 
onset (Mele 2010, pp. 5-6).  
The suggestion is that a conscious decision to move can be made in the same manner, i.e. as a 
momentary act that is conscious throughout its (short) lifespan. Indeed, silent “now!”-saying can 
arguably be understood as an imperative “flex now!” (Mele 2010, p. 6), i.e. something like an inner 
vocalisation of the conscious proximal decision to move (now!). Given that Mele hit on this 
particular strategy because no urge or intention to act arose on its own, the conscious decision to 
flex, made explicit in this paradigm by the silent “now!”-saying, directly explains his subsequent 
flexing; he would not have acted otherwise. While it would be possible to provide a revisionist 
(epiphenomenalist) explanation of how Mele’s silent “now!”-saying resulted in him flexing his 
finger, such an explanation would be at an additional disadvantage to the traditional (realist about 
CEC) explanation compared to the example of Gallagher’s intention above, since the revisionist 
here would also need to explain the apparent necessity of a conscious phenomenon for action that at 
the same time is causally ineﬃcacious with regards to that action.  
When considering a specific act performed at a specific time t, there is a further argument to be 
made for the interpretation that the conscious decision to perform the act is causally eﬀective in 
bringing it about: assuming a Libet-style experiment in which subjects are asked explicitly to make a 
decision to flex immediately (as was the case in Pockett and Purdy 2011), and assuming that an 
unconscious proximal decision to flex would be as eﬀective as a conscious proximal decision; for any 
given trial, the subject Sam performs the conscious act of forming the intention to immediately flex 
at time t and goes on to flex immediately at time tf (where an instance tfi  can be taken to follow an 
instance ti by a certain number of milliseconds). Now, for Sam, for any given point in time during 
49 His example is of the Frölich eﬀect, where a moving slit of light is perceived only some distance from the edge at 
which it first appears, never at the edge. 
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the experiment, t1, t2,…, tn, he might perform the momentary conscious act of forming a proximal 
intention to flex, or not. And for any given time Sam does flex, tfi, the act of flexing can be 
explained either by appeal to a non-conscious or to a conscious proximal decision to flex made at 
the corresponding time ti. But, argues Mele, if Sam is good at following instructions, if he does not 
consciously form a proximal intention to flex at t1, it is highly unlikely that he will go on to flex at tf1 
– rather, we would expect that Sam waits until t2 and then consciously forms the proximal intention 
to act at that time, thus flexing his finger at tf2. Given this setup, the fact that Sam acts when he does 
is explained by his conscious proximal decision, and so it seems that this is causally relevant to 
bringing about the flexing of his finger (Mele 2010, pp. 52-3). Thus, even if we grant that there is 
such a thing as a non-conscious decision and that this is as eﬀective in bringing about behaviour as 
conscious decisions appear to be (claims that are not independently argued for by Libet and others 
who can be taken to assume them), it still seems that only the conscious proximal decision can 
explain why action has been perform at a specific time, and not at some other.  
If we yet again consider this a standoﬀ between competing traditional and revisionist interpretations 
of the data, the conscious proximal decision is arguably the most powerful of the competing 
explanatory entities: if it is true that there is such a thing as a causally eﬃcacious conscious proximal 
practical decision, this would explain Sam’s actions in the imagined experimental setup. If, on the 
other hand, no such thing exists, and Sam’s actions are to be explained using something like a 
causally eﬃcacious non-conscious proximal practical decision, it is diﬃcult to understand why such a 
thing should be accompanied by what must then be understood as a causally ineﬃcacious conscious 
proximal practical decision, and apparently necessarily so. The revisionist interpretation suﬀers from 
what appears to be a malicious multiplication of explanatory entities without any gain in explanatory 
power (which makes it less than an ideal contender for a claim of an inference to the best 
explanation). I take this to be evidence for the claim that consciousness is causally eﬃcacious also in 
the immediate initiation of simple motor acts (even if the translation of a conscious decision into 
motor behaviour might be taken care of sub-consciously). 
The point about conscious proximal decisions explaining why action is performed at a specific time 
can also be extended to distal conscious practical decisions, i.e. the momentary formation of an 
intention to perform an act at some specific later time, which is particularly relevant to the 
conception of “conscious will” that Gallagher argued for above. In this regard, Mele points to the 
work done by Peter Gollwitzer on so-called “implementation intentions” (Mele 2010, pp. 54ﬀ). An 
implementation intention is, simply put, a specification of where, when and how some already-set 
goal is to be achieved. Research shows that forming explicit implementation intentions drastically 
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increase the rate of goal attainment for people who are otherwise similarly motivated to attain the 
same goal, e.g. for two groups of women who decide to do a breast self-examination (BSE) 
sometime during the next week: In the control group, who simply decided to perform the BSE at 
some unspecified later time that week, 53% of the women followed up on this intention. In the test 
group, who in addition to this made a written statement specifying where and when they would 
perform the exam, 100% of the women performed the BSE. Similar results were obtained both for 
compliance with an exercise regime (compliance rose from 29 to 91%) and with drug addicts who 
were to write a CV (0 vs. 80%). In parallel with the argument about Sam’s proximal conscious 
decision to act at time ti being the best explanation for why he flexed his finger precisely at tfi, Mele 
argues that the high goal attainment rates of the groups who were told to form explicit 
implementation intentions is best explained simply by reference to the fact that they formed explicit 
implementation intentions. While the recourse to a revisionist explanation through unconscious 
processes is still available, this would now not only have to account for a (by now familiar) 
necessary-but-epiphenomenal entity, here the conscious implementation intention; but would also 
have to provide some non-conscious mechanism which would explain how the non-conscious 
formation of an implementation intention would carry over to aﬀect goal attainment days or even 
weeks later, without relying on the proposed causally eﬀective conscious processes (Mele 2010, p. 
57).  
I am, of course, still relying on a glorified form of intuitive plausibility, but given that the revisionist 
(or illusionist as Mele calls him) has not provided any good reason to doubt the causal eﬃcacy of 
conscious decisions, intuitive plausibility counts towards the conclusion that CEC is true of humans. 
C 
 
These theoretical considerations appear to give strong, independent support for CEC. In keeping 
with the theme of this thesis, we should therefore also ask if there are scientifically studied 
phenomena that the traditional interpretation is uniquely able to explain. To this end, I will 
consider two quite diﬀerent kinds of pathologies that are alike in that they change the relationship 
between conscious and subconscious processes for action control, and thereby reveal what appears to 
be clear evidence in favour of the traditionalist interpretation that consciousness is causally 
eﬃcacious in initiating and controlling action. 
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9.3 Empirical Evidence for CEC 
Among the things Wegner appeals to in his argument to the eﬀect that conscious will cannot be 
what directly causes or initiates action, is the fact that much of what we do – both as (what might 
be called) “everyday experts” navigating the physical and social world with ease, and as real experts 
who perform amazing feats in competitive sport, music and the like – is done without any feeling of 
“willing”, i.e. without direct conscious control over the proceedings (Wegner 2002, pp. 83-4, see 
also Bargh and Chartrand 1999). Indeed, at a certain point, trying to retain explicit control over the 
execution of bodily movement will only serve to worsen performance, as evinced by pro baseball 
players who suddenly “forget” how to throw a ball when self-consciousness imposes itself on the 
otherwise smoothly unfolding action program that constitutes a skilled throw (what in sports is 
known as “choking”, Demak 1991). But while these considerations can perhaps be taken as support 
for the revisionist interpretation if coupled with more stringent arguments for this, it is certainly 
also possible to give them a traditionalist spin, e.g. if we, keeping in mind Gallagher’s argument 
above, focus on the amount of training that has gone into achieving a level of expertise where 
complex feats can be performed without direct conscious control (or, simply, remark that 
consciousness does something to action if it can disrupt it).  
That training, as opposed to (some forms of) skilled execution, involves direct conscious control is 
here (yet again) taken as prima facie plausible fact, and while I have yet to see a convincing argument 
against this, it behoves the traditionalist interpretation to produce some additional, empirical 
evidence for CEC. However, instead of trying to substantiate the possible role of consciousness in 
practice and training (what I imagine to be a complex endeavour, considering the myriad 
possibilities for revisionist objections), I will focus instead on two quite distinct pathologies where 
consciousness appears beyond doubt to be directly responsible for action initiation and control. 
9.4 The Role of Consciousness in Deaﬀerentation 
As with so many of our bodies’ amazing yet transparent abilities, the importance of subconscious 
motor control is perhaps only evident when something goes amiss. Persons having suﬀered 
complete deaﬀerentation provide one grimly fascinating example of this. The most famous case of 
deaﬀerentation is that of Ian Waterman, known in the literature as “IW”, who at the age of 19, 
after what probably was an autoimmune reaction, lost all his peripheral sensory nerves below the 
neck (Cole 1995). IW was not paralyzed in the traditional sense, since all nerves going from the 
brain out to muscles were still intact, but without any “proprioceptive feedback” providing him with 
information about the location and movement of his torso and limbs, he was unable to control any 
movement. Initially slumped in a chair or lying secured on a bed with complete lack of control over 
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his body, IW followed a rigorous training regime (of his own making) in which he would endlessly 
repeat diﬀerent component of movements, gradually building up mastery of his body by checking 
visually the eﬀects of a given eﬀort to move, and then modulating the eﬀort based on the eﬀect he 
could see. IW has in eﬀect created an external, visually based feedback loop to make up for the loss 
of feedback from proprioception (McNeill, Quaeghebeur, and Duncan 2010). 
Of course, even if the deficit can be made up for by consciously attending in this way, it is still a 
tremendously disabling condition because of the sheer amount of waking consciousness that has to 
be dedicated to monitoring movement (IW’s life is, as the title of Cole’s book reflects, “a daily 
marathon”). And so, by the misfortune of others, the blessing that is subconscious motor control is 
evident for the rest of us: we are able to think, talk, and generally multitask while our bodies take 
care of themselves; we only have to specify where we want to go, and we will usually know how to 
get there without having to think of how to move our legs. In other words, in the normal situation, 
most of our voluntary movements are directly executed and modulated or controlled by 
subconscious processes. Therefore, even if we do not find direct, conscious control over such 
movements in healthy subjects, we should not be surprised: this is not where conscious control is 
usually exercised. Seen this way, the case of IW seems to point directly to the causal eﬃcacy of 
consciousness, namely in the successful substitution that takes place between subconscious and 
explicitly conscious control processes.  
9.4.1 An Objection from Epiphenomenalism about Visual Consciousness, Refuted by the 
Example of Blindsight 
The revisionist advocate might object to this presentation, and argue that it is not consciousness or 
conscious attention per se that allows deaﬀerentated subjects like IW to guide their movements, but 
rather the visual feedback loop itself, regardless of any conscious awareness of what enters into it. 
The accompanying phenomenology, the revisionist could argue, is no more causally eﬀective here 
than in the experience of conscious will; accurate movement simply depends on information being 
passed through the visual system, and because the visual system and consciousness are so closely 
related, this particular (epiphenomenal) phenomenology naturally accompanies it.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the idea that visual information guides action independently of any 
consciousness of that information appears to be borne out in part by one widely influential view of 
higher order visual processing in the brain, the two-streams hypothesis (Goodale and Milner 1992, 
Milner and Goodale 2006). According to the two-stream hypothesis, visual information is 
processed in two functionally independent and anatomically distinct “streams”, the dorsal and 
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ventral streams. Crudely put, the ventral stream is the “what”-stream, tasked with object recognition 
and other elements of vision that contribute directly to our conscious experience of seeing (i.e. 
“perception”). The dorsal stream, on the other hand, is the “how”-stream, responsible for 
interpreting visual stimuli geared towards action, e.g. providing visual information to the 
subconscious processes that modulate posture and movement in relation to the environment. There 
is also empirical evidence for a double dissociation between the two streams: It has been shown 1) 
that visual information can successfully guide a subject’s action towards an object that the subject in 
question is unable to identify visually due to lesions on the ventral stream. This is complemented 2) 
by the finding that subjects, due to damage to the dorsal stream, may be unable to act towards an 
object that is clearly visible and that they can successfully identified (Milner and Goodale 2006). 
One might therefore imagine the revisionist finding support for his interpretation by claiming that 
the substitution of visual for proprioceptive feedback in IW happens entirely through the non-
conscious processing of visual information in the dorsal stream. And because IW has normal vision, 
any visual input will also be processed in the ventral stream, thus giving rise to the conscious visual 
experience, which on the revisionist interpretation is epiphenomenal (with regard to action).  
However, the revisionist is not thus supported by the two-streams hypothesis: even if the two 
streams may be functionally and pathologically dissociable, they are not dissociated in the normal, 
non-pathological case. So it does not make good sense to say that IW is either consciously or 
subconsciously using the visual information to help control the movement of his limbs: as long as 
his vision and higher order visual processing is normal, he is engaged in both at the same time, and 
could not will to do otherwise.50 Furthermore, there are also questions as to whether the two 
streams really are functionally independent, or if the diﬀerences found are better explained by a 
relative functional specialisation of associated brain areas (Schenk and McIntosh 2009). In that 
case, the potential support for the revisionist interpretation would be further weakened. 
The revisionist might object again: there are cases where people have lost either one or both of their 
primary visual cortices (V1), people who appear to be partially or completely blind, who can still act 
on visual information present in their blind field – what is known in the literature as “blindsight”. 
Do these cases not show that subconscious processes are self-suﬃcient for action initiation and 
control, and that consciousness is unnecessary? The revisionist might here point, e.g. to patient TN, 
who after a stroke destroying his entire V1 normally relies on a white cane to get around. However, 
in the hands of Beatrice de Gelder and Lawrence Weisenkrantz (the latter of whom coined the 
50 For a recent review of the complex interactions and top-down eﬀects of the visual processing system, see (Gilbert and 
Li 2013). 
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term “blindsight”, seeWeiskrantz et al. 1974), TN could easily navigate an obstacle-strewn hallway 
without any aid – and without having any reportable awareness either of the obstacles or his deft 
avoidance of them (de Gelder 2010).51 
While this remarkable feat does indicate that the relationship between awareness of visual 
information and the ability to utilize visual information for action is more complex than we might 
previously have thought, it still does not supply the revisionist with the kind of support he needs; 
blindsight actually provides an excellent counterexample to the epiphenomenalist view of 
consciousness in action, since, as Antti Revonsuo notes: 
 [...] the patients cannot really use the nonconscious information to any useful purpose in their 
deliberate behaviour or decision making. They do not know directly about the existence of that 
information, thus they do not see or recognize the stimuli as far as they are concerned, and their 
behaviour in everyday situations is as helpless as that of a person who has neither the conscious nor the 
nonconscious information available! (Revonsuo 2010, p. 130, emphasis mine) 
Similarly, de Gelder notes of her patient TN: 
[…] TN views himself as a blind person, and he will remain totally dependent on his white cane 
until he is convinced he can see without knowing it. (de Gelder 2010) 
In other words, “blindsight” only appears as a phenomenon in the force-choice situation of the 
laboratory setting, and here the experimenter and her accomplices eﬀectively supply the conscious 
planning and prompting necessary to complete action. The visual information is “there” – probably 
mediated by small structure known as the superior colliculus (SC, de Gelder 2010) – but without 
entering consciousness, it might as well not have been, since the person concerned cannot choose to 
act on it. Outside of the laboratory, people with blindsight are, to all intents and purposes, simply 
blind (or blind in part of their visual field). 
The comment de Gelder makes about convincing TN that he can “see” without conscious awareness 
of that which he sees is also interesting in this respect: de Gelder hopes that training blindsighted 
subjects like TN in relying on their subconsciously present visual information might aid them in 
navigating everyday situations. The fact that TN must be convinced, i.e. be persuaded to consciously 
embrace a belief in his own, subconscious powers of vision for this to be of any use to him, is a 
striking example of the role of consciousness in turning information into action. 
51 There is a video of this available at the Scientific American Observation blog web pages, attached to the article 
“Blindsight: Seeing without knowing it” (Collins 2010). There is a video of this available at the Scientific American 
Observation blog web pages, attached to the article “Blindsight: Seeing without knowing it” (Collins 2010). 
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While this does not prove the causal eﬃcacy of consciousness beyond any sceptical 
epiphenomenalist doubt, it does make the revisionist interpretation even more contorted, since the 
de facto blindness of blindsighted subjects means that the revisionist must account for a 
consciousness to which (visual) information necessarily must be presented in order for it to initiate 
action52, but which has no (direct) causal influence on the action thus initiated. The traditional 
interpretation of the data has no such problems, and can easily incorporate the dual findings of the 
power of subconscious processes in guiding what at some level or point must be consciously chosen 
action. 
C 
 
Overall, I take the above theoretical considerations and empirical evidence to provide strong support 
for the traditional interpretation that CEC is true of humans. There remains, to my knowledge, but 
one possible objection from the revisionist before I can conclude the argument of this thesis. 
9.5 The Objection from Temporal Priority Again… 
Granted that my argument thus far is successful in establishing a causally eﬃcacious role for 
consciousness with regard to action, the revisionist might still make a more fundamental objection 
to the claim that humans have something like the empirical free will we are discussing here. The 
objection goes something like this: 
Even if consciousness is causally eﬀective with regard to behaviour, e.g. when we consciously decide 
to do something, and even if RP is not the “real cause” of voluntary actions, conscious decisions are 
nevertheless the result of preceding neuronal activity. Thus, consciousness in the role of making 
decisions can only be seen as the mediate cause of behaviour, i.e. a part of a causal chain. And in this 
causal chain, the arrow of causation still goes from sub- or non-conscious to conscious processes 
(even as it might go on to behaviour from there).  In other words, even with the expanded time 
frame as argued for above, consciousness still always “comes too late” to fulfil the role ascribed to it 
in traditional or commonsense conceptions of free will, because it is not the first this in a chain of 
events. 
The objection is nevertheless easily refuted, since as long as consciousness is granted causal eﬃcacy – 
whether it is as mediate, immediate or some other kind of cause – CEC is true, and the empirical 
52 Or, as Gelder suggests, the lack of such direct availability may be made up for by training oneself to consciously rely 
on non-conscious information. 
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denial of free will by way of arguing for epiphenomenalism has failed. If there is a lingering feeling 
of unease with this resolution, I think I know the source: Admitting that our conscious decision to 
move is (merely) a mediate and not an ultimate cause activates underlying incompatibilist intuitions, 
as discussed in Part I. However, as we also saw in Part I, this appeal to ultimate causes is not 
straightforwardly relevant to the question of whether or not we have free will; specifically, there is 
no reason to accept the claim that having free will necessarily entails being the (conscious) ultimate 
cause of one’s actions. 
Another way of approaching the objection from temporal priority is to say that it simply does not 
make sense to claim that consciousness “comes too late” due to preceding brain activity: the brain is 
continually active (unless one is brain-dead), and, still barring substance dualism, consciousness is 
somehow part or an aspect of this constant activity. We can thus always find brain activity 
preceding a conscious phenomenon if that is what we are looking for, but given that no one has 
found a “neural correlate” for consciousness, nor even an unequivocal correlation between patterns 
of neuronal firing and a single conscious event (to the extent that such an event can be meaningfully 
isolated from the stream of events), this only amounts to a futile exercise in generating ever new, 
ever question begging statements of correlation.  
Finally, the entire worry from epiphenomenalism due to temporal sequence reveals a strong bias 
towards thinking of consciousness and behaviour in terms of linear causality, and it is worth, as a 
final side-note, to question whether this is suitable for describing the constant, often circular activity 
of the human organism with its brain and attendant consciousness. 
9.5.1 … And a Short, Additional Reply Using Circular Causality 
Walter J. Freeman (2006)53 argues that linear causality, while useful for describing technological 
relations and as shorthand for the workings of medical interventions, is too blunt a theoretical tool 
to be used to understand the complex, nonlinear interactions of our brain and mind. While we 
might describe the operation of a machine, or even certain kinds of human behaviour at a 
suﬃciently abstract and circumscribed level using clearly defined “start” and “stop” points; stimulus 
and response conditions, this is inappropriate when considering the human organism as it is, 
constantly active and constantly interacting with its environment. Freeman is (an early) member of 
a gradually rising number of thinkers on cognition, perception and behaviour who apply the 
mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory (DST) in order to model complicated 
53 The III, son of the (in)famous physician Walter J. Freeman II, who is known for popularising (and avidly performing) 
a simplified procedure for lobotomy. 
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cognitive/neural systems. With roots in John Dewey (1914) and Maurice Merleau Ponty (1961), 
and importantly developed by James Gibson (1979), contemporary scientist and philosophers like 
Hermann Haken, J. A. Scott Kelso and H. Bunz (“HKB”, 1985); Michael Turvey (1990); Andy 
Clark (1998); Tony Chemero (2009) and Michael Silberstein (Chemero and Silberstein 2011) (to 
name but a few); argue for the view that the human organism and its environment – or rather, the 
“niche” created by the mutual interactions of an organism with specific demands and abilities and 
the environment that both shapes and is shaped by this organism –  must be understood as a 
complex whole, a system dominated by interactions characterised by the dizzying fact that each 
“part” always both changes and is changed. This also means that no component can be singled out 
as uniquely changing, and another as being changed: influences are reciprocal and non-linear. 
While this can give rise to (apparent) complete chaos (which is why one also talks of “chaos 
theory”), such systems can also (spontaneously) organise into (temporarily) table patterns, out of 
which can emerge new (higher order or “emergent”) properties that arguably only belong to the 
system as a whole. Using DST, the state of the system as it develops over time is described as 
moving through a “state space” of possible configurations, with “attractors” arising out of the chaos 
to ensnare, more or less temporarily, the changes through which the systems moves over time – 
reducing, but not to unity, the set of configurations within which the system is likely to develop, so 
that properties may arise with temporary stability without the system ever returning to the exact 
same configuration. 
All this is terribly exotic compared to the trusty old conceptual framework supplied by linear 
causality, but has arisen as a direct reaction to the failures of the traditional mind-set to provide 
convincing models for understanding the mind, brain, organism and environment as these 
(undeniably) interact in the real-world case of living, breathing, thinking, feeling, acting, and 
perceiving human beings (and other organisms). The upshot of this is that there is no room in this 
picture for the worry from temporal priority: the mind is continually active and developing, and 
nothing can be singled out from the mutually and non-linearly interacting elements that can be said 
to be the “real cause” of some phenomenon like a conscious decision. As Freeman suggests, we may, 
for some applications, speak of causality in a more traditional sense, e.g. to say that a certain virus 
causes a certain disease, but only if we are aware of the fact that this kind of “linear” causality is a 
heuristically identified set of interactions within a larger set that is essentially circular. 
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10 Concluding Remarks 
“Thus, neuroscience might enable us to develop a more sophisticated view of responsibility that 
takes into account both the cognitive demands and the control demands made by intuitive and 
legal notions of responsibility, and reconciles them with a scientiﬁcally informed view of the brain 
as a physical system that governs our actions. This could result in a compatibilist theory of moral 
responsibility that is not predicated on paradoxical views of absence of causation or freedom from 
causal laws.” Adina Roskies (2006a) 
If my argument as presented here is granted, I take it to oﬀer solid grounds on which to conclude 
that neuroscience has not settled the question of whether or not humans have anything like free 
will. Furthermore, and going beyond this purely negative claim: in light of the evidence presented, 
there is little doubt that consciousness is causally eﬃcacious in bringing about behaviour. If, as 
suggested, i.a. by Shaun Gallagher, the empirical question of free will is about the way we 
consciously choose to act, and if the notion of “conscious will” as an empirical stand-in for “free 
will” is cashed out in terms of something like Mele’s “conscious decision”; I also take my argument 
to have provided good reason to be a realist about this kind of free will.  
To addend one last conditional, and therewith to tie together the two parts of this thesis: if “this 
kind” of free will – i.e. the causal eﬃcacy of conscious choice unhampered by a fundamental 
incompatibility between freedom of choice and the physical world – is what our notions of freedom 
and responsibility need for their justification (if indeed any such justification is needed beyond the 
actuality of our reactive attitudes), then I also believe that my argument supports a cautiously 
positive reply to the question “do humans have free will?” 
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